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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This research is about administrative and political decentralisation processes, 
especially the efforts made by the Chilean state towards regional decentralisation. Thus the 
analysis is focused on two reforms: the creation of the Division of Planning and 
Development within the regional government and the direct election of regional 
councillors, which aims to reorganise the regional governments. Qualitative research and 
instrumental case study approach were used in order to develop this research. 
The research addresses three main topics: the understanding of decentralisation that 
key actors have, so that the agency according to that understanding; the scopes of the two 
reforms so far; and the relationship between the central state and the regions. Thus, the 
main findings are that Chilean decentralisation has been implemented with excessive 
caution and gradualism and that informal relations between key actors are essential in the 
creation of collaborative spaces. The research also discusses whether decentralisation is a 
process or a sequence of isolated events in Chile. Finally, the tension between 
administrative and political decentralisation is analysed in order to have a better 
understanding of both processes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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‘If we can unite a sense of the other with 
a sense for the other it becomes possible to do 
research with people and for people rather than 
just on people. And if we can make these 
connections it becomes more likely that we will 
be able to redirect our future research in order 
to engage with a truly moral human geography 
which seeks to contribute to a more just and 
equal society’  
(Cloke et al, 2004 p374) 
 
 
One thing that I have struggled with for a long time is how our contributions to 
knowledge can be brought down to society, how we can link our research with the people 
researched in the sense that sometimes academics seem to be alienated from the ‘real 
world’ and also the ‘real world’ is indifferent to academic knowledge and debates. 
Although many topics may be directly applied to reality such as urbanism, politics and 
other sub disciplines of geography, it seems to me that the words of Cloke et al (above) 
show there is a missing link between research and people, and remind us that the ultimate 
aim of research is to contribute to a better society. Therefore, being a researcher entails the 
responsibility not just over the research that we conduct, but also towards the society in 
which we live.  
Another important issue for me has been how our understanding of the world 
changes over time and from the perspective of thinkers. The different interpretations that a 
fact can have in this postmodern era emphasises that there is no one truth, but different 
perspectives of a truth that we cannot see completely. The construction of knowledge never 
happens in one day; it is a continuum of questions and answers, and more questions – or 
the same questions with different connotations – and new answers to the same old 
questions. So, there are no ‘revelations’ but a constant evolution of thoughts, like a spiral. 
The above has motivated me to conduct this research. On the one hand, there was the 
need to be integrated - not isolated - from the society, in which I work as a bridge - or an 
interpreter - between the two worlds of academia and the public apparatus. On the other 
hand, the existence of different perspectives of a certain topic - all valid –, boosted the 
need to seek new ways to understand decentralisation. 
The reasons to choose Chile as a case study are many, but the two principal ones 
were first of all my personal attachment to the country and secondly, the significance of the 
case. From a personal perspective, I have the advantage of knowing the case from inside – 
as Chilean and as a former public servant, which allowed me to have a better and wider 
understanding of the subject - due to my knowledge of the Chilean historical background, 
economic and political system, and legal framework - and also gave me the empirical 
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advantage of having access to key documents and actors of the decentralisation process. 
Secondly, the significance of the case as the centralist and authoritarian history of Chile 
and the implementation of neoliberalism as the shaper or the re-shaper of Chilean 
economy, Constitution, state and culture since the middle 1970s, gives unique and 
fascinating conditions in which to analyse political decentralisation. In the following pages 
these elements will be explored in order to contextualise the efforts towards 
decentralisation in a country bound to a highly centralist culture. 
 
CONTEXTUALISING DECENTRALISATION IN TIME AND SPACE 
 
Decentralisation has changed over time, having different emphases and meanings 
through history. The last trend of decentralisation in the West emerged as a response to the 
crisis of the Welfare state1 in the late 20th Century, when it was seen as a means to improve 
the provision of public services: on the one hand through the privatisation of some of these, 
such as water, electricity, education and health; and, on the other hand, through territorial 
decentralisation, where subnational governments could respond directly to the needs of the 
people (Rondinelli, 1989). Although decentralisation has been a trend since the 1950s, it 
was not until the 1970s that decentralising measures towards the improvement of the 
provision of public services and the achievement of greater economic development were 
spread widely across the world (Conyers, 1983, 1984), promoted by international agencies, 
such as the United Nations and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and supported by central governments in different countries (e.g. Rondinelli 
1983 on Asia and Conyers 1983 on Africa). Despite its popularity, the issue of 
decentralisation’s applicability was raised by Rondinelli (1981), who stated that 
decentralisation was a concept developed in Western countries within a Western culture, 
which may not be totally applicable to developing countries. Because of that, 
decentralisation models applied across the world might not generate the same outcomes as 
in the West. The consideration of different cultures and economic and socio-political 
conditions is still very important during the application of decentralisation as non-western 
countries often operate on a different logic: e.g. countries with a high level of corruption 
could increase that problem through decentralisation owing to less control from central 
government over local authorities. 
In the 1980s the discussion was about what decentralisation was and how it had to be 
applied. There was a wide debate around what decentralisation meant, whether it entailed 
                                                 
1 Social system created in the 1930s whereby the State assumes responsibility to ensure a basic standard of 
welfare to all its citizens (the dictionary of Human Geography, 2009, p807-808).  
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just deconcentration or also devolution (see Rondinelli 1981, 1983; Conyers, 1984, 1986), 
in which deconcentration was understood as a transfer of functions and devolution as a 
transfer of power (Seely 2001 p501); in other words, where would decisions be made: at 
the national or the subnational level?  
At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, different kinds of decentralisation were 
recognised and analysed, such as administrative decentralisation, political decentralisation 
and economic decentralisation (Von Haldenwang, 1990). Von Haldenwang (1990) 
understood decentralisation as an instrument for the stabilisation of a political system in 
crisis (p61), and explained that decentralisation had turned into a fashion in Latin 
American (p61; also De Mattos, 1989); he also exposed the lack of clarity about what 
decentralisation meant or did from a political point of view. In addition, sceptical and 
critical points of view regarding decentralisation were raised as more literature from Latin 
America was published e.g. De Mattos, 1989 and Arocena, 1989. The key point for them 
was that a political and administrative reform of the state alone is not enough to achieve 
decentralisation and development; a thick well-developed civil society, is needed as well. 
This showed how Latin American governments were interpreting political decentralisation, 
reducing it to a state reform. Moreover, during the late 1990s and early 2000s there was an 
increasing worldwide concern in the literature about the potential dangers arising from 
decentralisation, such as corruption, the presence of caudillismo2, the power of 
multinational enterprises and the vulnerability of local interests, among others e.g. 
Prud’homme, 1995, Bardhan, 2002 and Fisman and Gatti, 2002.  
 
Decentralisation is a global trend as observed above, generated by different 
motivations; it is related to feelings of identity and belonging, to the global market and 
neoliberalism, and to the reorganisation of the state among others. Decentralisation has 
been promoted by different sectors of society from all colours of the political spectrum, 
central and subnational governments and minorities. Over the last 30 years the demand for 
greater transference of authority and resources towards subnational tiers of the government 
has increased (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003); decentralisation has been gaining adepts 
to the point where it is fashionable nowadays. In the 1980s decentralisation was seen as a 
                                                 
2 The phenomenon in Latin America called caudillismo, by which a government is controlled by leaders 
whose power typically rests on some combination of force and personal charisma (caudillos) 
http://www.britannica.com/facts/5/201167/caudillism-as-discussed-in-personalismo-Latin-American-politics 
(February 2011) 
In Latin America Federal nations with less-developed party systems frequently gain some of the same 
decentralizing effects through what the Latin Americans call caudillismo—in which power is diffused among 
strong local leaders operating in the constituent polities. Caudillistic noncentralisation apparently exists also 
in Nigeria and Malaysia (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/100367/caudillism) (February 2011) 
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radical idea but now it is seen as a natural practice (Burns et al, 1994). Furthermore, 
according to Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010), “the trend towards decentralisation has 
been relentless and widespread among most large countries in the world, regardless of their 
level of development” (p621) and nowadays countries are devolving political, fiscal and 
administrative powers to subnational levels.  
There are different degrees of decentralisation, Keating (1998) identifies four, from 
the weakest to the strongest: functional decentralisation, which is the establishment of 
some agencies with specific tasks at the regional level in response to specific needs; 
regional institutionalisation, where key institutions – e.g. central state, local governments, 
unions, private sector - have a defined role in order to achieve a common goal, such as 
regional planning; regional administration, which is a deconcentrated subnational body of 
the central government; and regional government, which is an autonomous elected political 
body with its own functions and powers. Different forms of decentralisation around Europe 
have been identified, such as federalist governments (Germany, Austria and Switzerland) - 
in which each level has a clear sphere of competences, constitutional power’s distribution 
and the relationship between levels is not hierarchical - and regional devolution - in which 
the central state transfers some functions to subnational governments, but the relationship 
between levels is hierarchical (Keating, 1998). The latter can be found in France, Poland 
and Italy, which presents different limited regionalisation with delimitation of competences 
and overriding power from the central state. In addition, some countries grant equal 
functions and powers to each region, which is called symmetrical devolution – e.g. France 
and Germany. On the other hand, asymmetric decentralisation – e.g. UK, Spain and 
Portugal - means that regions have different functions, powers and degrees of autonomy 
(Keating, 1998; Mackinnon et al, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). Also, 
transition countries in Eastern Europe and central Asia, and low and middle-income 
countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America are applying decentralised measures 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010).  
 
THE LONE STAR 
 
Since the outset of the Republic3 there has been tension between Santiago – the 
capital - and the regions, but the unitary and centralist state has always prevailed. The lone 
star, as the star of the Chilean flag is known, represents the state, which alone in the sky 
                                                 
3 Chile’s independence process ended in February 1818 with the Oath of Declaration of Independence. The 
republican history of Chile started in 1810 with the establishment of the First Chilean Government 
Committee - which governed in the name of the king of Spain while he was prisoner of Napoleon - until 
nowadays (Villalobos, 1993). 
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concentrates the power and keeps vigil over the nation. A star that illuminates the country 
and guides the destiny of its inhabitants; thus, the Chilean state has traditionally been seen 
as the father that takes care of his children.  
The process of independence of Chile and its first steps towards the republican state 
were led by the mercantile and monopolist oligarchy, with the main purpose of transferring 
the colonial monopoly market from Spain to the economic elites based in Santiago and 
Valparaíso (Salazar and Pinto, 2012). Thus, the centralist elites sought political power in 
order to replace Spain as the main agent in the external trade of the colonies and to open 
trade with other countries4. In order to do this, the Chilean state was constructed with the 
idea of a strong, conservative and centralised state, also called the Portalian state, in 
honour of its creator and main articulator Diego Portales5 (Villalobos, 1993 and 2000; 
Mires, 2012; Salazar and Pinto 2012).  
Despite the above, there have always been core-periphery tensions between the 
central and the subnational levels. The following quote reflects the tension produced by the 
centralism in 1826, which shows how this has been an issue since the very beginning of the 
republican history of the Chilean state. The quote comes from a speech given in the 
national Congress by Manuel Antonio González, a representative of Coquimbo Province in 
18266. 
 
‘Para mitigar el odio a la monarquía, se nos dice que tratan de constituir una república; pero 
la centralidad está en contra de ese nombre lisonjero… Si el objeto de la unidad centralizada es 
hacer un gobierno robusto, fuerte, capaz de aniquilar media nación en un momento, ¿quien 
destruye ese coloso cuando quiere perpetuarse? República es aquella en que los pueblos, mirando 
su propio interés, protegen el todo de la asociación; pero si el bien i el mal les han de venir 
precisamente del centro, los pueblos no son otra cosa que instrumentos de la tiranía… En el sistema 
central, sólo los aduladores de la Corte tienen colocación en los empleos, i a éstos se les da como 
de obsequio el mando de una provincia, que comúnmente sacrifican a su ambición’ 
 
 ‘To mitigate the hatred of monarchy, we are told that they attempt to form a republic, but 
the centrality is against this flattering name… if the object of the centralised unit is to make a 
robust and strong government, capable of annihilating half nation in a moment, who destroys this 
colossus when it wants perpetuate itself? Republic is one in which the people, looking out for their 
                                                 
4 The support of the British crown was essential in this matter; it not only helped economically Chile’s 
independence, but also sent the British Royal Navy in order to help the new Republic to consolidate its 
internal power (Salazar and Pinto, 2012). 
5 Diego Portales was a statesman and entrepreneur, who lay the foundations of the Chilean state and was the 
main author of the constitution of 1833 – which was valid until 1925. 
6 Originally, the political-administrative division of Chile was in provinces, which were led by a city. E.g. 
Valdivia, Concepción, Valparaíso, Coquimbo, etc.  
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own interests, protect the whole of the association, but if the good and the evil they have come 
precisely from the centre, the people are nothing but instrument of tyranny… In the centralist 
system, only the flatterers of the court set the jobs, and the command of a province is given to them 
as a gift, which is commonly sacrificed to their ambition’7 
 
González made two significant points in this quote: the first one is related to the 
exchange of the Spanish crown for a centralist state, the second one, related to the perils of 
appointing people to key positions in the provinces. González argued that centralism is 
another form of tyranny and that is against the idea of a republic. Thus, the provinces felt 
used in order to achieve the independence of the country, not for them but for the 
Santiaguine elites. The second point made by González is that provincial authorities -
appointed by the central government – were not engaged with the welfare of the territories 
they ruled, but focused on their own ambitions. 
This quote is far from being obsolete; the issues posed by González are still valid.  
Nowadays, the regions (former provinces) are still discontented with the central state, 
claiming more autonomy in decision-making, highlighting the dangers of having political 
authorities that are not from the territory they are ruling and railing against the excessive 
centralism of Santiago. 
The development of the state centralism has kept pace with the curtailment of 
subnational sovereignty (Salazar and Pinto, 2012). The republican history of Chile has 
been characterised by the continuous disarticulation of the republican culture of cities and 
villages inherited from Spain, disarticulation that after two centuries has as a consequence 
the civic poverty of the local citizen (p267). The power struggles between the capital and 
the rest of the territory had resulted in the development of stronger centralism in Santiago 
in order to keep control over the regions, which in turn, has resulted in the current 
antagonism between Santiago and the regions. The centralism of the state has been 
questioned mainly because of the state’s inabilities to reach all the territory and to respond 
properly to specific people’s needs, such as those in the inaccessible areas in the far north 
(altiplano) and the far south (Patagonia).  
The outset of Chilean centralism is related to economic power, as it was used by the 
oligarchy as the way to control the mercantile economy during the 19th century. Chile was 
born capitalist; on the one hand, the Spanish neomercantilism had been applied all over its 
colonies during the 18th and 19th century, and on the other hand, economic liberalism 
predominated since the second half of the 19th century (Gárate, 2012) – the latter under the 
                                                 
7 Salazar and Pinto, 2012 p272 
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guide of British economic interests8. Regarding Salazar and Pinto (2012) the main purpose 
of the national elites was to have a strong central state in order to monopolise the external 
trade, giving less or no importance to the internal economy. During the second half of the 
19th century the provincial elites were included in the political parties and integrated to the 
national economy, which assured their support for the central government and the 
suppression of provincial resistance. Salazar and Pinto (2012) explain that those provincial 
elites slowly migrated to Santiago and adopted the same lifestyle and dominance as the 
traditional Santiaguine elites. They argue that the expansion of the political elite produced 
a widening of the territorial control of the mercantile oligarchy, disrupting the unity of the 
local community in the provinces. Thus, the economic and political power was centralised 
in Santiago during the first century of the Chilean republic.  
Through out Republican history the hegemony of Santiago has been questioned by 
subnational elites that wanted more participation in political decision-making. Examples of 
this are the insurrections of Coquimbo, Concepción and Valdivia during the 19th century 
(Villalobos, 1993 and 2000; Salazar and Pinto, 2012). The civil war of 1891 – also called 
‘the revolution of 91’9 – during Balmaceda’s government (Villalobos, 1993 and 2000) was 
not directly related to the tensions produced by centralism, but to the confrontation of two 
groups from the same oligarchy: one parliamentarian10 and the other presidential 
(Villalobos, 1993). Although the main issue was about economic reforms and political 
power (Villalobos 1993), these two groups held differences regarding the implementation 
of a decentralising project. Balmaceda’s proposal included to replace the Constitution in 
order to make the new one less authoritarian, therefore the government regimen would be 
more representative and it could act through a decentralised administration. On the other 
hand, the parliamentarians’ proposal was not structural; they proposed less radical changes 
related to the electoral system in order to diminish the electoral centralism, in other words, 
they sought the arrangement of the political parties around the Executive (Salazar and 
Pinto, 2012). At the end of the conflict President Balmaceda committed suicide and with 
him died the last attempt towards decentralisation until the second half of the 20th century. 
During the 20th century, the Chilean state continues with its centralist practices and 
increasing them to the point of being accused of being hyper-centralist since the 1950s by 
its detractors, mainly from the communal level, as the state had interfered in their budgets 
and decision-making (Salazar and Pinto, 2012). Several attempts to reorganise the country 
were made during the second half of the 20th century, such as the CORFO and 
                                                 
8 During the 19th century Britain had many economic interests in the former Spanish colonies, mainly in 
mining and trade (guano and nitrate). 
9 La Revolución del ‘91 
10 Supported by British economic interests in the northern mining 
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ODEPLAN11 proposals’. Finally, a process called ‘regionalisation’ - a political-
administrative reform implemented under Pinochet’s regime - started in the 1970s, aimed 
at a more efficient structure of the national state. Thus, the country was divided into new 
regions, provinces and communes in which each of the sublevels was hierarchically tied to 
its upper level and had authorities appointed by the central government (see chapter IV for 
further details). 
It seems paradoxical – or at least curious – that the most systematic and successful 
policies towards decentralisation started under the longest and harshest dictatorship that 
Chile has experienced and also the most hyper-centralised government in its history. 
Salazar and Pinto (2012) argue that the ‘regionalisation’ and the ‘municipalisation’ – the 
process to devolve some functions to the communal level, such as education – were 
consequences of a market logic and part of the capitalist restructuration of the country (see 
also De Mattos, 1989); therefore it is a reform that stems from the implementation of 
neoliberalism and not from the need of better representation and governance. Thus, it is not 
paradoxical but logical that the early administrative decentralisation was implemented by a 
government eager to transform the economic and political system of the country (see 
chapter IV). 
There were no further steps towards decentralisation during the dictatorship, and the 
next milestone was the achievement of full communal autonomy in 1992, after the return 
of democracy. Although there have been many important steps to increase regional 
decentralisation – such as the creation of regional governments in 1993 and the creation of 
the Regional Council in 1997 - the regional level is still tied to the central level politically 
and economically and the lone star continues its vigil over the country (see chapter IV for 
further details). 
 
TERRITORIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT OF CHILE 
 
Chile is a long and narrow country - 4329 kms. long and 180 kms. wide on average 
- located on the west coast of South America between 17º30’ LS and 56º30’ LS12. Due to 
its shape, it can be divided in five macro zones: Big North (Atacama desert), Small North, 
Central Zone, South and Patagonia, reflecting their respective variety of climates and 
biodiversity. As a consequence, Chile possesses multiple resources such as minerals, 
forestry, agricultural products and fish, among others, and bases its economy on the 
exploitation and exportation of them in raw and processed forms. 
                                                 
11 CORFO: Chilean Economic Development Agency / ODEPLAN: National Office of Planning  
12 This description can be only applied to Continental Chile, without Antarctic and insular territory  
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Fig 1-1: Localisation of Chile13 
 
 
The Chilean economy is based mainly on copper exportation followed by forestry 
and primary products (OCDE, 2009). Despite that, its strategy over the last 30 years has 
been to diversify both production and target market. Thus Chile has become known for its 
fruits, wine, fishmeal and cellulose among other products all over America, Asia and 
Europe, with which Chile had signed many Free Trade Agreements. Also, Chile has been 
diversifying its economy promoting industry, mainly based on primary goods, and services 
(ibid). Over the past three decades Chile has achieved economic growth due to solid 
macroeconomic management and a stable regulatory framework (ibid).  
 
Chile is known worldwide for being one of the most stable and prosperous 
countries of South America; characteristics such as the GDP per capita, the quality of life 
index, the human development index, a low perception of corruption and steadier 
economic growth allowed Chile to join the OCDE in 2010. Despite its national prosperity, 
                                                 
13 Map elaborated by Mike Shand, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow. 
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Chile faces huge problems of inequality of wealth proven by the gini index of 0.501 
(OCDE, 2011). 
According to the Census of 2002 Chile has 15,116,435 inhabitants, who are mainly 
concentrated in the Central Zone; Santiago, the capital, houses 40% of the population. 
Figure 1-214 shows on the left side the political-administrative regions of Chile, while that 
on the right side represents the area of each region according to the proportion of its 
population in 2002.  
 
 
 
Chilean population is distributed unequally and decreases from the centre towards 
the periphery. Also, territory and population are inversely related, as the peripheral 
regions15 have the biggest territories and the smallest population, while the regions located 
in the centre of the country have smaller territories but more people. As a consequence, 
there is also a concentration of financial resources, public and private services, greater 
diversity of goods, etc. in the centre. 
                                                 
14 Map Source: Chile será descentralizado o no sera desarrollado. Edited by Heinrich Von Baer, 2008 p9 
15 In Chile the regions of the far north (Arica-Parinacota, Tarapacá and Antofagasta) and the regions of the 
far south (Magallanes and Aysén) are also called ‘peripheral regions’ due to the huge distance from Santiago. 
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Any attempt toward decentralisation should consider the uneven distribution of 
population in order to address related issues such as the distribution of fiscal resources – 
which are allocated according to the 
population - and the lack of regional 
capacities (see table 1-116). Regions are 
funded through two ways: the National 
Fund for Regional Development (FNDR) 
and by sectoral investment from 
ministries. The FNDR is the instrument 
used by the central State to transfer fiscal 
resources to regions and is administered mainly by SUBDERE17. The Regional 
Governments present proposals to the central body, which are approved or modified by 
SUBDERE and/or DIPRES18. On the other hand, sectoral investment comes directly from 
ministries to their regional branches, in which the regional governments have no 
participation. In both cases the normal criteria for public expenditure is the quantity of 
people who would be benefied by a certain investment, so that projects or programs that 
benefit larger populations are usually prioritised over those aimed at territories with less 
population. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The main focus of this research is political-administrative decentralisation processes, 
particularly the endeavours made by the Chilean state towards greater regional 
decentralisation. As explained in the following pages, my interest in decentralisation issues 
started from the reforms of 2005 and 2009, which aimed to re-structure the regional 
governments. The research questions emerged from those particular reforms and my desire 
to contribute broadly to the debate about state transformation, political decentralisation and 
power relationships within the state structure. I wanted to ‘humanise’ these topics by 
examining the way that public policies are implemented by people who have their own 
beliefs, values and ways to work. As human beings are active agents in the construction of 
their environment, this research also aims to contribute to understanding the influences that 
state personnel might have over the outcomes of these reforms. Different groups of people, 
with different interests and goals also construct different relations within, among and 
                                                 
16 OECD 2009 
17 Subsecretariat for Regional and Administrative Development (Ministry of Domestic Affairs) 
18 National Budgetary Secretary (Treasury Ministry) 
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between the institutions they represent; how are all those ideas integrated into policies that 
contribute to build a better place to live? How are agreements made when actors are caught 
inside a net of power relations - political, economic and social? When they are not free to 
make decisions? 
First of all, I started this research in the quest of some answers, but also knowing that 
on the way more questions would stem from them. Some questions had grown inside of me 
during the time I was working for the government in Chile: these were related to power 
relationships and the role of individuals in the decision-making process. How are power 
relationships defined between and within levels in the state apparatus? What makes them 
change? Are these power relations formal or informal? To what extent is it individuals who 
define these power relations? My master’s dissertation was about the approval system of 
territorial order plans at regional level and the tension produced between technical and 
political decisions. While doing the field trip for this, I realised there was a concern among 
public servants at the regional level regarding the transference of territorial and strategic 
planning towards the regional government. Although it was not directly related to my 
master’s research, as I was in Chile I decided to take the opportunity to question 
participants regarding this issue. Thus, at the outset of my PhD, I had relatively clear idea 
of the last steps towards regional decentralisation that were being implemented in Chile. 
What had taken my attention was the suspicions and sometimes open resistance towards 
these changes from the regional state personnel I had contacted during that research. 
Besides, at that time it seemed to me that the central body in Chile had a more complete 
view/understanding of the situation (centralism/regionalism) than the regional body, which 
did not have access to the information and assessments made by the central state (Ministry 
of Domestic Affairs). Besides, the fact that decentralisation processes in Chile were led by 
the central body seemed to me a paradox, as the Chilean state has always been 
characterised as highly centralist, paternalist and assistentialist; therefore an attempt of the 
central body to instigate decentralisation did not make sense to me.  
Having these two issues in mind, I started my PhD with the idea that decentralisation 
should be approached from a different perspective, that is to say, not only from the 
effectiveness or success of those policies, but also from the perspective of how the actors 
implement them. Therefore, the focus is not only on the policy itself but on the agents 
working on it and affected by it; how the actors react to new policies, how willing are they 
to participate in them, how involved they feel, to what extent their beliefs, values and 
interests interfere with the implementation of such policies and, of course, how these 
elements affect the outcomes. Also, the understanding of the relationships among actors 
became the centre of my interest; how a policy developed in the capital was implemented 
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in the regions, how it was received, what were the attitudes of the actors regarding it… and 
finally, taking all these elements in consideration, whether those policies were born to 
succeed (more or less) or were condemned to failure from the outset because they were 
top-down imposed. 
Three questions stemmed from those preliminary thoughts, which are addressed in 
this research in an attempt to contribute both to the understanding of the Chilean case and 
to the academic debate: How is political decentralisation shaped in Chile? To what extent 
are regional governments being empowered by the decentralisation process? and What is 
the relationship between the central state and the regions regarding the political 
decentralisation process? 
The first research question – how is political decentralisation shaped in Chile - aims 
to ascertain the points of view of the actors involved in the decentralising processes and 
through that, to understand how decentralisation is being shaped. In others words, what are 
the meanings of decentralisation that each actor holds as an agent of decentralisation and 
what are the discourses behind those meanings. This is for two reasons: firstly, from a 
technical point of view, the understanding of the task (in this case the implementation of 
decentralising measures) will lead to the way the task will be done; and secondly, from a 
political point of view, the discourse behind the meaning will define the expected 
outcomes of the task. For instance, if the actors are influenced by the economic discourse, 
they will work to improve the efficiency of the service delivered by the state; on the other 
hand, actors influenced by the political discourse will aim to improve governance and 
democracy. Thus, even the assessment of the outcomes will be different regarding the 
leading discourse of a certain policy.  
Thus, the first question gives a frame in order to contextualise the decentralisation 
process in Chile, which leads to the second research question - to what extent is this 
process empowering the regional governments. This question points to the practicalities of 
decentralising policies, especially in terms of the positionality and strengthening of the 
regional government within the net of relationships at regional level. So far regional 
governments have faced two situations: firstly, they are ‘young’ institutions - created in 
1993 - so there is not enough recognition from other public institutions and, secondly, their 
role has been mainly administrative. Taking this into account, the effectiveness of 
decentralising policies becomes crucial for regional governments because it might be the 
key to finally achieve the leading position within the regions that they should have.  
Finally, all of this leads to the last research question – what is the relationship 
between the central state and the regions – which aims to understand the extension of the 
autonomy and freedom of the decision-making processes of the regions. In other words, 
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are the regions having a greater capacity of negotiation? Are they in a better position with 
respect to the central body? Can they make their own decisions with respect to their own 
aims? Has the central body been able to release the regions to their own fate? Therefore, 
the ‘contradiction’ of a decentralisation process led by the central body is addressed here, 
mainly regarding the relationship between ministries and their regional branches. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis has been organised in eight chapters, including this introduction. The 
second chapter discusses and brings together the three conceptual pillars of this research: 
political decentralisation, the state and power. The analysis of political decentralisation 
uses Montecino’s definition of decentralisation and follows the discourses defined by 
Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall (2008) –cultural, economic and political -, which are 
fundamental to frame the theoretical background to decentralisation. The chapter 
emphasises its political aspects, how it is understood as an ongoing process and its 
advantages and disadvantages. Likewise, the literature related to the state is analysed in 
order to frame the discussion. Special attention is given to the three strategic approaches 
defined by Jessop (1997) about the reform of the state – denationalisation, de-statisation 
and internalisation – as the context in which decentralisation is being implemented. 
O’Neil’s (1997) arguments of the transformation of the Keynesian state into a qualitative 
state are also taken into account to place decentralisation in academic debate. Finally, 
power is analysed through Allen’s (1997) perspectives of power as a capacity, power as a 
medium and power as a relational effect of social interaction in order to contextualise the 
construction of power relations between national and subnational levels.   
Chapter Three is the Methodology, which discusses the research design and methods 
chosen during the research as well as the positionality and ethics of the researcher. Thus, 
the selection of qualitative research and the instrumentalist case study approach are 
presented as the most suitable to meet the goals of this thesis. One of the main purposes of 
this research is to allow the emergence of the different perspectives of decentralisation held 
by the actors involved, in order to answer research questions through in depth and semi 
structured interviews with key actors and the review of key state documents. The 
instrumentalist case study of Chile serves to better understand decentralising processes 
when they are applied in unitary states and to link it with broader research questions and 
academic debates. The chapter also discusses my positionality, giving a brief account of 
my background in Chile both as a researcher and as a former public servant. Positionality 
and ethics are presented in relation to my dual roles as outsider and insider in order to use 
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the advantage of both roles to get quality data, but also in order to avoid bias during the 
collection and analysis. Finally, the chapter addresses the reasons why Tarapacá and 
Valparaíso regions have been selected for this research, introduces the institutions chosen 
and describes the methods for data collection and data analyses.  
The fourth chapter is the Case Study. The goal of the chapter is to contextualise 
historically, socially and legally the current state of political decentralisation in Chile. In 
order to do this, the chapter begins with accounts of the evolution of the role of the state 
since the outset of the Republic. Thus the Portalian state - established in the early 19th 
century in response to the necessity of a new order after the independence of the country – 
and the conservative paternalism of the elites are crucial to understand the consolidation of 
the central state. Then the chapter analyses the influence of the Pinochet dictatorship (1973 
– 1990) on the economic, political and social re-shaping of the country. During the 
dictatorship the role of the state diminished regarding its intervention in the market but 
increased regarding its coercive role over the population and territories; a new constitution 
was written and business-people became as political actors. The changes that civil society 
has experienced over the last 30 years are also analysed from the economic perspective –
citizens have become consumers – and from the political perspective – as a left-right 
division is not enough to explain the new movements against centralism. The chapter also 
explores the current political system of the country, highlighting issues such as the legal 
framework, representativeness, binominal electoral system and political parties. Later on, 
the chapter describes the regionalisation process and the regions chosen: Tarapacá and 
Valparaíso. The different demographic, economic and political characteristics of them 
make the comparison of their responses towards decentralising measures from the central 
level highly interesting. Finally, the chapter describes the two decentralising reforms 
addressed by this research: the direct election of regional councillors - which addresses 
issues of representativeness and democracy - and the creation of the Division of Planning 
and Development within the Regional Governments, which seeks their empowerment of. 
As decentralisation is being implemented through legal reforms, the support of the 
Congress is crucial for its success, therefore, the political system and the main coalition 
parties should be considered in the analysis. 
Chapter Five aims to answer the first research question, how decentralisation is 
shaped in Chile. It also aims to shed light on the entanglements in which political 
decentralisation, due to the multiple actors and spheres involved, is embedded. In order to 
do that, the chapter defines and examines the philosophical, political and technical 
dimensions of Chilean decentralisation, as well as the driving agent and key actors. The 
philosophical dimension frames the agent’s understanding of reality, the political 
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dimension is related to decision-making and the design process of decentralising strategies, 
and the technical dimension is the implementation of those decisions and strategies. Thus, 
the chapter discusses how different understandings of the discourses, such as those defined 
by Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall (2008), lead to certain decisions and actions; it identifies 
SUBDERE19 as the driving agent of decentralisation in both the political and technical 
dimension. The chapter also provides an account of the main challenges faced regarding 
decentralisation so far – the centralist culture, the state of engagement and regional 
capacities -, which have as a consequence an excessive gradualism subject to the will of 
the government in turn in the implementation of decentralisation and its advances. 
Chapter Six addresses the second research question – the scope of the reforms -, 
which is mainly focused on the Division of Planning and Development (DIPLAD) as the 
first elections of regional councillors will be held in November 2013. The chapter firstly 
examines the desired outcomes of both reforms: the autonomy of the Regional Council 
from the Intendente, currently appointed by the President, and the change of the 
gravitational centre within the region. The roles of the individuals in key positions are also 
analysed in order to illustrate how policies created and designed at the central level are 
received and implemented in the regions. Jones et al (2004) and Theodore and Peck (2010) 
are discussed in this section, as they give a sound grounding of the topic. Particularly 
relevant is the recognition of the participation and agency of key actors in the success and 
failure of a certain policy, in which the analysis goes further than that exposed so far in the 
literature. The chapter also identified three steps in the implementation of DIPLAD: 
passing decisions down, preparation of the regions and the transfer of functions. The 
difficulties faced by DIPLAD positioning itself within the Regional Government and in the 
regional scenario as the leader of the strategic and territorial planning of the region has 
been the main challenge so far. The chapter concludes that the reforms are good steps 
towards decentralisation, but have resulted so far only in the strengthening of the regions 
and not in their empowerment. Chilean decentralisation has not yet challenged the idea of 
the unitary state so embedded in its culture, as all policies and guidelines still come from 
Santiago and the regions show scarce capacity of decision-making. 
Chapter Seven focuses on the third research question – the relationship between the 
central state and the regions -, which is addressed from the perspective of the Ministry of 
Housing and Urbanism. Firstly, the chapter analyses the formal and informal relations 
between the national and the regional levels, and discusses how the role of key actors can 
change vertical structures into cooperative spaces. The results show that although the 
                                                 
19 Subsecretariat of Regional Development, based in the ministry of Internal Affairs. 
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relationship between levels is highly vertical in legal terms, individuals are more 
comfortable using informal channels to create alliances to achieve their goals or raise 
issues to the headships. The degree of dependency of the regional level is mainly related to 
the will of the minister in turn, which is exacerbated when regional sectors are involved in 
power disputes as they look to their ministry for support. SEREMI’s desire for greater 
autonomy is in terms of specific issues within the ministry, while keeping a strong sense of 
belonging to their sector: loyalties are first towards the ministry and secondly towards the 
region. Finally, the chapter examines the key factors to strengthen the regional institutions: 
empowered and proactive regional headships, along with knowledgeable and skilled 
teamwork. 
Finally, Chapter Eight presents the conclusions of this research. It starts with the 
response of the research questions, followed with other findings related to the Chilean 
case. The issues addressed are the discussion of whether decentralisation is a process or a 
sequence of isolated events, contradictory aspects and actors involved, the relation between 
administrative and political decentralisation expressed in the tension between 
deconcentrated branches of the state and the regional government, and the comparison of 
regional response. The chapter then presents the overall conclusions, contribution of this 
research and further steps. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will analyse the three concepts that are the pillars of this research: 
decentralisation, the state and power. As these concepts have been approached and applied 
differently according to the discipline and actors that use them, it is essential to delimit the 
framework in which this research is embedded. 
Firstly, decentralisation is the main topic of this research. A large body of literature 
examines its meanings, approaches, applications and scopes, as it has many forms and 
degrees. As this thesis focuses on political-administrative decentralisation, the chapter aims 
to contextualise it theoretically and to emphasise its political aspects. Thus, the first section 
will discuss its definitions, how it is understood as an ongoing process and its advantages 
and disadvantages. Then the second section seeks to place political decentralisation within 
the global tendencies towards greater devolution. 
The second pillar of this research is the state. In the third section the changes to the 
state will be defined and analysed. Special attention is given to changing perspectives on 
the state, in which the quality of its intervention is more important that its size. The current 
restructuration of the state will be discussed along the three lines defined by Jessop: de-
statisation, internationalisation and de-nationalisation, as the context in which 
decentralisation is being implemented. 
Finally, the third conceptual pillar of this research is power. Power will be discussed 
from the perspectives of: power as a capacity, associational conception of power and 
Foucauldian conception of power. This is fundamental to understand how relationships 
between the national and subnational levels are developed. 
Thus, these three pillars sustain the key topic of this thesis: the empowerment of 
subnational levels. This entails an examination as to how decentralisation is being inserted 
in the ongoing reform of the state and being understood as the transference of power from 
upper to lower levels. 
 
DEFINING DECENTRALISATION 
 
Decentralisation is a wide and complex concept with many dimensions and 
approaches that affect many different arenas and multiple actors (Eaton, 2004); each case 
differs according to its origins, key elements and consequences. Its interpretation has also 
changed over time from the 19th century shaped by elements of modernity and updating its 
main goals, it also has different meanings or emphases according to the region of the 
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world. Therefore this section is focused on the understanding of decentralisation, in which 
definitions, the worldwide context, approaches and discourses will be reviewed.  
 
Understanding decentralisation 
 
In a broad sense and from an organisational point of view, decentralisation is the 
transference of authority (power) and resources (human and financial) from a central body 
to its branches or from a central organisation towards other organisations, which may be 
independent or semi-independent from the first one. In the public sector, decentralisation 
forms range from local governments raising their own taxes, and thus, having their own 
sources of economic resource, to the transfer of power over some sectors, such as 
education or housing - from the central level to subnational tiers of government or towards 
local governments independently elected by the citizenry. The difference between 
decentralisation towards subnational branches of the state apparatus and towards 
independent subnational governments is crucial, as the power relationships are totally 
different; in the former the relationship is more hierarchical because power is exerted 
through the authority and in the latter it is more balanced because the exertion of power is 
associational1. Thus decentralised subnational governments may act in partnership with the 
central state as they are aiming at similar goals.  
Decentralisation is studied and analysed by different approaches or discourses, such 
as the economic, cultural and political; and a substantial body of literature from western 
and developing countries has been produced2. There are two main groups3: firstly, those 
who see decentralisation as a path to increasing democracy and governance, and who 
therefore support the empowerment of subnational governments in order to promote more 
horizontal relationships between and among public and private institutions, improve 
communications with the community, make innovative policies, and develop policies 
better suited to the subnational reality. Secondly, those who perceive decentralisation as a 
tool to achieve development; they promote the reduction of the leading role of the state, the 
improvement of the delivery of goods and services to the community, the privatisation of 
some services, and the promotion of local development. These two groups are not just 
focused on different aspects of the same process, but they are actually two different 
streams, one based on decentralisation and the other on development. For those who 
                                                 
1 Different actors or institutions united in order to achieve a certain goal. Also known as ‘power to’. 
2 See Finot, 2001a, 2001b, 2003; Ascencio, 2003; Campbell, 2003; Lira, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 
2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003; Alburquerque 2004; Boissier, 2004; Eaton, 2004; Monge, 2005; 
Montecinos, 2005; Pike et al, 2007; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010 
3 See Bardhan, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003; Monge, 2005; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Sagall, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010 
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promote decentralisation itself, it is an ongoing process, it is alive, it flows and changes 
over time; while decentralisation is in second place for those who seek greater 
development, it is a set of useful measures and/or reforms that can help to achieve 
development. This is fundamental because decentralisation will be established from 
different logics. The instrumentalisation of decentralisation by supporters of development 
makes it weaker, because as a tool it can be abandoned when it is not useful. However, 
when decentralisation is the goal itself, it is the reason why reforms and policies are 
implemented, so commitment to decentralisation is likely to be greater and more enduring. 
Thus, although decentralisation appeared during the second half of the 20th Century as a 
reform that aimed at the improvement of public service provision, this concept has become 
more complex as it incorporates economic and political elements.  
Decentralisation can be applied emphasising its political (authority/power) or 
economic (resource) aspects; while the economic approach sees decentralisation as a 
reform addressed to reduce the inefficiencies in resource allocation associated with 
centralism (Willis et al, 1999; Finot, 2001b), the political approach is related to the 
redistribution of power (Boisier, 2003). Therefore decentralisation - understood as a 
strategy in which authority and resources are transferred from the central government to 
subnational levels or subnational governments (Rondinelli, 1981; Campbell, 2003; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003) – raises the question of whether decentralisation is a 
means or an end: is it a strategy to achieve economic development or a goal in itself? 
In this research, decentralisation will be studied in its political dimension, which is 
understood as a process of transferring political, fiscal and administrative power from the 
national level to the subnational levels of government4 (Montecinos, 2005, p73). Four 
elements arise from it: first, decentralisation is a process not a single event; secondly, it is a 
process of transference of power; thirdly, the power transferred is economic, administrative 
and political; and fourthly, that transference is produced between central and subnational 
levels of the government. 
Decentralisation is a process that changes over time. It flows going forward and 
backward according to the context, but as a spiral because it can never comes back to the 
same point; it evolves in line with the paradigms of the time. As a process, it is always a 
path, an ongoing situation, an incomplete state; it is not possible to achieve total 
decentralisation. Therefore decentralisation is not a single event or a sequence of events, 
but a dynamic process in which an event - e.g. a particular reform or policy - is followed 
for an adaptative period so that it does not stop, it becomes. The tension between 
                                                 
4 ‘Proceso de transferencia de poder político, fiscal y administrativo desde el nivel central a los niveles 
subnacionales del gobierno’. 
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decentralisation and recentralisation is also part of this ongoing process, like the tides of 
the sea it ebbs and flows. Therefore, decentralisation can be manipulated, resisted and even 
reversed; however, the forces behind its fluxes are ongoing and cannot be stopped, as it is 
responding to the society in which it is embedded.  
A second key point is the distribution of power, in which the tensions in economic 
and political power relations become crucial. The transference of power to subnational 
governments is fundamental to increase decentralisation, allowing the subnational level the 
autonomy required to make their own decisions. In this arena, it is essential to be aware 
that each actor, institution and organisation has its own agenda and that they will act 
accordingly. The tension of these forces - when each actor presses to achieve its/his/her 
own goals - will depend on the power position and the skills of each one.  
 Thirdly, Montecinos mentions three aspects related to the transference of power: 
fiscal, administrative and political. To hold real power subnational governments need 
financial freedom at the moment to make decisions, otherwise the central government 
might use the budget as an excuse to interfere in subnational decisions. Fiscal 
decentralisation implies that the taxes paid by the citizens are directly related to the 
benefits that they receive (Montecinos, 2005); subnational governments may generate their 
own income through local taxes and they make decisions of how to spend it (Finot 2001a; 
Montecinos, 2005). The goal of fiscal decentralisation is to deconcentrate the fiscal 
expenditure and to increase the coverage of the provision of public goods (Finot 2001a; 
Montecinos, 2005).  
The other two aspects, administrative and political involve the decentralisation of the 
physical administration of the central government - or deconcentration - and the 
empowerment of the subnational levels - or devolution - (Burns et al, 1994; Lane, 2003; 
Eaton, 2004). Deconcentration is the transfer of some functions, or procedures, from the 
national level to subnational branches of national institutions, while decision-making 
remains at national level. For instance, a Programme of Housing for poor people can be 
administered by the subnational level, but the decision of how many houses will be built in 
certain areas will be taken by the Ministry of Housing - at the national level. The 
subnational office acts only as a window that receives the people’s petitions and evaluates 
how many of them meet the eligibility requirements for a house. Meanwhile, devolution is 
the transference of power and decision-making from the national level to subnational 
institutions. Following the previous example, under devolution the subnational level would 
have the power to decide how many houses and where they should be built. Although, both 
deconcentration and devolution are considered elements of the same process, their 
implementation and operation have opposing facets; while devolution is giving power and 
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autonomy to subnational organisation/institutions, deconcentration may be a way of 
exerting greater control over subnational territories by the central state. The latter allows 
the establishment of a net of institutions that penetrate all subnational levels, so that 
deconcentration may be a reinforcement of centralism – possibly making it more efficient - 
under the cloak of decentralisation. In both cases - deconcentration and devolution - 
inclusion is a crucial issue because the more voices are included in the debate, the greater 
the possibility that those decisions will be carried out. In the sphere of government this is 
called governance, a concept nowadays understood as the inclusion of new actors in 
decision-making processes and networks (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008).  
Governance is a process, also known as the de-statisation of governing, based more 
on networks than traditional hierarchies, which is more about self-organisation, inter-
institutional collaboration and coordination; and it has more autonomy from the formal 
structures of the government (MacKinnon, 1998). Political decentralisation promotes good 
governance, which, in turn, increases democracy. Furthermore, political decentralisation is 
not shutting out the central state, but including more voices; however it is important that 
those voices are appropriate to the scale of the decision being taken. For instance, the 
European Union promotes the subsidiarity of the state, in which ‘all decisions are taken as 
close as possible to those directly affected’ (Johnston et al, 2000 p172). If this is done 
effectively, it might be possible to achieve better results. Administrative decentralisation 
and political decentralisation frequently appear together in the literature and in the practical 
application of the strategy. Political-administrative issues are found together in many 
cases, because administrative decentralisation may be a first step towards political 
decentralisation5.  
Finally, Montecinos’ definition expresses that the transference of power comes from 
the national level and goes to subnational levels. At this point special consideration of the 
relationship between levels is needed. Is it a transfer from the central body towards an 
independent subnational government? Or is it from the central body to the subnational 
branches of the state apparatus? The question becomes crucial considering that a 
subnational government - if autonomous and democratically elected - is representative of 
its citizenry; therefore it is from a better power position to negotiate with the central state 
than an appointed one. In that case, subnational governments have the political power to 
rise and support their claims, and are in the position to negotiate concrete solutions as well. 
On the other hand, when the transfer is from the central body to deconcentrated branches 
of the same apparatus, the relationship is hierarchical; the subnational level is subordinated 
                                                 
5 Both approaches, administrative and political will be analysed further in the point 2 of this section. 
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to the central state. Thus, negotiations, such as the regional budget, are less controversial as 
the strength of those institutions depends on top-down decisions. Decentralisation may be 
understood as devolution, however it is not just about the empowerment of subnational 
levels, but also about a clear definition of each territorial level and its functions. This may 
become fundamental, as actors do not usually want to share or resign their power; 
moreover, usually the political arena is driven by power struggles. Having a clear 
separation of duties and functions at each level might help to avoid duplicity of functions 
and power struggles between levels.  
 
Political decentralisation 
 
Political decentralisation, also known as the Political-administrative approach or 
government decentralisation, is seen broadly ‘as a change in subnational institutions’ 
(Eaton, 2004. p219), which is a political-administrative reform of the state in order to 
achieve more autonomy at subnational levels and to improve the delivery of public goods 
and services. It allows a country to be ruled in a less hierarchical way improving 
governance and participatory democracy. In recent years it has been also focused on the 
efficiency of public services and on a more open and accountable form of government 
(Batterbury and Fernando, 2006). 
According to Burns et al (1994), the role of local governments is to protect political 
liberties – i.e. supporting political diversity, contributing to political education and 
including the citizenry in the decision making process; Burns et al argue that besides the 
quality of services, local government must ‘focus on the welfare of the local polity’ in 
which councillors and officers have to work on ‘strategies designed to improve the quality 
of government’ (Burns et al, 1994, p30). To do that, the citizens have to be at the centre of 
empowerment strategies (Burns et al, 1994). Therefore, political decentralisation is 
directly related to greater democratic governance6 (Finot, 2001b, p9) 
 
The political approach commonly takes three forms: 
-­‐ Administrative decentralisation or deconcentration 
-­‐ Political decentralisation or devolution 
-­‐ Sociological decentralisation or empowerment of civil society7 
 
                                                 
6 ‘La descentralización política se vincula directamente con una mayor gobernancia democrática.’ 
7 Understood by Arocena as private enterprises, participating in all sectors (education, health, social security, 
etc.) and community, developing their own alternatives of development (Arocena, 1989) 
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Firstly, the Administrative approach (deconcentration) is defined as the delegation of 
functions from the central state to subnational branches (Finot, 2001a; Bardhan, 2002, 
Montecinos, 2005), by which more effective work and control of the central government 
over the whole country may be achieved by penetrating to all levels, while still making 
decisions at the central level. In Administrative decentralisation, also called territorial 
(Conyers, 1983; Boisier, 2003) or managerial (Burns et al, 1994), deconcentration is 
understood as the physical dispersion of the central government offices to lower levels. 
One of the most important goals of this approach is to achieve more freedom of 
management by the subnational institutions and for governments to increase their 
efficiency (Montecinos, 2005). At this stage some decisions and financial responsibilities 
are transferred from a central government to a lower level of a sectoral organisation, to 
which public servants are appointed, so the central government can keep the power of veto 
(Finot, 2001a). Thus those subnational institutions can make some decisions but are always 
inserted within the hierarchy of the central state. Therefore, deconcentration is mainly a 
top-down process, in which regional authorities are not elected by the citizenry, but 
appointed by the central government. Power is exerted – directly or indirectly - by the 
central government and not by subnational authorities. Despite the above, it is important to 
recognise that deconcentration involves a great effort by centralised states, in which the 
current institutionality is deployed to sublevels and spread over the territory. Therefore, 
deconcentration is a first step for building a network of institutions at regional and local 
level that will support the empowerment of the subnational levels at the political stage of 
decentralisation. Even if deconcentration is not an essential condition to decentralise a state 
it is possible to use it as a starting point for further decentralisation. 
Secondly, the political approach or devolution is related to the empowerment of 
subnational levels and - although it does not imply the election of subnational authorities -, 
it seeks the transfer of decision-making to subnational levels. Devolution is the transfer of 
power – authority and resources (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003) - from central 
government to the lower levels, where decision-making is carried out by subnational 
governments without the direct interference of the central government8. However, it does 
not mean that the central state disappears, but its role changes from protagonist to strategic; 
it ensures that subnational decisions are consistent with the national vision. Therefore, the 
role of the central state is to develop national policies as the framework into which all 
public plans and programmes have to be inserted and to facilitate their implementation. For 
instance, if the national policy is to improve the quality of public education, each level 
                                                 
8 Burns, et al, 1994; Willies et al, 1999; Finot, 2001a; Finot, 2001b; Bardhan, 2002; Lane, 2003a; 
Montecinos, 2005 
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would decide how and with what resources they would do it – e.g. investing in 
infrastructure, facilities and/or qualified personnel. There are three steps to achieve 
devolution: legitimacy, decentralisation of resources and decentralisation of authority 
(Donahue, 1997).  
Devolutionary processes may imply social, cultural and political benefits 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003) and they are not the same in every country; they can be 
either bottom-up or top-down processes and, also, they are not homogeneous in all regions 
within a country as ‘intra-national differences frequently transpire in different powers and 
budgetary capacity across regions’ (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003. p18). Thus, 
decentralisation can be symmetric or asymmetric; the former is when all the regions within 
a country have the same treatment, as in France, and the latter when the regions have 
different degrees of autonomy, as in Spain. The discourse behind devolution (economic, 
political or cultural) may explain how it will be applied; however its consequences will 
depend on the characteristics of each country (Keating, 1998). Thus, according to the point 
of view adopted, the empowerment of subnational government will be used to grant more 
participation in the decision-making process and less interference from central government 
in local development. 
Devolution seeks the empowerment of subnational levels, which could have been 
created under deconcentration, if an administrative decentralisation has been carried out as 
a previous step. Regional devolution can take different forms and degrees, having its 
greatest expression when authorities are locally elected and there is a clear differentiation 
of functions per level in order to avoid overlapping. Thus, public servants are not trapped 
within the complexities of hierarchies and subordinations between levels, as no level is 
superior to another (Keating, 1998). Devolution can be associated with increasing 
innovation in the policies and the way that they are applied and adapted to local needs 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003). In some cases regions are looking for total autonomy 
and in others, just for more control over their own affairs. Political decentralisation is also 
associated with a greater transparency and accountability of subnational authorities 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003). Furthermore, Enikolopov and Zhuranskaya (2007) add 
that politicians affiliated to strong national parties are doubly accountable; on the one hand 
to their party, which has a coherent national project and which will support them while 
they remain faithful to this project; and, on the other hand, to the people who have elected 
them. 
Thirdly, a further step of decentralisation is the empowerment of civil society, also 
called the Sociological approach, in which decentralisation means that civil society, 
through a strong and direct participative process, shares the power of decision making. In 
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the words of Tocqueville all of that that can be decided and managed at a lower level must 
not be done at a higher level (Tocqueville Principle, quoted in Finot, 2001a, p339). This 
step involves a strong commitment from citizens with their community/territory because 
they need to be informed and willing to take part. It also involves accountability from the 
authorities in all decision-making processes (Monge, 2005) and in their management, 
giving the public access to the data when they need it. So, devolution in decentralisation 
can offer civil society the opportunity to participate in decision-making on key issues in 
their territories (Monge, 2005) and to be responsible for their own successes and failures. 
A mature citizenry is required to achieve this; one that is interested in taking part, which 
makes an effort to be informed and who places the good of the community above their own 
interests, so that it is seriously involved in the reality of its community/territory (Arocena, 
1989; De Mattos, 1989). Moreover, a transparent and accountable local government is also 
needed, one that periodically publishes information and records regarding every relevant 
issue in the community/territory. 
The empowerment of subnational government and civil society is the main goal in 
the process. Directly elected subnational governments have more power to negotiate with 
central government, because they are legitimised by the citizenry (Eaton, 2004). The 
emphasis in each one of these stages will depend on the characteristics and needs of 
different countries; while in Europe and other developed countries the main issue is 
devolution, those countries with a more centralist tradition combine devolution with 
deconcentration. This research aims to have a further understanding of both 
deconcentration and devolution in order to analyse decision-making processes and power 
relations between levels of government. 
Arocena (1989) simplifies centralisation and decentralisation as opposing models, 
explaining that centralisation privileges order, the general and unity; while decentralisation 
privileges movement, multiplicity and diversity. However, the tension between 
centralisation and decentralisation is far from being so simple. Arocena argues that the 
elites prefer a centralised system, because that is the way to hold power; nevertheless, it is 
important to take into account that those elites are also the people who hold the economic 
power and from the economic point of view they will promote a decentralised system, 
where the role of the state is diminished and privatisation is stimulated. Thus centralisation 
and decentralisation are being promoted by the same elites in different arenas. For 
instance, efforts towards deconcentration from the central state may be seen as steps 
towards greater decentralisation, however, as it has been discussed, this may mask a more 
                                                 
9 ‘todo aquello que pueda decidirse y gestionarse a un nivel inferior no debe hacerse en un nivel superior’ 
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efficient and strong centralism. Also, regions that are fighting for more autonomy against 
the central state are at the same time reproducing centralising patterns within their territory. 
Political-administrative decentralisation is an important condition but it is not enough 
to achieve the real decentralisation of the system. Without a real commitment from civil 
society and subnational governments, decentralisation will be only a political 
administrative reform without real consequences for the quality of life of the community 
(Arocena, 1989). Moreover, it is important to take into account that this kind of reform 
itself cannot modify the society in which it is applied (De Mattos, 1989), so that it is 
fundamental to articulate the reforms made from the centre (top-down) with the actions 
from the grassroots (bottom-up). It is important to analyse critically the decentralisation 
process as Bardhan (2002) exposes that the supporters of decentralisation are trying to 
diminish the power of the central state. Some radical groups do so because they see the 
empowerment of local communities as a new form of Marxism, and other groups because 
they see the state as an obstacle to the development of a free market (Bardhan, 2002). 
 
Advantages and disadvantages of decentralisation 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of political decentralisation have been broadly 
discussed in the literature, highlighting the impacts of decentralisation according to the 
case. Devolutionary processes are different in each country not only because of the kind of 
decentralised policies that have been implemented, but also because of the different 
capacities of these countries to implement them (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003). 
As summarised in the table 2-110, political decentralisation may improve democracy, 
participation, accountability, governance and promote development. However, 
decentralisation may have also a negative impact increasing caudillismo, uneven 
development, the vulnerabilities of local interests to external agents, inequalities and 
corruption11. All of these debates understand that political decentralisation is ‘first and 
foremost an institutional change’ (Eaton, 2004. p222). 
Decentralisation offers new opportunities to improve the quality of democracy 
because people not only exert their right to vote but also to express themselves through 
participating in local affairs (Burns et al, 1994; Campbell, 2003). Moreover, Monge (2005) 
points out that through decentralisation, the desire to participate and the belief that ‘politics 
                                                 
10 Source: author 
11 See Arocena 1989, De Mattos 1989, Burns et al 1994, Prud’homme 1995, Finot 2001a, Finot 2001b, 
Bardhan 2002, Fisman and Gatti 2002, Campbell 2003, Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire 2003, Escobar 2004, 
Mongue 2005, Battebury and Fernando 2006, Gilbert 2006, Enikolopov and Zhuranskaya 2007, Rodríguez-
Pose and Sandall 2008 and Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010 among others. 
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is worthwhile’ (p45) may return to the community. Therefore, political decentralisation 
may increase political participation (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003), which means 
inclusion, a call to all: from top-down it is the opening of new spaces for dialogue; from 
bottom-up it is the raising of new voices (Monge, 2005). One important danger of 
decentralisation arises at this point: caudillismo, through which the tyranny of local elites 
over the community and local government can be exerted, transforming territory into a 
kind of modern feudalism (Arocena, 1989). Regarding the latter, electing politicians that 
belong to strong national parties can help to avoid caudillismo because they have to align 
themselves with their party to ensure their support in the next elections (Enikolopov and 
Zhuranskaya, 2007); so a way to deter caudillismo could be via the promotion of national 
political parties.  
 
 
 
Decentralisation may improve accountability, as local politicians have to respond to 
both a closer community, with more spaces in which to express themselves, and their 
parties (Enikolopov and Zhuranskaya, 2007). For instance, people that have the will to be 
more informed usually can know how politicians have voted or acted by going to the open 
assemblies or checking the government’s webpages. Fisman and Gatti (2002) also support 
the idea that a decentralised structure brings greater accountability and transparency of 
government, as the community is able to oversee the actions of politicians and public 
servants (see also Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003; Gilbert 2006).  
Political decentralisation may promote development through the formulation of 
innovative policies in accordance with the subnational reality (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 
2003). Subnational governments can develop more suitable and specific policies to apply 
in their territories, which are orientated to respond more efficiently to the community; and 
the creation of strategic policies in order to increase local/regional development. However, 
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this may lead to a third disadvantage of decentralisation: the further generation of uneven 
regional development and inequality (Finot, 2001a; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010); as 
territories are diverse and have different potential, it is natural that some regions will 
develop more than others. Compensatory measures from the central state are required in 
order to avoid these inequalities (Arocena, 1989). Thus, decentralisation could be a double-
edged tool if applied without taking some precautions, mainly in those territories that are 
economically backward. 
Political decentralisation is strongly related to greater governance, where public and 
private institutions make alliances in the pursuit of shared goals. Another important 
disadvantage of decentralisation is the intrusion of transnational enterprises, which can 
endanger local interests (Prud’homme, 1995; Bardhan, 2002, Fisman and Gatti, 2002). The 
presence of a strong civil society (community, private actors, local institutions, NGOs, etc) 
participating in the decision-making processes and strong inter-institutional negotiation 
roundtables provide a defence against undesired external intrusions (Arocena, 1989).  
At this point it is important to take into account the capacity of subnational 
governments. Local governments are directly related to a community, so they are in a 
better position than central government to know and to resolve its needs. Therefore, 
decentralisation might help local governments to be more efficient, responsive, functional 
and accountable than the central state (Fisman and Gatti 2002; Gilbert 2006). In 
consequence, there can be better outcomes - more just and equitable – in the quality of 
public goods delivery and, also, in the implementation of suitable subnational policies 
(Bardhan, 2002; Lane, 2003a; Gilbert, 2006). However, to achieve this, it is important that 
public servants and politicians at lower levels are able to handle the responsibility, so they 
require not only empowerment but training as well. Besides, subnational governments 
often have a double function: as agents of central governments and as representatives of 
their regions (Finot, 2001b). In countries with a centralist tradition, subnational authorities 
often have this double role. This places them in an awkward position, as they cannot fully 
fulfil either of those roles without affecting the other one. This will be a recurrent theme in 
this thesis, as the autonomy of subnational levels requires the separation of both roles. 
Subnational interests are often against the will of central government, therefore subnational 
agents may lose strength when they are also employees of the central state. The outcomes 
of decentralisation when it is applied in such an environment often make a moderate 
impact, because subnational levels are still strongly tied to the central state. 
Finally, a great disadvantage of political decentralisation is that it might increase 
corruption. Neither decentralised nor centralised systems lead to corruption per se; 
however, when corruption is part of the ‘normal’ culture of political behaviour, 
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decentralised measures may aggravate it through the application of the strategy and less 
control from upper levels and/or of the citizenry. ‘Moreover, we find the origin of a 
country’s legal system to be a good instrument for the extent of government 
decentralization, and our results suggest that the effect of decentralization on corruption 
persists when decentralization is instrumented for in this way.’ (Fisman and Gatti 2002, 
p327). When applying decentralisation, strong hierarchical systems could lead to 
caudillismo or to strong dominant regional elites that control territory without scope for the 
central government to interfere, which might create inefficiencies in the delivery of public 
goods and clientelism (Finot, 2001b). On the other hand, if there are more actors involved, 
participating, demanding solutions, contributing to the decision making processes and 
controlling the actions of the local government, there are fewer spaces for corruption. 
However, this requires a mature citizenry (De Mattos, 1989).  
 
Decentralisation has advantages and disadvantages, so the positive or negative 
consequences will depend on how and where it is applied. For example, economies of scale 
are better exploited by the central state – e.g. the construction of schools, roads and 
hospitals -; however, the management of them is better at subnational level (Bardhan, 
2002). Therefore, mixed strategies may provide better answers than pure or dogmatic 
solutions.  
 
GLOBAL TRENDS AND DISCOURSES 
 
Strategies towards decentralisation have been increasing since the second half of the 
20th century, oscilating between decentralisation and centralisation until the 1980s 
(Connyers, 1983, 1986). Since then, decentralisation has become more and more popular, 
being promoted by subnational movements, central governments and international 
organisations12. Decentralisation has many supporters, among them: free-market 
economists, who see decentralisation as a way to reduce the power/control of the central 
state, which distorts the market13; new regionalists who see devolution as a path to achieve 
greater economic efficiency14; subnational movements looking for independence or more 
autonomy, such as in the Basque country and Scotland (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 
2008); and post Marxist theorists, who see decentralisation as a way to achieve a more 
participatory democracy and good governance (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). 
                                                 
12 See Conyers, 1983, 1986; Arocena, 1989; Rondinelli, 1989; Bardhan, 2002; Alburquerque 2004; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008 
13 See Bardhan, 2002; Arocena 1989; De Mattos, 1989; Burns et al, 1994; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008 
14 Keating, 1998; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010 
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Arocena (1989) points out that the fact that international organisations, some central 
governments and neoliberal supporters are promoting decentralisation is a sign that these 
policies do not seek to benefit the weaker parts of the system. 
In 2000 the World Bank declared that 95% of world democracies have elected 
subnational governments and nowadays decentralisation processes are in full swing. The 
reason for this ‘fashion’ is associated with globalisation15, which due to the dynamism and 
proliferation of communication and transportation media, speeds up the exchange of ideas 
(internationalisation). As Harvey (1989) explains, there are two factors that favour 
internationalisation: temporal, in which public and private decisions are made faster; and 
spatial, in which those decisions spread to a wider territory. Furthermore, globalisation has 
diminished the leading role of the nation-state resulting from the rise of supranational 
organisations and the increasing relevance of the subnational level (MacKinnon, 1998; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Flint and Taylor, 2007). In this context, decentralisation is 
also a strategy that attempts to re-position the power of the state in the new arena. 
 
Rodríguez-Pose has defined three main discourses that promote decentralisation: 
political, economic and cultural (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). The three of them 
have consequences in political decentralisation, though in different ways: cultural or 
identity discourses usually seek political and economic autonomy as there is a necessity of 
being recognised. Economic discourses are behind government efficiency, privatisation 
and local development; they are focused on the necessity of better delivery of public goods 
and on the opportunity for subnational territories to develop themselves. Political discourse 
emphasizes governance and democracy, as there is the necessity of greater participation in 
decision-making processes. Therefore, Political decentralisation is not just a reorganisation 
of the political-administrative structure of the state, but a strategy, which responds and is 
rooted in the interests of the actors and the needs of the people. All that means that 
decentralisation is a process that is both bottom-up and top-down; it has to rise from the 
ground as well as from the centre. Decentralisation therefore, is the result of a mixture of 
these three discourses. 
There has been a change in the discourse supporting decentralisation over the last 30 
years from a cultural perspective to a political and economic perspective (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Sandall, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010), which is related to whom is 
driving the process (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003). Initially decentralisation was 
mainly driven by minorities, who sought greater autonomy, reinforcing their own identities 
                                                 
15 See Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010 
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and fighting against homogenisation and economic changes derived from globalisation. 
Over time, the political and economic points of view driven by neoliberal theorists and 
post-marxists have become stronger, allowing a shift of the paradigm and transforming 
decentralisation as a vehicle to achieve them (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandal 2008; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). In the following pages each of these discourses will 
be further explained and analysed. 
 
Cultural discourse 
 
This is also known as the identity discourse, which started in the 1960s with the 
social movements of feminism, gay rights and ethno regionalism, among others (Gallaher, 
2009). Through the cultural discourse, individuals and social groups understand the world 
(Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2007) and define their identity, which is about belonging, 
shared beliefs, culture, traditions, language, worldviews and so on (Keating, 1998).  
Political identities tend to be linked to territory, to a homeland (Keating, 1998). It is 
about recognition and participation, the desire to be included in the decision-making 
process. Nationalism is the territorial expression of identity (Gallaher, 2009; Mountz, 
2009), in which regional nationalism is related to groups or regions which have different 
identities to that of the country in which they are; these groups often seek independence 
more than autonomy and the processes is highly bottom-up (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 
2008). An example of the latter is the Basque Country in Spain.  
The relation between regional identities and political actions can be analysed through 
three elements: the cognitive, affective and instrumental (Keating, 1998). The cognitive 
one is when people are aware of their region and its geographical limits. The affective one 
is related to the way that people feel about their region, a framework of identity and 
solidarity within their region. And the instrumental one, is when the region is used to take 
collective action in order to have more social, economic and political benefits (Keating, 
1998). 
Political geographers see nationalism as a force which can be both centripetal or 
centrifugal (Mountz, 2009). On the one hand, groups can hold a territory and strengthen 
themselves by reinforcing their identity; on the other hand, separatist movements might 
end in the splitting up of the country into several nations when they contain multiple 
antagonistic nationalities, as was the case in Yugoslavia, for instance. Therefore, identity 
movements are usually forces that resist homogenisation, which may be brought about by 
globalisation (Rodríguez-pose and Sandall, 2008) and they emphasise the particularities of 
each culture. Although Mountz (2009) adds it is not certain that globalisation has 
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influenced the current regional movements, it is important to take into account that the 
creation of the modern nation-state in Europe involved a trend of centralisation and 
homogenisation (Fowerker et al, 2003) that was spread to their colonies and across the 
world. Therefore global trends can influence local and national behaviours regarding 
centralism and decentralism.  
Nowadays, the influence of international laws to legitimise minorities’16 petitions has 
been crucial; in Latin America these groups have challenged governments and they have 
become significant political actors (Fowerker et al, 2003). Usually regions with a higher 
concentration of ethnic minorities tend to be less developed within a country (Mountz, 
2009); therefore, nationalist movements seek to participate in the economic process to 
ensure that those minority groups have a share in the benefits of the economic policies of 
their country and to diminish the disparities in development levels across its regions. Frank 
(2004) adds that behind cultural backgrounds there are usually economic disparities, which 
encourage redistribution discourses. In those countries, rich regions prefer asymmetric 
decentralisation in order to keep their wealth within the region; this is the case of Santa 
Cruz in Bolivia, Guayas in Ecuador and Cataluña in Spain. 
Besides, it is important to take into account that culture can define the kind of 
government and administration that a country has; highly hierarchical societies tend to 
have states that are more centralised, in which the focus usually is the satisfaction of 
people’s needs. On the other hand, more diverse societies may have a tendency to 
decentralisation, although there is no correlation between diversity and decentralisation 
(Frank, 2004). 
 
Economic discourse 
 
This discourse is strongly related to economic efficiency, in which decentralisation 
addresses the inefficiencies in the allocation of resources associated with centralism17. 
Also, Finot (2001b) makes the point that the provision of public goods and services would 
be more efficient if it is territorially differentiated. Through a decentralised system it is 
possible to focus efforts (resources, time and energy) on the needs of a particular territory 
without wasting those efforts across the whole country, where people do not necessarily 
have the same needs.  
                                                 
16 Regarding to the United Nations 1992 ‘a minority may be defined as a group which is numerically inferior 
to the rest of the State’s population, occupies a non-dominant position, possess distinctive national, ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics, and seeks to ensure its survival and development as a culturally distinct 
population’ (Foweraker et al, 2003 p167)  
17 See Willis et al, 1999; Finot, 2001b; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010 
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Decentralisation is also seen as a way to restructure the capitalist system through 
state reforms – such as privatisation and de-regulation -, compatible with neoliberalism and 
globalisation18, which promote local development. Often the implementation of 
decentralisation is tied more to increasing the efficiency of local government than to 
political issues19. Burns et al (1994) argue that for those in the right ‘the introduction of 
market mechanisms into public services is the ultimate form of decentralisation’ (p5). 
Thus, economic decentralisation is desirable in order to promote local economic 
development and to improve the response of the state to people’s needs. 
Centralism could increase the uneven growth of regions inside a country (Finot, 
2001a); therefore decentralisation might be focused on regional specialisation - i.e. taking 
advantage and enhancing regional activities, such as mining, forestry, tourism, etc -, 
capitalising on the comparative advantages of each territory. Central governments faced 
the economic crisis of the 1970s through generic policies, leaving aside the local context 
(Alburquerque, 2004), showing their incapacity to adjust solutions to local areas. 
Therefore, local governments and the private sector, mostly from developing countries, had 
to assume a more hands-on role in filling the gaps left by generic and national policies 
(Alburquerque, 2004). Besides, in the 1980s national economies were opened up to greater 
internal and external competition, and the responsibilities of the state were rolled back and 
substantially modified (Gilbert, 2006, p393). Since then, the perception that economic 
decentralisation generates better economic outcomes has grown (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Bwire, 2003); however, that has not been proved yet. Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) 
point out that few studies analysing the real increase in efficiency through decentralised 
measures have been made, and those few have had contradictory results. The consequences 
of decentralisation on economic development are not totally understood, as the studies are 
focussed mostly on individual case studies (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). 
Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2003) also explain that devolution may increase efficiency 
depending on the characteristics of each country, such as its size, level of income, quality 
and structure of its institutionality among others. 
It is possible to distinguish different kinds of economic decentralisation in the 
literature reviewed such as fiscal decentralisation and local development (Finot, 2001a; 
Bardhan, 2002; Montecinos, 2005). Besides, Bardhan (2002) adds that different aspects of 
decentralisation are not always found together at the same time and in all cases, and it is 
possible to find them mixed in their application in different countries. 
                                                 
18 See De Mattos, 1989; Burns et al, 1994; Escobar, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008 
19 See Conyers, 1984; Oates, 1993, Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008 
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Fiscal decentralisation, also called fiscal federalism, means that subnational 
governments have the right to make decisions about their fiscal expenditure and to 
generate their own income through local taxes (Finot, 2001a; Montecinos 2005); it implies 
that the taxes paid by citizens are directly related to the benefits that they receive 
(Montecinos, 2005). The goal of fiscal decentralisation is to de-concentrate the fiscal 
expenditure and to increase the coverage of the provision of public goods (Finot, 2001a; 
Montecinos 2005), so that subnational governments are obliged to improve their 
management20. Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) add that the results of fiscal 
decentralisation will depend on the level of development of each case. In less developed 
countries with high territorial inequalities, decentralisation can exacerbate them; and, on 
the other hand, in developed countries it might be neutral or even help to decrease 
territorial inequalities. Moreover, Enikolopov and Zhuranskaya (2007) point out that two 
elements are needed to ensure efficient fiscal decentralisation: a political system with 
strong national political parties and subnational authorities which are not subordinated to 
the higher levels of the government.  
Local economic development is based on the territorial values of identity, diversity 
and flexibility of the production of a given area (Alburquerque, 2004); it is a set of local 
initiatives in order to improve or resolve its particular problems. The key elements of local 
development are the inclusion, participation, coordination and commitment of the private 
and public actors involved in the process, which means that the outcomes of this strategy 
are not only economic, but also political, because it may improve governance and 
democracy in the whole system. It other words, under local development strategies, local 
governments can work side by side with the community to achieve development in a 
horizontal relationship (Alburquerque, 2004). The main goal is to take advantage of the 
local knowledge in order to generate policies more suited to local conditions, which 
position subnational governments in a better place - in comparison with national state – 
when responding to people’s needs. 
Economic decentralisation can be either a bottom-up or top-down process. It allows 
the development of the economic potential of territories, which adapt themselves to the 
economic changes (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). 
According to Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall (2008) one reason to support economic 
decentralisation is territorial competition, as territories often compete in the global market 
in order to attract investment, therefore the learning process of making regions more 
competitive and identifying those areas that might have more dynamism in a globalised 
                                                 
20 See Finot 2001a; Bardhan, 2002; Boisier, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003 
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world is important (see also Keating, 1998).  In that scenario regions cannot depend only 
on the central state to resolve their problems, but need to promote themselves and to 
establish also a nexus between the global and the local. 
Advocates of economic decentralisation highlight that subnational governments can 
develop appropriate policies for the community’s needs, innovating in the provision of 
public services and, therefore, ensuring they are more efficient and accountable. On the 
other hand, detractors, mainly from the field of fiscal decentralisation, argue that 
devolution does not bring more efficiency due to: lack of scale economies, overlapping of 
functions, corruption and soft budget constraints (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003).  
 
Political discourse 
 
This is also called democratic discourse or good governance discourse, because both 
democracy and governance are at the core of political discourse. Governance is understood 
as the process of coordination and management through networks in which the public and 
private sector participation is encouraged, being more horizontal and inclusive. Good 
governance shaped the language and arguments of those agencies – e.g. the World Bank 
and the IMF21 -, which seek to influence the countries that have received their help 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). It involves transparency and accountability in public 
administration, efficient use of public resources and participation in decision-making 
processes (Gregory et al, 2009). Detractors argue that the adoption of western models of 
public administration by developing countries may lead to negative impacts; also, they 
expose their concern about the lack of democratic control over decision-making with the 
increment of private actors’ participation (Gregory et al, 2009). 
Political discourse has found supporters from theorists from both the right and left 
wings, who blame the central state for being unresponsive, the former to the market and 
the latter to citizens (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). As a consequence, the political 
discourse is used by international nongovernmental organisations, multilateral institutions, 
donor and recipient governments, etc.; it has achieved a privileged place in the field of 
international development (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). ‘Arguments in favour of 
devolution stress the importance of participation in the policy making process and 
increased accountability’ (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003. p6). A closer relationship 
between government and citizenry can highlight local processes and improve political 
participation. Likewise, increasing transparency may diminish bureaucracy and improve 
                                                 
21 International Monetary Fund 
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the capacity of the community to oversee elected politicians, who are therefore forced to be 
more responsive to their electors (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003). In this context 
devolution arises as a key point. Empowering subnational government and civil society 
allows the achievement of good governance as both subnational governments and civil 
society, are in a better position to negotiate with the central state.  
Thus, political discourse is a way to rethink democracy (Arocena, 1989) through 
good governance, permitting greater dynamism and diversity of inclusion; in the words of 
Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall (2008) it is the transition from representative democracy to 
participatory democracy. Therefore, in a political discourse decentralisation seeks greater 
democratisation in decision-making processes and better governance. 
 
Although these three discourses are different in their arguments and implementation, 
the three of them are connected to a political dimension of decentralisation. The idea 
behind decentralisation is to achieve greater autonomy and the capacity to make their own 
decisions according their own needs and realities. To do that it is necessary to have 
economic and political power, at least control over the budget, ideally over the regional 
resources and authorities democratically elected in order to avoid a relation of 
subordination to the central state. 
 
STATE AND POWER 
 
The State 
 
Broadly, the state can be defined as the basic unit of political life, a set of institutions 
that have control and sovereignty over a definite territory, that has coercive power in order 
to protect the population that lives there and that has the capacity of law-making22. 
However, the state is a complex entity difficult to define (Mann, 1984; Jessop, 2007; 
MacKinnon and Cumbers, 2007); many theories around the state have been developed but 
none of them can fully explain it, all definitions seem to miss a part of it (Mann, 1984; 
Jessop, 2007; Gregory et al, 2009). Jessop (2007), following the thoughts of Poulantzas, 
exposes that the state is first of all a social relation, which means that as it is part of the 
society where it is embedded the relationship between the state and society is two-ways: 
the state may influence and be influenced by society. Therefore, as the state is transformed 
together with society, state theories also change over time and across space.  
                                                 
22 Mann, 1984; MacKinnon and Cumbers, 2007; Bevir, 2009; Gregory, et al, 2009 
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Conventionally the state has been seen through the Keynesian approach, in which it 
was responsible for the welfare of its people providing full employment and a social 
welfare system (Mackinnon, 2012). However, since the early 1980s a shift towards 
neoliberalism has evolved (Mackinnon, 2012), which promotes state policies of non-
intervention over the market, privatisation and the inclusion of new actors into decision-
making processes. Thus, the power of the state seemed to be eroded and its sphere of 
action limited so that it was moved away from a leading position. Mann (1984) explained 
how the analysis of the state by marxist, liberal and functional traditions reduced it to an 
arena in which power struggles and different interests were expressed and institutionalised; 
however, he considered this analysis a narrow vision of the state. Later on, a 
transformationalist approach was introduced, in which the idea of the state as a dynamic 
process in continuous transformation - according with the times and places where it is 
located - rather than something fixed, is emphasised (Jessop, 2007; MacKinnon and 
Cumbers, 2007; MacKinnon, 2012). Furthermore, Jessop (2007) explains that actually ‘the 
state is neither a subject nor a thing (…) it changes shape and appearance with the 
activities it undertakes, the scales on which it operates, the political forces acting towards 
it, the circumstances in which it and they act, and so forth’ (p3). Thereby, for instance, the 
changes produced in the economy have had a crucial influence over the transformation of 
the state over the last 30 years so that nowadays it has a more collaborative role rather than 
the primacy role that it held in the past.  
Since the late 1970s the market has been gaining power and influence over the world 
to the detriment of the state. Neoliberal supporters have promoted a reduced role for the 
state over it arguing that ‘it is the very absence of state action that produces the best 
conditions for the efficient allocation of productive resources and the most desirable 
distributions of production’s rewards’ (O’Neill, 1997, p290), although the last economic 
crises have proved this argument erroneous. The Keynesian state was therefore loosing its 
influence through economic reforms like privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation 
(MacKinnon, 1998), as state interventions produce distortions in distributional outcomes 
(O’Neill, 1997). In this scenario the state had to rebuild itself in order to respond to the 
new economic era. 
After the crisis of the Keynesian state, important contributions sought to understand 
the changes produced within the state; researchers have studied the state from different 
approaches such as the regulationist theory, the qualitative perspective and the strategic-
relational approach, among others. The regulationist perspective is based on the idea that 
the state stabilises and sustains capitalist forms of development (MacKinnon and Cumbers, 
2007); the qualitative approach establishes that the state has to be studied from the 
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perspective of its relationship with groups of interests within society, the way it intervenes 
and how decision-making processes take shape (O’Neill, 1997); the strategic-relational 
approach contributes with two main ideas: the state as a social relation and the ‘hollowing-
out’ process of the state (Jessop, 1997; Jessop, 2007) 
According to Mann (1984) the state can be analysed from two dimensions, 
institutional and functional; the former related to how the state looks institutionally and the 
latter to what the state does. From these it is possible to identify four key elements: a set of 
institutions and personnel, centralism in the making of political decisions, action over a 
delimited territory, and the monopoly of coercive power (Mann, 1984). Thus, the approach 
to the state can be established in a more conventional way, taking into account its size 
(bureaucracy, resources and so on), or from a functional point of view, which emphasises 
the political decision-making process and the exertion of power. 
The conception of the qualitative state - developed by O’Neill (1997) - underlines 
three statements: the state is an entity that is engaged and interacts with other institutions; 
the state has a fundamental role in the creation and operation of markets, including at the 
international scale; and, the power of the state has not been diminished by globalisation but 
changed. From this point of view, O’Neill exposes the need to study the state from a 
different approach, one that emphasises the changes produced in it and the relations 
developed between the state and other groups of interest - e.g. its intervention in society 
matters and how the decision-making process is developed. The reorganisation of the state 
is partly a response to the pressures of globalisation (MacKinnon and Cumbers, 2007), 
which has accelerated three processes: de-statisation, internationalisation and de-
nationalisation; these have undermined the dominance of the state (Jessop, 1997). De-
statisation is the shift from government to governance, which is a movement from a 
prominent role of the state towards other institutions, agencies and private interests. 
Internationalisation is related to a greater engagement and links between national, regional 
and local institutions in different countries, where networks and transferences of initiatives 
among countries have a significant role. And denationalisation refers to the transfer of state 
functions to the supranational or the subnational level (Jessop, 1997). Globalisation 
pressured states’ reorganisation into a less ‘heavy’ structure, in which its size 
(bureaucracy) is less important than the quality of its functions (MacKinnon and Cumbers, 
2007; MacKinnon, 2012)  
From the strategic-relational approach the state is understood as a social relation 
(Jessop, 2007), the state has the same structures, behaviours and practices of the society 
into which is embedded; society is influenced by state actions and at the same time, the 
state also reproduces what exists in society. The former explains decentralisation based on 
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internal lines of authority within society and the latter points out that decentralisation is a 
consequence of diversity within society (Frank, 2004). Moreover, Jessop points out that it 
is not possible to have an adequate theory of the state without a theory of society. He 
understands the state as the territorialisation of political authority and defines the state 
apparatus as a group of institutions and organisations, whose function is to define and 
enforce collective decisions on the population on behalf of the ‘common interest’ or 
‘general will’ (2007). The state is embedded in a political system ‘articulated with other 
institutional orders and linked to different forms of civil society’ (Jessop, 2007. p6; see 
also O’Neill, 1997). The understanding of the state apparatus and uses and practices of the 
state personnel is also relevant. On the one hand the institutional structure is a reflection of 
social identity and on the other hand, the state is also composed by people who belong to 
society – it is a peopled organisation (Jones et al, 2004) -; thus, they are also entangled 
with cultural, economic and political behaviour and interests. From this point of view, the 
implementation of new policies or changes within the state has to be according to changes 
in society in order to have the support of the people who are going to implement it. 
According to Jones, et al (2004), state personnel have a key role implementing or resisting 
broader political projects; they might delay or even block proposals designed by political 
elites. Jones et al focused on state personnel’s individual skills and their struggles within 
the power net of the central state. Peck and Theodore (2010) explain that policy actors are 
located in specific organisational and political fields. In other words, they belong to 
institutions that are part of a net of power relations; but also, are part of the internal 
structure of an organisation. Besides, actors are ‘embodied members of epistemic, expert 
and practice communities’ (p170) that often do not work alone as they count on consultants 
that can influence decisions. Their individual skills, backgrounds and careers also shape 
their thoughts and decisions. Thus, actors are complex beings that make decisions for more 
than one reason; they are influenced by their profession, levels of expertise, specific skills, 
personal or collective interests, beliefs, net of influences and so on.  
A policy itself is not a ‘recipe’; it will not have the same outcomes everywhere it is 
applied. On the contrary, there are so many variables involved that it is difficult to predict 
what is going to happen, as there are different actors involved and because of the 
characteristics of the sites where the policy is going to be implemented. Policies created 
and decided at the national level are transformed when passing down to the regional level, 
as actors interpret and implement them in different ways. Those actors are also defined by 
their territories, they act not only according to all the above but also taking into account the 
specific needs of the territories where they work and live. Also, Jones et al (2004) highlight 
the importance of the attitudes of state personnel in the success of certain decisions. 
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Having proactive and willing personnel will help to develop better outcomes when 
implementing policies, as they will do their best to maximise their benefits. 
There are two main schools of thought: those who see the state as a singular, 
powerful and isolated entity, which has lost power because of the global market; and those 
who see the state embedded in society, interacting with other institutions, promoting 
governance and transforming itself by adapting to the time and arena. O’Neill (1997) 
argues that the idealisation of the Keynesian Welfare state has had a great impact and has 
been used to compare subsequent state roles. It is commonly believed that the power of the 
state has been eroded over the past two decades because of the nature of capitalist 
accumulation, which he signals as inadequate. O’Neill emphasises that the shift in the role 
of the state does not erode its power but changes its relationship with other actors and 
institutions. For instance, in Europe, the conception of the state has experienced tension 
due to international integration, regional decentralisation and the advance of the market 
(Keating, 1998).  
Free market supporters see decentralisation as a solution to the increasing conception 
of the state as an obstacle to the accumulation model23. Moreover, Zunino (2002) goes 
further declaring that many researchers are arguing that the power sphere is moving to 
local and global scales so that the national state as a significant political and economic 
actor might disappear. This erosion of the power of the state is seen by hyperglobalists24 as 
a triumph of capitalism over the nation-state (Murray, 2006). However, Goodwin et al 
(2005) express their concern regarding ‘new regionalism’ which emphasised the role of 
institutions and networks in detriment of the state, while explaining that it is still playing a 
key role in the economy. Although the central state has often proved to be inefficient in the 
provision of services that it has to deliver to the community (Willis et al, 1999), this is not 
reason enough to assume that the solution is the market, which is often not efficient either 
(or efficient only for some groups), as could be seen in the last economic crises – such as 
banks collapse or the indebtedness of countries. Both the qualitative approach and the 
strategic-relational approach give a different framework to understand the changes 
produced in the state over the last three decades. The idea of the disappearance of the state 
has not much support if the current economic crisis is considered, in which the state is 
having an active role in the attempt to revert it – e.g. the rescue of the banks in the UK. 
Even in more stable times, the state plays a key role in economy issues, such as economic 
protection inside its boundaries, the legal framework for economic activities – e.g. 
                                                 
23 See De Mattos, 1989; Bardhan, 2002; Escobar, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008 
24 School of globalisation which argues that ‘the first truly ‘global civilisation’ ‘ (Murray, 2006. p34) has 
emerged 
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regulations of natural resources exploitation, establishment of partnerships and operation 
of financial institutions -, provision of public goods, income and wealth redistribution, 
promotion of international financial flows – e.g. FTA – and so on. Goodwin et al (2005) 
also explain how the state has a key role producing and articulating the institutional norms 
and networks of this new arena (also O’Neill 1997). Moreover, the state supplies the 
infrastructure that supports most of economic activities, such as roads and ports. Thus, 
taken into account those perspectives, one might say the state is far from disappearing from 
the economic and social spheres, it has adapted itself in a way that its interventions are 
crucial. Rephrasing O’Neill, it is not about the size or the quantity of the state actions but 
the quality of its intervention; its power has not been eroded but the way that it is exerted 
has changed.  
The ongoing transformation of the state is therefore an attempt to recover its primacy 
role over its territory and society and decentralisation becomes a key strategy to regain its 
power. Decentralisation can support the recovery of power by the state in two fundamental 
ways: having presence in its territory and becoming a key actor while inviting other actors 
to participate in the decision-making processes.  First of all, decentralisation allows the 
state to have presence at the subnational scale; it can be said that through decentralisation 
the state ‘goes to the people’ instead of the traditional Keynesian state bureaucracy that 
was seen as an inaccessible ‘monster’. The state can be more efficient in its response 
towards the citizenry and thereby recover primacy in their mind; through improving its 
communication with them, the state recovers the power to act on their behalf. And 
secondly, subnational bodies of the state can influence the economy and society through 
strategic planning and collaborating with public and private local actors. Through 
coordinating such negotiations the state recovers a prominent role within the political 
arena. In other words, while the market supporters see the state as ‘the enemy’ and 
promote its diminishment and the erosion of its power, the state ‘strikes back’ with an 
inclusion policy, calling all the actors to participate in the negotiation round table and 
becoming the greater promoter of collaborative work and governance.  
Finally, although the state nowadays has to make alliances and negotiate with many 
other actors and institutions to achieve its goals, and although there has been a loss of 
power in certain areas - such as trade and the regulation of financial markets -, it has 
gained or maintained power in other areas such as foreign policy and crime (MacKinnon 
and Cumbers, 2007). 
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Power 
 
Power becomes fundamental to the debate due to both the ongoing reform of the 
state and political decentralisation. While in the former power is crucial in order to bring 
back the state, in the latter the focus is on power fluxes between national and subnational 
levels within the state. Centralised systems maintain power at the national level, while a 
decentralised system entails sharing power, transferring it - or part of it - to subnational 
levels.  
In a broad context, power is ‘the ability of one agent to affect the actions or attitudes 
of another’ (Gregory, et al, 2009 p575). Traditionally, power is understood as a fixed 
capacity, which is possessed by an individual, group or organisation and it is easily located 
(Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2010). From this perspective, power is the capacity to 
influence actions, decisions and/or behaviour in order to achieve certain outcomes (Allen, 
1997). Allen (2003) identifies two forms of power within the conventional perspective: 
instrumental or ‘power over’ and associational or ‘power to’. The former is understood as 
something that can be held or possessed over others and used to obtain leverage, which 
entails a negative idea of dominance and, therefore, winners and losers - one group at the 
expense of another. The latter – the associational form - is related to the idea of 
collaborative action in order to achieve common aims, so everyone taking part may 
benefit. 
Sharp et al (2000) analyse power emphasising the struggles of domination and 
resistance. On the one hand, power is an attempt to dominate, control and/or to repress 
others, which can be exerted by governments and economic interests among others. And, 
on the other hand, power is the attempt to resist that domination through social 
organisations, political actions and even direct confrontation. Thus, power means ‘to be 
able’ - to be able to act or to resist an action. Participation in decision-making processes 
also involves accountability, in which ’to be able’ means that individuals, groups and 
governments should be accountable to themselves and/or electors for the way they exert 
the power that was given to them.  
The associational conception of power – power to or power as a medium - is based 
on the production of power. Power is not possessed by a ruling class, it is not inherent to 
certain groups or institutions, but generated through networks. Individuals or institutions 
make alliances in order to achieve certain goals, which can be short-term or long-term 
depending on the goal. Power, in this context is a fluid medium - where there are no 
winners or losers -, which can expand or contract according to the agreements among 
institutions (Allen, 1997). This is a more positive or softer conception of power, which is 
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broadly used by local and regional development studies (Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2010). 
The heart of this conception is that people or institutions that share some goals come 
together in order to develop collective projects (Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2010) and 
therefore the capacity to mobilise resources in order to achieve certain outcomes (Allen, 
1997); thus networking becomes crucial. This form of power is also related to the ongoing 
restructuration of the state, specifically, to the shift from government to governance, which 
integrates new and different actors to decision-making processes. Although ‘power to’ is 
seen from a conventional perspective by Allen, it also can be analysed as part of the post-
structuralist approach, taking into account that it is not fixed or clearly located but it 
changes/moves according to particular circumstances.  
The Foucauldian conception explains that power is not something that is held over 
others, or that operates in a unidimensional way; power has a direction - an intention - but 
nobody knows exactly who is behind that power and it is exerted everywhere. For instance 
authorities exert power but they are not the ‘owners’ of this power, therefore, it is not 
something that can be won or lost. Foucault also argues that power is a diffuse and 
unlocatable force, which permeates all levels of society in a way that individuals are in 
both positions, exerting power but also being subject to it (Foucault, 1972a, Katz, 2009).  
Furthermore, Allen (2003) explains that the conventional understanding of power – 
power as a capacity - does not take into account two key elements: the different modalities 
of exercising power – domination, authority, seduction, manipulation, coercion and so on – 
and its spatial dimension; power is inherently spatial and also spatiality is imbued with 
power. He argues that power has not been studied from the way it is exerted and that 
geographical spaces are not homogeneous; thus social relations – and, therefore, power 
relations – are developed and exercised in different ways. For instance, distance is an 
important issue regarding power scope; authority and coercion, he argues, have a greater 
impact when they are exerted close-hand. Also, he points out that there is not one kind of 
power exercised at the time, but a complex overlapping net of power modalities working at 
the same time over the space. Thus, for him, power is the result of forces’ interactions in a 
certain place or territory. This post structuralist conception is based on Foucaudian 
thought, which does not see power as an end or a mean, but as several techniques and 
practices; power is understood as a fluid process that circulates through society (Cumbers 
and MacKinnon, 2010), which is not possessed but exerted. Power is exerted by people or 
institutions but it is not centred in them (Allen, 1997); power is a relational effect of social 
interaction (Allen, 2003). 
Cumbers and MacKinnon (2010) point out three critical comments about post-
structuralist perspectives: the value of power as a capacity, the value of historical 
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sedimentation, and the agency of social groups. First of all, the post-structuralist approach 
must not underestimate the value of the conventional perspective, because power is both a 
capacity and an effect (Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2010). Therefore, conventional and post-
structural approaches are not in conflict; one does not invalidate the other, and they can 
both be used to understand the complexities of the power relations that build spaces. 
Second, the associational perspective tends to overvalue networks and associations in order 
to generate power and neglect historical processes and ‘inherited forms of attachment and 
belonging’ (Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2010. p253), so the understanding of power 
relations in a certain region must also consider historical sedimentation. And thirdly, the 
uneven development of regions stems from past and current struggles for power possession 
and its operation and reproduction in particular places, where on the one hand, there are 
social and political processes at work in the construction and transformation of human 
landscapes, and, on the other hand, there are elements or factors that seek to fix or modify 
that landscape through certain ideological and political discourses (Cumbers and 
MacKinnon, 2010). Therefore, the territory is an ongoing construction, which needs to be 
approached from the tension that exists between fixity and mobility. Cumbers and 
MacKinnon (2010) also explain that the issues of agency of social groups or interests 
resisting transformation (mobility) have been underplayed by the post-structural approach. 
More studies have to be done regarding these issues in order to understand better power 
relations in a territory. 
These three ways of seeing power are highly related to decentralisation: power as a 
capacity is the heart of the centralist system. Power as a medium (networking) is the key to 
governance, which is one of the goals of decentralisation. And the post-structuralist 
conception is the key to understand how power flows among levels and institutions; firstly, 
because power is dynamic and quite difficult to pin down, and secondly, due to the grasp 
of power as the product of social interactions within a territory and among different scales. 
It is important to be aware of the different meanings of power in centralisation and 
decentralisation processes: on the surface centralisation appears to be a means of control 
and dominance while decentralisation would be a move towards freedom and resistance. 
However, life is not black and white, but in shades of grey. Foucault (1971b) explains the 
dangers of this conception as a prohibitive/repressive force instead of the fact that power is 
accepted because it is a force that produces things, discourses, thoughts and pleasure. 
Decentralisation means sharing power – empowerment -, which entails giving others the 
opportunity to exert power in decision-making processes. It is about inclusion. However, 
decentralisation might also be used manipulatively by particular groups of interest. 
Foucault also points out that access to power is only possible through the study of the 
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strategies, tactics and rationalities used by the social actors to control society (Zunino, 
2002). 
Mann (1984) explains the existence of two kinds of power exerted by the state: 
despotic and infrastructural; the former is related to the ability of the state’s elite to act 
over civil society – e.g. ancient kingdoms where the elite had power over the lives of its 
people - and the latter is related to the power of the state to penetrate and coordinate the 
activities of civil society through its own infrastructure. The infrastructural power is 
defined as the capacity of the state to penetrate and coordinate domestic life of civil 
society, such as by policies for development and public works on transport infrastructure 
among others. He also explains how the infrastructural power of the state has increased to 
the point that nowadays the state penetrates almost the whole domestic life of its 
population, by providing or regulating schools, hospitals, police, waste disposal, pensions, 
etc (Mann, 1984). 
Another important point regarding power is the relationship between political and 
economic forms of power, which are impossible to separate; behind authorities and 
policies generally lie economic interests. There is an increasing economic interest in 
decentralisation (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008), because often decentralisation means 
the privatisation of services that were usually provided by the state and the promotion of 
local development. 
The complexity of power relationships within and among levels in a territory are 
very important regarding decentralisation; they are inserted into a net of fluxes in which 
the power is exerted but not settled, passing through different groups according to the 
circumstances (Sharp et al, 2000). Decision-making is a key point here because the issue of 
who will make those decisions and also the way that they will be made depends on the 
degree of autonomy of each level. For example, some development plans may be made at 
subnational levels but have to be ratified by the central level, which means negotiation 
with decision makers at the upper level. In this context it is very important to take into 
account what kind of relationship exists between levels, strongly vertical (hierarchical) or 
more horizontal (transversal); the former is more related to a centralised system and the 
latter to a decentralised system.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
A better understanding of decentralisation is fundamental to identify key elements 
that will be analysed in this research, such as the motivation for its implementation, as a 
means towards development or as an end itself; or the tension between deconcentration and 
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devolution, which are part of the same process but also may be opposite forces when the 
central state uses deconcentration in order to increase its presence and, therefore its 
control, over the territory. Decentralisation is a strategy developed within the ongoing 
reform of the state, specifically related to denationalisation, in which the state rebuilds 
itself in order to maintain a strong position in relation to the Market. 
There have been two key issues identified in the literature reviewed in this chapter: 
the tension between deconcentration and devolution as decentralising forces, which should 
be analysed further; and secondly, the role of the state personnel in the implementation of 
public policies, which should focus on their personal values, interests and beliefs besides 
their abilities or positionality within a certain institution. Both elements will be explored in 
the results chapters of this thesis. 
Among the key elements for political decentralisation are the state and power, 
whose role is crucial; the state as the agent who promotes and implements the changes 
towards decentralisation and power, which is the object that is transferred from central to 
subnational levels. In this regard, questions such as how decentralisation process is shaped, 
to what extent regional governments should be empowered and what is the relationship 
between regional and central government arise. These questions will be analysed in 
chapters V, VI and VII in relation to the Chilean case, which is introduced in Chapter IV 
(Case Study). Regarding the shapes that political decentralisation can take, the focus will 
be on the different understandings that key actors have of decentralisation and therefore, 
different ways in which it is implemented. The extension of the empowerment of regional 
governments - in other words, whether decentralisation has to lead towards federalisation 
or whether it can end in more autonomous subnational governments, and what are the key 
factors to decide which - will be analysed in relation to the dichotomy of political 
decentralisation as a mean or an end and therefore how public policies toward 
decentralisation are being applied. Finally, the relationship between central and regional 
government will be studied regarding power fluxes within state institutions. There still are 
many questions around decentralisation, such as whether the current reforms will end 
debilitating it or strengthening the state and in what aspects; and whether this trend towards 
decentralisation will continuous or reverse. All these questions will be analysed in the next 
chapters with the aim of making contributions to the debate and providing some insight on 
these issues in the specific case of Chile.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will discuss the research design and methods used in order to answer the 
research questions and meet the goals posed at the outset of this thesis. It has been divided 
in three sections: research design, positionality and ethics, and methods. The research 
design section presents the methodological approach employed, explains the research 
questions and addresses the steps followed in order to execute it. The second section 
discusses my positionality and the ethical issues entailed within the research, which are 
mainly related to my insider/outsider role. The third section explains the methods used for 
the collection and analysis of the data, introduces the actors and institutions that 
participated and explains the main challenges faced during the research. The section ends 
with reflections in order to assess critically what has been done. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Theoretical/philosophical justification 
 
In this section the methodological framework in which the research was developed 
will be explained, emphasising the importance of qualitative methods in order to answer 
the research questions posed at the outset of this thesis. In a wide sense, this research uses 
an unstructured methodological approach in order to allow the emergence of as many 
perspectives as possible of the topic; the tendency is to ask general rather than specific 
research questions (Bryman, 2004). This research is set in the frame of political geography 
and it has also been influenced by the new institutionalist perspective and by the 
transformationalist approach of the state (March and Olsen, 1984; Lowndes, 2002). Having 
this in mind and considering the research questions, the qualitative research, defined by 
Bryman (2004 p267) was chosen (see also Marsh and Stoker, 2002). 
The pivotal concern of qualitative research is the understanding and interpretation of 
how the social world is represented. What becomes essential is how people represent their 
world rather than reality (Marsh and Stoker, 2002), in other words ‘the social world must 
be interpreted from the perspective of the people being studied’ (Bryman, 2004 p279). 
Therefore the researcher takes the place of the ‘other’ in order to obtain social knowledge. 
Qualitative methods are also constructionist, which means that the social world is the 
consequence of interactions between individuals (Bryman, 2004). What is important is the 
meaning of certain practices and ‘qualitative methods are good at capturing meaning, 
process and context’ (Marsh and Stoker, 2002 p199). 
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The interpretative and constructive aspects of qualitative research are the most 
suitable to achieve the aims of this research, which seeks to understand the decentralisation 
process in Chile from the perspective of the actors involved. Thus, institutions are political 
actors in their own right (Marsh and Olsen, 1984) and the state is seen as a social relation 
(Jessop, 1997). Also, triangulating the data - by interviewing different groups of 
respondents and by checking with written documents - makes it possible to go inside a 
broader reality of political decentralisation in. Therefore, by identifying motivations, 
actions and perceptions, it is possible to have a better grasp of the constructions of political 
decentralisation and its representation(s) in Chile.  
Specifically, the research is focused on a case study using a constructivist paradigm, 
which recognises the relevance of interpretation and subjective re-creations of realities 
while not rejecting objectivity (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The case study approach focuses 
on the particularities and complexities of a single case, in which the first goal is to 
understand the case itself. I chose the instrumental case study as it provides insights into a 
broader issue (Stake, 1995), such as the top-down implementation of decentralisation in a 
country with centralist tradition. Although the ‘real business’ of case study approach is 
particularisation, it also allows polishing, delimiting or modifying certain generalisations 
(ibid). The reasons to choose this approach are related to first of all to my personal interest 
in Chile, not only because it is my country, but also because my research questions 
stemmed from my experience working for the government in Chile. Secondly, because of 
the singularities of the case, such as the contradiction of a decentralising process driven by 
the central body, the high centralism of the country – Chile is one of the most centralist 
countries in Latin America (Eaton, 2004) -, and the reluctance that some regional actors 
showed regarding the decentralising process. 
 
Research Questions and overall design  
 
The motivations and interests behind this thesis and also how the research project 
was designed will be explained in this section. Some of the questions that have driven me 
over the past years are related to power relations and the role of individual actors in the 
decision-making process and the implementation of policies at both the national and 
regional level. A second issue that have caught my attention within the Chilean case is the 
contradiction/paradox of a top-down decentralisation process, which has made me think of 
a tightly controlled process. Thus, I developed three research questions (see Chapter I): 1) 
How is political decentralisation shaped in Chile? , 2) To what extent are regional 
governments being empowered by the decentralisation process in Chile? , and 3) What is 
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the relationship between the central state and the regions regarding the political 
decentralisation process? 
In order to answer these questions, it was necessary to explore the literature to define 
and shape a theoretical framework for decentralisation processes. The discussion around 
decentralisation and the three main discourses explained by Rodríguez-Pose were 
fundamental for this purpose. The contributions of Jessop and Allen about the state 
transformation and power relations respectively were also important. On the other hand, 
for an empirical perspective two Chilean reforms towards decentralisation were chosen - 
the creation of DIPLAD and the direct election of regional councillors. The combination of 
both theoretical and empirical information - literature review, analysis of public policies 
and laws, and in-depth conversations with key actors – contributed to answer the research 
questions above and to understand further decentralising processes driven in countries with 
unitary states. 
 
The research was designed in four steps, based on Bryman’s scheme (p269 Bryman, 
2004): (1) formulation of research questions, (2) data collection, (3) data analysis, and (4) 
writing up of the thesis. The formulation of research questions was based on my previous 
experience working for the Chilean government and on my master’s research, which after 
reading broadly on the main topics of this research I refined them to their current form. 
First of all, general research questions were formulated in order to delimit decentralisation 
and to define the relevant topics. From those questions I started the exploration of literature 
focused on three main topics: political decentralisation, state and power. This had two 
main purposes, firstly to familiarise myself with the relevant literature and secondly, to 
frame the research in the context of academic debate. At the same time, I also examined 
documents related to the Chilean state in order to have a more accurate idea of the current 
situation there. After this I was able to redefine the research questions to the three that are 
being addressed in this thesis. 
The data collection includes the selection of sites and subjects and the collection of 
relevant data. The subjects were defined looking for the key actors in the two reforms 
chosen for this research, while the sites – Valparaíso and Tarapacá regions – were defined 
looking for regions with contrasting realities in order to compare their response towards 
these reforms1. Once the sites and subjects were defined, two field trips were organised: 
the first one from October 2009 to February 2010 and again from November 2010 to 
January 2011. The reason for those two periods of data collection was the Chilean 
                                                 
1 Further details in the section of Methods 
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presidential elections held in December 2009, which meant a change of government in 
March 2010. Therefore I wanted to obtain information from the actors that had worked on 
decentralisation issues during the 2006 – 2010 period and also from people in those 
positions during the next regime (2010 – 2014). Although it was possible nothing was 
going to change in the order of public policies, usually a change of governments means 
change of some key actors and I felt it was important to talk with the agents involved in 
Chilean decentralising policies in order to have firsthand information. At this stage I used 
two main sources: in-depth interviews - with academics and relevant actors - and the 
revision of various sorts of Chilean documents such as the constitution, laws, official 
guidelines and documents produced by state institutions and by regionalist movements.  
The data analysis also includes interpretation of data and conceptual and theoretical 
work. The first step involves grouping interviewees, coding the data and relating it to the 
relevant literature. Initially, participants were classified by institutions, levels and 
positions, although later on it proved to be more useful grouping them into seven groups 
that combines the three of them. The coding disaggregated the interviewees’s responses 
into topics, thus all the information was deconstructed and grouped by topics that were 
analysed separately. Later on, the results were reorganised in order to answer the research 
questions, which constitute the three results chapters of this thesis (V, VI and VII)2.  
 
POSITIONALITY AND ETHICS 
 
Representation in regard to the status of the researcher is fundamental as he/she is 
the interpreter of the data collected (Marsh and Stoker, 2002); being aware of the role and 
the positionality of the researcher is essential to avoid bias. Cloke et all (2004) explain that 
research in geography is a social activity that ‘takes place within a multiple and 
overlapping set of social relations and will be inevitably influenced by them’ (p365). 
Therefore the researcher and participants hold their own personal values, beliefs, emotions 
and identities as a result of their own experiences; that background is involved in every 
stage of the research – from the formulation of the research questions to how the findings 
are presented - as they determine the choices he/she makes. Those choices can be 
conscious or unconscious, which means that the researcher is not always aware of them. In 
this section I will explain my positionality both as an outsider and an insider of the 
research from my perspective and also in the view of the participants. I will also explain 
how this could influence the research, being aware that there are other issues that I am not 
conscious of that may have affected it.  
                                                 
2 Further details in the section of Methods 
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First of all, I was born and grew up in Santiago, the capital of Chile, which implies 
that my education and experiences were shaped by a centric perspective. It does not mean 
that my thoughts and beliefs are centralist, but that I lacked a grasp of regional matters. 
While studying geography, I joined a group specialised in fog water research within the 
Department of Geography3 with whom I worked for ten years, mainly in the north of Chile. 
In addition, I worked for the Regional Secretariat of Planning (SERPLAC) in O’Higgins’ 
Region for three years after I gained my degree in Geography; I left in order to dedicate 
myself full time to research. Because of my work on fog, I travelled a lot to the north of 
Chile, which opened my eyes to the different realities within the country; I learned from 
local people what were the main difficulties they faced and I started to understand what the 
sentence ‘Santiago is not Chile’ truly means. The knowledge of the arid and semiarid parts 
of the country gave me a more complete vision of the territory and in 2002 I left the CDA 
in order to work for the Regional Secretariat of Housing and Urbanism (SEREMI MINVU) 
in Tarapacá Region, where I was in charge of the Territorial Planning Unit. In 2007 I 
decided it was time to go back to academia, so I came to Glasgow University in order to 
continue my studies. Both experiences at university and in the government allowed me to 
develop a wide understanding of practices within the Chilean state and knowledge of 
territorial planning. My early steps in academia, though in physical geography, also trained 
me to question everything - never taking a thing for granted – and the will to search for 
answers even if more questions arise, as the path of a researcher is to develop more 
questions because seeking those answers is the way to contribute to greater knowledge. 
Besides, as I have worked in different regions – mainly in the Metropolitan region, VI 
Region, IV Region and I Region – I have a good knowledge of the diversity and regional 
issues within each of them. 
 
Having this in mind, my position as a researcher was both outside and inside the 
research, which had advantages and disadvantages. Being Chilean allows me to understand 
the language and culture of Chileans; and having been a public servant helps me to 
understand the practices and terminology within the state. However, this also could bias 
my judgement regarding the people selected for interviews and the way to address the 
discussion. From those points of view I was an insider, I was part of the country and the 
topic that was being researched. On the other hand, I was not a public servant anymore, I 
had left the country and I was doing research for a foreign university; therefore I was also 
                                                 
3 Later on the research group became the CDA (Atacama Dessert Centre). I was an active member from 1993 
to 2002 and after that I have worked with them sporadically. 
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an outsider. Moreover, some people I had already met when I worked for the Ministry of 
Housing (MINVU) were more willing to chat and catch up than to have a serious 
interview; and from my perspective I had to be aware that my previous knowledge of 
people should not influence my decision of whether to include or exclude them from the 
research.  
From my personal point of view, both roles suited me well. Being an insider 
facilitated my access to participants, to academic work published in Spanish and state 
documents. As an outsider, I got some distance from the subject and could analyse it from 
a wider perspective. In other words, all my knowledge and expertise plus the skills and 
knowledge I gained in the University of Glasgow placed me in a privileged position as a 
researcher. From the point of view of the participants, I feel that being an insider made 
them feel more comfortable; they could explain themselves easily and also on occasions it 
seemed to me that the respondents felt it was their duty to help a compatriot. Some 
disadvantages stemmed from the natural mistrust of state personnel towards outsiders and 
the lack of value some of them attribute to academic research. 
When interviewing, my role was also both as an outsider and as an insider. I was an 
insider because I could speak the same language – i.e. I know state personnel jargon so I 
can use the same terminology as them – and they could take some things for granted such 
as that I know how the state operates. Also, I was an outsider, someone who was doing 
research on a specific topic in a foreign country. The participants responded differently to 
my outsider/insider position. I strengthened my position as a researcher playing both roles 
regarding the situation. For instance, showing I was one of them so there were no need of 
further explanation of cultural behaviour or language and also explaining that I was acting 
as a ‘translator’ of their views for academia, both in Chile and the UK; therefore their 
contribution could help to make bridges between different worlds. 
 
During the data analysis I faced other challenges due to my background: not to be 
judgemental. As I have met some of the participants, when I worked in Chile (20) and few 
of them are close friends (3), I was concerned that my personal knowledge of those people 
could affect the analysis. I had an opinion on their capacities and personal agenda so I was 
in a position of prejudge those interviews – positively or negatively – and make 
interpretations beyond what was said within the research, which I could not do with the 
other respondents. To avoid the possibility of doing that when I transcribed the interviews, 
I coded them so that it was not possible to link the respondent with his/her interview easily. 
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Ethics in research is very important, not only for the integrity of the research but 
also for the safety of the participants; ethical issues might arise at any stage of the research 
(Bryman, 2004). The main ethical principles are to have informed consent from the 
respondents before the start, to respect the privacy of participants, not to harm participants, 
to avoid deception and sensitivity to cultural difference (Bryman, 2004; Cloke et al, 2004). 
Because of the nature of this research, I completed the ethical application form of the 
university and I got the permission from the ethical committee to do the research. 
Participants were not happy to sign a permission form; most of them argued that 
consenting to the interview was proof enough of their willingness to participate in the 
research. This could be because it was an election period, so respondents were more 
suspicious, or perhaps it was just that Chileans are quite paranoid regarding such things. 
In the case of this research, which was mainly focused on interviews with state 
personnel, my first step was to inform all potential participants about its characteristics and 
what I needed from respondents. Once I had arranged the interviews, I tried to create an 
alliance between them and me. Cloke et all (2004) explain how the creation of a ‘research 
alliance’ can balance the power relationship within an interview, creating a safe 
environment in which there is a mutual trustworthy interaction between interviewer and 
interviewee; thus the point of view of the respondent is more valued. Therefore the way I 
worked with participants was more conversational than questioning; as Cloke et all (2004) 
point out interviews become joint constructions. Although participants had given their 
consent for the interviews, I started each one by presenting myself and explaining my 
motivations. Politics is a very sensitive subject in Chile, as a result of the de-politicisation 
campaign during the dictatorship  – especially within the state apparatus –; I established 
clearly that this research was not about political parties and their struggles for power but 
about the relationship between institutions and the implementation of decentralising 
reforms. Thus, I shifted the focus from government and elections to state and policies. Also 
I guaranteed confidentiality and privacy; the interviews were anonymous and everything 
that was said there has been only listened to by me (and one assistant - bound by the same 
undertaking - who helped me with the transcriptions). This way I think participants felt 
more relaxed because they understood I was not researching them, or the current political 
struggles, unless they affected the institutions and policies I was interested in.  
The construction of such an alliance was not always possible; however, I believe it 
worked in most cases. In this regard, playing the role of an outsider/insider was also 
fundamental; I was an outsider that wanted to understand decentralisation in Chile but also 
an insider that was aware of ‘taboo’ topics during the election period. Also, as some of the 
respondents had participated in my master’s research, they had experienced the seriousness 
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of confidentiality in academic research and had noticed no harm from taking part; so they 
were less suspicious. I did not offer any kind of reward for participation in the research; I 
think the main motivation of participants was their interest in making contributions from 
their positions. A great number of them – mostly from the regions - claimed that their 
opinions were almost never solicited when the central body made decisions, so they were 
happy to have a place to express themselves.  
During the interviews I first approached with peripheral or broad questions in order 
to let the respondent develop their answers. They were building the ground for what they 
wanted to say and I was following their construction of thoughts, going deeper into those 
topics they were willing to explore. I was only giving them some guides if the conversation 
was deviating too far from the subject. Thus, the participants felt they were in control and 
were not pressured to talk about anything with which they were uncomfortable.  
 
The conflict with my positionality arose early during the research; I have met many 
people when I worked for the government and some of them were close friends (actually, 
some of them still are close friends). I wondered if the closeness to some of the 
respondents could affect the research, or our personal relationship; I did not want to risk 
the integrity of the research nor our friendship. Therefore, I firstly identified the potential 
conflicts and secondly, I tried to figure out how to avoid or manage them. From the 
perspective of the researcher, to know some people might entail biases in selecting 
participants, but it could also be turned into an advantage if I used that knowledge in order 
to select the most suitable people – key informants - for the research. Besides, I was 
concerned about how acquaintances and friends that have known me in a different context 
might react, so for them it could be difficult to see me as a researcher and in consequence 
not to take the interview seriously. It is very common among public servants to think that 
research in academia is something beyond reality (in Chile at least), so many of them think 
it is a waste of time and resources. I was concerned that this might create a conflict over 
my identity with people who already knew me. That was not a conflict with people that did 
not know me before the research because for them I was a researcher. To avoid that kind of 
situation I used all the formal channels to contact and arrange interviews with them in 
order to generate an atmosphere of professionalism before and during interviews. Also, I 
spent more time with them during the meetings before starting the interviews because they 
wanted to know what had become of me since I left the Ministry. Also I was very careful 
not to abuse the trust I had from them. 
The responses I had were positive. Those who knew/remembered me treated me 
more as a colleague than as an outsider; they were very willing to help me in any way 
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possible such as giving me additional information, documents and in some cases loaning 
me a desk in order to have a place to work when I had to wait for the next interview – e.g. 
my ex boss was extremely helpful and supportive in all these matters. Also, people who 
had met me before gave their personal opinions more openly without showing signs of 
excessive caution or distrust. Those participants that did not know me before were more 
cautious and reluctant to reveal their personal opinions; most of them used the 
‘institutional discourse’ at the beginning of the interview, however, as the interviews 
progressed, they felt more comfortable and relaxed, so they were more willing to share 
their personal perspective of decentralisation issues. In some interviews the difference 
from the beginning and the end of an interview was so great that even the language 
changed from formal to informal.  
My position as a former public servant was an advantage in order to contact 
potential participants, have easier access to people that usually it is very difficult to 
interview and to have more open conversations with those participants who knew who I 
was. This could be turned into a disadvantage when some interviewees were more willing 
to ‘gossip’ than to give an account of the issues I was asking. Although I did not encourage 
this, I did not discourage it either because one of my interests was to ascertain how 
personal relations can affect the implementation of a policy. However, when this happened 
I kept a neutral position, addressing the next questions on how this ‘gossip’ might affect 
the reforms I was studying. In general, participants that knew I had worked for the 
government in the past were more relaxed in the way they expressed themselves, avoiding 
all the obvious explanations – such as what is EDR and PRDU -; unfortunately some of 
them also assumed I have been updated about everything that has happened since I left the 
SEREMI, so they omitted some information they considered common knowledge and I had 
to ask for more details.  
On the other hand, some respondents were cautious, as if I was still a member of 
the Regional Secretariat of Housing and Urbanism (SEREMI MINVU), so their answers 
were polite but not saying much. When than happened I had to conduct the interviews in a 
way that showed the interviewee I had no attachment to my previous job and by 
emphasising my position as an outsider researcher. Chileans are usually quite suspicious of 
‘strangers’ - more inside the government and even more in election times. So some 
participants were very cautious, at less at the beginning of the interviews. I had to play 
different roles in order to get the answers I was looking for. Being Chilean was also an 
advantage as I could realise easily when interviewees were giving superficial or 
‘institutional’ answers; thus I could change the way to make the questions in order to make 
the interviewee feel more comfortable to give deeper answers. On the other hand, being an 
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outsider – for instance in Valparaíso, where I did not have many contacts – hindered my 
access to key participants, so that during the first field trip I mainly established networks 
instead of getting interviews. That work proved to be useful for the second field trip when I 
had easier access to them and I could interview key actors. Another disadvantages of 
playing my outsider role was that in some interviews, the respondents would give me a lot 
of details of basic information so I had to show some knowledge of the state apparatus in 
order to lift the level of discussion. 
 
METHODS 
 
 As was enunciated at the beginning of this chapter, this research is based on 
qualitative methods to collect and analyse the data. This entails the use of two or more 
sources of evidence, qualitative interviews with relevant actors and the scrutiny of 
documents during the data collection process and thereafter triangulation during the 
analysis in order to validate it (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). The main steps used in the data 
analysis included coding, interpretation, and conceptualisation. 
 
Data collection 
 
The collection of data was made in 5 steps: the selection of the institutions 
involved, the selection of the regions to be analysed, contact and selection of participants, 
preparation of interviews and field trip logistics. The selection of sites and institutions was 
aimed to have a wider spectrum of points of view from both the formal discourse of actors 
– expressed in official documents and declarations – and the informal perspective of agents 
constructing and implementing decentralisation policies.  
The state institutions selected were from the central and regional body in order to 
cover both levels. Al the central level the institutions selected were the Sub-secretariat of 
Regional Development (SUBDERE), which is the central body leading the decentralisation 
process in Chile; the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU) and the Ministry of 
Planning (MIDEPLAN), with which SUBDERE negotiated the transfer of the Regional 
Plan for Urban Development (PRDU) and the Strategy for Regional Development (EDR) 
respectively. At the regional level the institutions selected were the Regional Secretariat of 
Housing and Urbanism (SEREMI MINVU) and the Regional Secretariat of Planning 
(SERPLAC) – both branches of MINVU and MIDEPLAN respectively - from where 
PRDU and EDR were transferred; and the Regional Government (GORE), which is the 
institution receiving the planning function. During my first field trip I realised the 
importance to contact parliamentarians who were working on decentralisation within the 
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Congress; this was because all the proposals made by SUBDERE (executive) have to be 
submitted to the Congress for their approval. 
The regions chosen were Tarapacá and Valparaíso, whose attributes will be fully 
presented in the chapter IV Case study. The selection criteria were both practical and 
theoretical; from an empirical perspective I was familiar with Tarapacá Region as I worked 
there for several years and because my master degree used it as case study. Therefore, I 
had knowledge of the region and a of network of actors that might be interested in 
participating in the research. Then, I was looking for a region that could be a counterpart 
for Tarapacá, so that I could compare the response of contrasting regions. Although I did 
not have any previous contact with state personnel in Valparaíso Region, as I am originally 
from Santiago, my knowledge of that region was good enough to make me think it would 
be a good counterpart for Tarapacá. From a theoretical perspective the main criteria were 
distance, political weight and identity. While Valparaíso region is next to Metropolitana 
Region – where Santiago is located – Tarapacá is 1,800 kms. from the capital. The latter 
raise questions of core-periphery relations i.e. whether the control from Santiago is higher 
or equal over closer regions than peripheral regions. The 1,539,852 inhabitants of 
Valparaiso elect 16 seats of the Congress, while the 238,950 inhabitants of Tarapacá only 
choose four. This involves the problem of representation at the central level, as the 
presence of fewer parliamentarians from Tarapacá in Congress works against that region. 
Identity issues are mainly related to the historical background of both regions; Valparaíso 
shares the same history and culture with the centre since the 16th Century, while Tarapacá 
was part of Peru until the Pacific War in 1879. Feelings of belonging to the country are 
also important to take into account, as they are related to the cultural discourse of 
decentralisation. 
Once the regions and institutions were identified, I contacted the personnel working 
in units related to decentralisation or being affected by the reforms of 2005 and 2009. I 
also contacted academics interested in the state from different universities in Chile so that I 
could have a point of view from outside of the state, although, some academics were 
consultants to the governments or had taken part in the workshops and seminars organised 
by SUBDERE. Through those that answered the email, I used the snowball sampling 
approach in order to reach the key actors involved in the process. Although in the contact 
letter I was playing the role of an outsider, that is to say, I did not mention my previous 
connection within the state apparatus, because of my previous experience I got a faster 
response and a greater number from Tarapacá Region in which most of the people 
remembered me. 
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All the written material from the Chilean state and about Chilean decentralisation 
used in this research was obtained from the official web pages of state institutions or was 
provided by the participants. Thereby I had access to legal documents, internal documents 
of institutions and books on the topic that were not for commercial purposes.  
The second source, in-depth interviews, was chosen as the best way to get 
information because of both practical and methodological reasons. On the one hand, the 
target participants were politicians, political authorities, public servants and academics, 
who are usually very busy people unwilling to meet a researcher outside of their offices or 
after work. To organise a focus group with them would have been difficult because of their 
different schedules. I declined to use participant observation because public policies are 
constructed and implemented over the long term, which made that impractical. On the 
other hand, methodological reasons to use in-depth interviews were related to the research 
questions, which were looking for the construction of decentralisation in Chile and the 
relationship between the national and regional level of government. In order to do that, I 
was looking for different points of view with the intention of getting a free interpretation of 
these issues. In the words of Marsh and Stoker ‘in depth interviews allow people to tell 
their own story in language with which they are familiar. Where the discussion of issues 
flows naturally it is possible to understand the logic of an interviewee argument and the 
associative thinking that led them to particular conclusions’ (Marsh and Stoker, 2002 
p199). Therefore, as I was looking for their own perspective of decentralisation issues, 
private conversations where nobody could influence their opinions were essential. In this 
regard, I was very aware of the importance of a safe environment to express opinions, as 
internal power practices – both formal and informal – might influence the answers of some 
respondents. 
In-depth interviews were made with a broad range of participants (see table 3-1 and 
3-24). Following Marsh and Stoker (2002) the interviews were designed as guided 
conversations, considering open-ended questions and discussion of issues in a semi-
structured or unstructured manner. The topics were discussed in no predetermined order 
and interviewees were free to extend them as long as they wanted in order to cover those 
topics deeply5. The interviews were on average one-hour and participants chose the place 
and time most suitable for them to ensure their comfort. Most of the interviews were held 
in their offices, but other places were chosen, such as restaurants and cafes; in the case of 
two close friends, they were made in their homes, as they felt freer to talk about these 
issues outside of the office and out of working time. 
                                                 
4 Source: author 
5 See also Bryman, 2004; Cloke et al, 2004; and Flowerdew and Martin, 2005, Yin, 2009 
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Besides interviews I also had several informal conversations with people about the 
same issues, which were not recorded because were made more in terms of previous 
friendship and work relations than formal research, even though, guaranteeing anonymity 
permission was given in order to use that information. In addition, I kept in touch with the 
participants via email, phone and/or skype during the whole research, so that during the 
data analysis I could ask them to expand some comments or send additional information or 
material. For instance, a public servant mentioned the proposal of a certain guideline 
related to the decision-making process, which would not be available until it was approved 
by the respective ministry; that interviewee sent me the document once it came into force.  
A set of issues was defined from the research questions for discussion. The 
interviews were designed in order to allow respondents to expand freely on those themes 
they were more interested in or concerned with. The topics defined (see Appendix 1) were 
semi-structured interviews used as the starting point for each bit of conversation; I started 
each interview with the same question: ‘what do you understand by decentralisation?’ 
Thus, according to how the interviewee addressed that question, I could go to reforms, or 
the relationship between the central government with the regions, etc. I also closed each 
interview in the same way: ‘we have covered all the topics I have on my agenda. Do you 
want to add something else?’ Giving the opportunity to talk freely about their concerns was 
an opportunity to raise new topics or to go even deeper into what have already been 
discussed; it also helped me to realise how much the state personnel have the need to 
express themselves, as many of them seem to feel that their opinions do not count. 
Interviews were arranged in advance with participants when was possible. Most of 
them were politicians and state personnel in middle to high ranking positions who are not 
usually able to plan their time too many weeks in advance; as their schedule depends on 
weekly issues, it changes quite quickly. Despite that inconvenience 62 interviews were 
made. Table 3-1 shows the number of participants from each institution contacted and table 
3-2 disaggregates them by regions and levels. Participants were classified in three different 
ways: a) by institutions - universities, regional councils, DIPLADs, SEREMIs, Ministries, 
SUBDERE and Parliament; b) by levels - regional (Valparaíso and Tarapacá) and national 
(Santiago); and c) by role - public servants, political appointees, politicians and academics. 
Although most of academics are not directly involved in the process, at least two of the 
respondents participated in several workshops regarding decentralisation organised by 
SUBDERE in the early 2000, which were the starting point for the current strategy for 
decentralisation and one of them has been a consultant for the government in several 
occasions. These classifications allow patterns between the participant’s perspectives to 
emerge. For instance, the groups that seem to have a wider understanding of 
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decentralisation are from universities and SUBDERE; the academics are studying different 
aspect of decentralisation in Chile and SUBDERE because it is the institution that leads the 
process. The other groups present more limited knowledge and understanding.  
 
 
 
In general, respondents were not suspicious about the research; they were quite open 
in the interviews, perhaps because I was open and honest about every issue that they asked, 
even when it was not directly related to the research. For instance, some interviewees were 
very curious about Scottish culture. Thus, it did not seem participants felt any threat from 
me; probably because confidentiality was guaranteed. As there is no dialogue - or very 
little - between the academia and public sector, state personnel usually do not understand 
and value the academic sector. Maybe because participants did not see any relation 
between this research and their lives, they did not feel constrained in expressing their 
opinions. Some of them were interested in the research and a few were quite critical of it as 
 65 
well, which was well received because it gave me the opportunity to re-think about it from 
a different perspective. 
The first field trip was made during a presidential and parliamentarian election 
period; the elections were on the 13th of December 2009 and the second run for President 
was on the 17th of January 2010. This affected the mood of those contacted and the tension 
increased as the elections dates approached. I had to be very cautious in the way to present 
the research and the questions, especially with the politicians and political authorities, who 
were very suspicious of everything at that moment. Fortunately, as I had contacted most of 
them earlier during the year I did not have any big issues while doing the interviews. 
However, some people I had contacted postponed the meetings we had previously arranged 
several times, and a few were not possible to interview that year. I knew it was not the best 
time for the field trip, but I decided to do it anyway due to the high probability of a change 
in the government; the former coalition – Concertación – had been in power since 1991. I 
did not want to miss the opportunity to interview people from that government while being 
in power, because they had promoted decentralisation continuously since the early 1990s. 
Also, in the case of a change in the government – as actually happened – I wanted to have 
a solid ground from which I could analyse the potential changes to decentralising policies 
that the new government might introduce. Another consequence of doing research during 
an elections period was that the opinions of some respondents were slanted and polarised. 
This was for two reasons, on the one hand because they were influenced by their political 
preferences - i.e. those who supported the government had the tendency not to be critical 
while those from the opposition were extremely critical; and, on the other hand, because 
there were afraid of loosing their jobs if the government coalition changed.  
As interviews were mostly done in the respondents’ offices, we were interrupted by 
phone calls and other issues related to work. I.e. I had arranged an interview for 9:00 am 
with a certain participant but when I arrived at her office, I had to wait almost an hour 
before she could receive me. After 15 minutes interviewing, she got a phone call 
summoning her to an urgent meeting; as she thought it would be a short meeting she asked 
me wait. I did so for two hours before the secretary informed me that she would not be able 
to see me that day so we re-arranged the interview for another time. This happened mainly 
with politicians and political appointees, increasing in frequency as the elections 
approached. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Although I tested the interviews in Glasgow before going to my field trip, few 
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interviews were made as pilots once I was there. Therefore, despite having material 
prepared before the field trips (see annexe 1), I was continually testing the interviews and 
the list of topics to discuss in order to adjust them for different respondents. Besides, new 
topics stemmed from previous interviews and the preliminary analysis; therefore the 
interviews were jointly constructed with the participants. From my personal point of view, 
this was the most enriching experience during the field trips. This iterative approach 
permitted a repetitive interaction between data collection and data analysis (Bryman, 
2004), to obtain the best from each interview.  
The transcription of the interviews was done in Spanish, as that was the language 
used during the field trip, as well as a great part of the early stage of the analysis. After the 
transcription, it was necessary to re-group the interviews, as the classification made earlier 
(see table 3-1 and 3-2) proved to be too complicated and it was not suitable for a clear 
analysis. Therefore seven groups (see table 3-36) were defined in order to isolate specific 
relevant actors and to group others. For instance, DIPLAD and CORE, although part of 
GORE were analysed separately, and MINVU and MIDEPLAN were analysed together, 
but separated by levels in order to get views from the central body and the regions. The 
same procedure was used for each of them to analyse the information systematically: 
coding, categorising, interpretation and production of answers to research questions. 
 
 
 
The organisation of the material was done through coding and categorisation. Coding 
consisted in breaking down the material in order to identify the ideas and sentences related 
to specific topics. Categorisation consisted in grouping those topics in a way that 
relationships between them could be deduced (see Bryman, 2004; Cloke et al, 2004; and 
Flowerdew and Martin, 2005). For instance, initially, I approached the strategic planning 
instruments – Strategy for Regional Development (EDR), Regional Plan for Territorial 
                                                 
6 Source: author 
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Order (PROT) and regional policies – separately in the interviews. However, after 
analysing the answers and linking them with the research questions, I realised that they 
could be grouped and worked altogether, as the key point was not the instrument itself but 
the transfer of the function and how the actors interpreted that (see table 3-47). The type of 
research questions posed in this research needed the use of explanation building techniques 
(Yin, 2009); therefore deconstruction of the material collected into the topics below was 
the way to deal with the data.  
 
 
 
Originally, I had planned to use NVivo for the analysis of the interviews; however 
when I came back from the first field trip my computer crashed and I replaced it with a 
Mackintosh, not knowing that it was not compatible with NVivo. Therefore, I used Word 
for all the analysis, which was compatible with any computer. 
In order to validate the data, I crossed check the information received from 
interviewees in different ways: within the same interview by asking about topics at 
different moments of the conversation, with information provided by other participants and 
also triangulating it with written sources. Thereby I could separate facts from perceptions, 
which was very important in order to have a better understanding of the forces behind 
                                                 
7 Source: Author 
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certain practices, such as the support of, or resistance to, decentralising policies.  
 
The interpretation process was made by relating all the topics listed above to the 
theoretical framework of this research, that is to say decentralisation, state and power. At 
this point I also compared the responses of every group, both study areas – Valparaíso and 
Tarapacá - and from both levels – national and regional -, so that different perspectives of 
each topic emerged. From this stage new links and ideas came to light, which identified 
possible explanations for practices and outcomes of decentralisation policies implemented 
within the state structure.  
 
The main challenge faced at this stage was my positionality as a Chilean and 
former public servant while selecting and interpreting data. Marsh and Stoker (2002) 
recommend being cautious when qualitative methods are applied because of the researcher 
might be caught in a net of different representations in which his/her motivations and/or 
preoccupations can lead to highly subjective interpretations. They also recommend paying 
attention to the research process as much as to the research outcomes (Marsh and Stoker, 
2002); thus I was all the time very aware of my background so that all my actions and 
reflections were focused on the best way to avoid bias. My approach to the material was 
empathetic - I did not check the name of interviewee but the group he/she belonged - so I 
tried to understand his/her side of the story and used his/her explanations as the basis on 
which to build my own theoretical and empirical explanations. The way to do this was by 
reviewing the material several times. As I was working with 7 groups, I worked from the 
first to the seventh one by one and then came back to the first one again. Thereby, I had 
time to reflect on the data for long periods, avoiding hasty conclusions. 
The results of those reflections were the reorganisation of the material into a new 
categorisation, more suitable for the construction of the research questions’ answers. Thus, 
some topics were merged and others were omitted, as they were not directly related to the 
result chapters: the new list of topics was under broader themes and related to each of the 
research questions, as shown in table 3-58. 
Finally, the results were placed in the academic debate in a way that was possible to 
make bridges between practicalities and theories; they are presented in chapters IV, V, and 
VI of this thesis, one for each research question. This stage was also a challenge, as after 
being so embedded in the material I had to make a step back in order to see the bigger 
picture and develop the answers to my research questions having in mind the broader 
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reality of decentralisation processes. For that purpose I used a simple technique of drawing 
diagrams of my ideas, which helped me to make sense of them. 
 
 
 
Methodological reflections 
 
After doing this research some critical thoughts arose in relation to the 
methodology; from a theoretical perspective, the advantages and disadvantages of 
qualitative methods, and from an empirical perspective the steps that I could do better.  
Much has been argued about the advantages and disadvantages of qualitative 
research (see Marsh and Stoker, 2002; Bryman, 2004; Flowerdew and Martin, 2005; and 
Yin 2009 among others); the main criticisms are related to replicability, validity, 
generalisation and bias. The emphasis put on these issues by researchers depends on 
whether they have been more influenced by qualitative or quantitative methods; thus 
researchers from quantitative background tend to be more critical than those influenced by 
qualitative methods (Bryman, 2005).  
Usually qualitative case study research is not seen as replicable or comparable due 
to its focus on small groups or on a specific site; therefore there it is little basis on which to 
make scientific generalisations. However, the findings of a case study can be compared 
with others in order to establish similarities and differences and thus confirm its validity 
(Marsh and Stoker, 2004; Bryman, 2005; Yin 2009) and also by relating them back to 
theory and the research questions. 
The other issue on qualitative research is bias; the risk of subjectivity occurs at 
every stage of the research i.e. in-depth interview requires the researcher taking part in the 
conversation and developing an alliance-relation with the participants in order to generate 
trust. Marsh and Stoker (2004) recommend ‘rather than attempt to control the effects of 
bias in field relations, qualitative researchers prefer to acknowledge it in effects on 
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substantive findings’ (p206). Therefore, by being aware of the limitations of qualitative 
research it is possible to find ways to diminish them. On the other hand, the advantages are 
much more important because qualitative research allows the analysis of process rather 
than events and the construction of plausible explanations behind those processes (Marsh 
and Stoker, 2004; and Bryman, 2005), which is a great contribution to the academic debate 
and also to specific case studies. 
 
I have found some steps I could have done differently in this research to make it 
better. However, I do not regret them because this experience has made me learn from 
those mistakes. As Yin (2009) points out, case studies are one of the most difficult as there 
is no standard methodology to follow; therefore it is a learning process in which the 
researchers with more experience are more accurate than those who have less. He also 
explains that the main trouble for a new researcher using case study is the huge amount of 
data they collect, which sometimes is unmanageable. In this regard, I think my main 
mistake was that I conducted too many interviews. I was very concerned to gather as much 
information as possible, so I tried to get the greatest number of interviews possible. 
However, quantity does not guarantee better results, that is to say, the number of 
interviews needed should be that which allows one to know all the points of view of a 
certain issue; when new interviews do not add another perspective or more information, it 
is time to stop. I did not realise that at the time, so in consequence, I have too many 
representatives of some institutions, such as SEREMI MINVU, both in Tarapacá and 
Valparaíso. This was not necessary, as with half of the number of interviews I would have 
had the same results. 
Another change I would do is to interview key people – such as from Regional 
Government – before and after elections in order to compare their responses, which was 
the first intention but it was not possible to do all of them twice due to delays I could not 
have foreseen e.g. the strikes of public servants during the second field trip. On the other 
hand, the gathering of written material was adequate, mainly because that was done 
systematically during the whole research period – not only during field trips -, collecting 
information from official websites, newspapers and documents sent by participants when 
possible. Finally, as Marsh and Stoker (2002) point out ‘research is often messy and rarely 
proceeds in the neat and tidy way that researchers wish for’ (p204), so I value the 
experience gained in this research, as I feel better prepared for my next project.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has presented the methodology used for this research emphasising the 
importance of qualitative methods in order to answer explanatory research questions. 
Therefore the research was designed relying on qualitative methods, specifically in-depth 
interviews, and on written documents from the institutions involved in the decentralising 
reforms of 2005 and 2009. Showing how I developed the methodology in function of the 
research questions was fundamental in order to explain why I took some decisions instead 
of others – e.g. chose in-depth interviews instead of focus groups.  
 
This chapter also highlights the main challenges I faced during the research and the 
ways I dealt with them in order to get high quality outcomes. Positionality and ethics were 
analysed due to the importance of my dual roles as outsider and insider, as the awareness 
of those roles was essential in order to avoid bias during the collection and analysis of data. 
 
Finally, the main lesson from this process was to learn about flexibility within the 
research design, that is to say, pose the main tasks at each stage and then define subtasks in 
order to achieve the main ones, but being aware that many times things will not be as had 
been planned. Therefore having a backup plan or enough flexibility to change the order of 
the tasks was essential, specially for field trips, during which usually there is not enough 
time to rearrange the schedule.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter aims to frame the Chilean decentralisation process within its historical, 
cultural and political context. In this brief journey through Chile, important issues related 
to centralism and decentralisation will be discussed, such as the evolution of the role of the 
state in 19th and 20th century, the influence of the Dictatorship (1973 – 1990) on politics, 
society and the state apparatus, the political system and the current structure of the central 
and regional state. 
A second aim of this chapter is to introduce two reforms approved recently and the 
two regions that have been analysed in this research: Valparaíso and Tarapacá. These two 
reforms, one in 2005 and the other in 2009, are part of a decentralisation’ strategy, led by 
SUBDERE1 (central Agency); it is important to have in mind that these reforms are not 
isolated events, but part of a greater process. In this regard, understanding the Chilean 
context is essential to locate the current stage of Chilean decentralisation. On the other 
hand, the regions chosen have different characteristics regarding population, economic 
activities and political weight; therefore comparison may show different responses to the 
same reform that has been applied all across the country. 
The first section is about Chile, emphasising its paternalist tradition and influence of 
Dictatorship over current socio-political processes and the current political system. The 
second section introduces the regions: Tarapacá and Valparaíso. The third section 
describes the state’ structure at national and regional level, focusing mainly on the regional 
governments’ structure and the two legal reforms that are being analysed.  
 
STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHILE 
 
Historical Context of Decentralisation: Centralism, Democracy and Dictatorship 
 
To understand the decentralisation process in Chile it is necessary to take into 
account several cultural and historical issues, which defined Chilean society and 
institutions. First of all, Chile is culturally and politically strongly paternalist, which is also 
evident in its vertical institutionality and the role of the state throughout its republican 
history. Secondly, the debate of being unitary versus federalist is far from over, even 
taking into account that Chile has been a Unitary Republic since the early 19th century. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Subsecretariat for Regional Development 
	   74	  
Thirdly, Chilean politics have been framed by their recent history; the coup and subsequent 
dictatorship still have great influence over national issues such as the debate about the 
Constitution, the electoral system and decentralisation among others. And finally, Chilean 
civil society has experienced substantial changes over the past 30 years. 
The Chilean paternalist system has been inherited from the ‘República Señorial’ (the 
landlord’ Republic) of 19th century, also called ‘Paternalismo Señorial’ (Landlord 
Paternalism), similar to a feudal system, in which landlords were the owners of land and 
the people living there were ‘in debt’ to them; Chilean society was traditionally rigid with 
behavioural patterns to maintain class differences (Bajú, 1975). Although the traditional 
landlord system does not exist formally anymore, the dependence relationship is still 
reproduced, being highly authoritarian and vertical. Leader supremacy in any of its forms –
boss, owner, landlord – prevails over participation and dialogue, which are considered as 
second order tools (Ominami, 2011). This is relevant because the decentralisation process 
in Chile has been developed from a strong top-down perspective, which is consistent with 
its traditional paternalism. 
Chile often praises itself for its 
democratic and republican tradition, being 
recognised politically as one of the most 
stable nations in Latin America, despite the 
period between 1973-1990, which is the only 
time in all its history that the country has 
been under a dictatorship (see table 4-12). 
This is a consequence of the establishment of 
the Portalian State during the first half of the 
19th century through the Constitution of 1833, in which a strong centralised government 
was established (Mires, 2012). This conception of the state is called Portalian3 after Diego 
Portales, the statesman behind the organisation and inspiration of the Chilean state. His 
ideal was a republic whose men were truly models of virtue and patriotism and who were 
capable to lead citizens on the path of order and virtue (Portales, 1822). In order to do that 
Portales believed in strong and authoritarian centralised structures, in which the Executive 
power reached such importance that the figure of the President became all-embracing, 
patriarchal and extremely authoritarian. This has also been a characteristic of other Latin-
American republics (Mires, 2012). The presidential regime prevailed in Chile during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Table composed by the author with data of Villalobos, 2003 
3 Estado Portaliano o concepción Portaliana del Estado 
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19th century until the civil war of 1891 when a change to a semi-parliamentarian regime 
was produced. However, it did not last long and in 1925 the country went back to a 
presidential regime. Palma (2009) explains how during the 19th century Chile was focused 
on the extension, consolidation and cohesion of the national territory, taking actions of 
peace and war in order to fulfil these purposes. Within that context a strong central state 
was most suitable for the strengthening of national sovereignty (Palma, 2009; Prat i Catalá, 
2009). Furthermore, both Palma and Prat i Catalá express that those actions were taken 
from the capital by the elite; therefore Chilean centralism was the creation of Santiaguine 
elites and it is rooted in the history and institutionality of the country. Palma (2009) adds 
that centralism has been an ongoing and accumulative process, which has been legitimised 
by its long duration and persistence. 
Mires (2012) also explains that Portalian conceptions are still embodied in the 21st 
century Chilean state as the current Constitution (1980) is based on the former Constitution 
(1925), which was in turn based on the previous Constitution (1833); therefore Portales 
spirit’s still influences the Chilean state apparatus. Furthermore, Cea (2001) argues that the 
current Constitution (1980) has led the presidential regime to its strongest expression in 
Chilean republican history (also Ominami, 2011). The ‘hyper executive’, as it is called by 
Mires, may be found all across Latin America, which might lead one to think that the 
common factor could be having been a Spanish Colony for 300 years; Spain developed a 
strong centralised institutional system in order to keep control over the colonies, a tradition 
that was followed by the new nations. In Chile the vertical and centralised institutional 
structure has continued since its independence, being reinforced during the Dictatorship 
period, in which again the goal was to keep control over the territory. Under this logic the 
citizenry cannot be part of the decision-making process and regional governments are just 
representatives of presidential power in a given territory (Ominami, 2011). 
Garretón (1992, 2009) explains the changes in the role of the state over the 20th 
century. The traditional socio political matrix in Chile was defined by the relationship 
between political parties, social forces and the state; however, during the Military 
Dictatorship it was disarticulated: political parties and social organisations - such as unions 
- were prohibited and the role of the state changed. The economic role of the state 
diminished, for instance, as privatisation affected its entrepreneurial role. Thus, the 
traditional role of the state as an agent of redistribution and social integration disappeared, 
giving space for a new actor: the business political class. Therefore, the new socio-political 
matrix was defined by the relationship between the state, businessmen and workers. 
Despite this withdrawal of the state from the economic sphere and its subjugation to 
market laws - which is called the ‘Chilean neoliberal experiment’ – the strength of the state 
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increased regarding its coercive role (Garretón, 1992). Furthermore, Palma (2009) argues 
that the role of the state in this matter - control and power over territory and institutions – 
still remains without substantial changes. He declares that although the Concertación 
governments were preoccupied with territorial development, creating a huge number of 
productive programs, all of them have been top-down in design – for instance, all the 
Regional Strategies for Development are made under the same guidelines, deadlines and 
contents - giving scarce space for regional and local initiatives, which is consistent with the 
Chilean centralist tradition.  
In response to this reality, regional discontent has been increasing and some 
organisations representing regions have appeared, such as the National Council for 
Regionalisation and Decentralisation (CONADERE) and the Corporation for the 
regionalisation of Chile (CORCHILE). These kinds of civil organisations, based on the 
regions, seek to open new space for regional participation, to obtain more autonomy and an 
effective decentralisation.  
Since 2006 a series of demonstrations have been occurred from time to time in Chile, 
being ever more frequent. Mires (2012) explains that all the mobilisations occurring within 
the country over the last years – student movements, Calama’s claims, HidroAysén’s 
rejection and so on - can be understood because civil society has not been properly 
represented by political parties. Mires attributes all these movements to discomfort against 
the excessive centralism of the state: they do not have the classical political ‘left-right 
wing’ component and they are not pro or against the economic or social macro system, the 
common factor is the state. The most emblematic example of this increasing regional 
unrest was the uprising of Aysén in February of 2012 against the central state. Aysén is an 
isolated Patagonian region, where difficulties of access and long distances make the cost of 
living more expensive, starting with fuels. The state has been ignoring this reality for 
decades; during the Dictatorship it was not possible to complain and later on, when 
democracy returned, the coalition in power, Concertación, was able to channel demands 
via a net of political operators from the parties who acted as mediators between the 
community and the state apparatus. Thus Concertación governments were able to handle 
most of regional and citizenry issues. The current government, Alianza, disliked the idea of 
mediators so suppressed them increasing the gap between civil society and state. In 
February 2012, a group of representatives of different social organisations – the artisanal 
fishermen’s association, the National Association of Public Servants (ANEF), the Worker 
Union (CUT), ‘Patagonia United’, ‘Patagonia without Dams’ and neighbours - established 
a round table in order to discuss regional needs. They defined an agenda with eleven points 
related to the quality of life of Aysén’s inhabitants and claiming more autonomy and 
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participation in decision-making, which means, a recognition of the regional voice and 
desires. Regional branches of the state were unable to deal with Aysén’s demands and the 
conflict exploded with demonstrations and strikes all over the region from all sectors: the 
roads to access the region were blocked and the region stood up against the government 
recalling Lope de Vega’s Fuente Ovejuna4. It was a social movement essentially, without 
the formal participation of political parties, which were unable to understand that the claim 
was about representation and empowerment rather than subsides and assistentialism. The 
voice of Aysén was so loud that the whole country heard it, thus obliging the central 
government to go there and struggle with difficult negotiations to obtain an agreement. 
 
The current efforts toward decentralisation are rooted in the 1960s when serious 
attempts by the central state were made in order to reorganise the country politically and 
administratively. During the governments of Frei Montalva and Allende, ODEPLAN5 was 
the the central body institution charged with developing a new political and administrative 
division of the country. The pivotal idea behind the reorganisation of the territory was to 
have a more efficient state. Then as today, the logic behind regionalisation in both forms, 
decentralisation and deconcentration, was a top-down process highly controlled by the 
central body of the state. This topic will be analysed more deeply in the section of 
‘Regionalisation and political-administrative division’. 
After the coup, the Military government saw the importance of creating a new order 
within the country, to better administrate and also for better control. The regionalisation 
introduced by the Military government adopted most of the proposal from ODEPLAN and 
incorporated a strategic geopolitical dimension in relation to the defence of the country in 
case of war. It has been said that it was in order to protect the country from foreign 
enemies, but it also might have been to keep control within a country that was no longer 
free. The regionalisation decreed by law in 1974 continued the tradition of verticality that 
Chile had shown since the outset of the Republic and clearly established a relation of 
dependency between the regions and the central state; all decisions were made in Santiago 
or by single-person authorities, who were appointed by the central level. Garretón (1992) 
defines regionalisation in Chile as the spatial distribution of institutions with military and 
administrative criteria (p7). Thus, regionalisation under the Dictatorship increased the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Play written in 1612, based on an historical incident that took place in the village of Fuente Ovejuna in 
Castile in 1476. While under the command of the Order of Calatrava, a commander, Fernán Gómez de 
Guzmán, mistreated the villagers, who banded together and killed him. When a magistrate sent by King 
Ferdinand II of Aragon arrived at the village to investigate, the villagers, even under the pain of torture, 
responded only by saying "Fuente Ovejuna did it." 
5 National Office of Planning 
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state’s capacity of vertical and authoritarian control over the subnational sphere. During 
the first democratic government after the Dictatorship, there was the historic opportunity to 
change the relationship between central and subnational governments within the frame of 
democratisation and modernisation of the state; however, the political parties’ interest in 
electoral expediency prevailed, leaving aside the debate on the nature and functions of 
subnational powers. Thus, Aylwin’s government (1990-1994) and the opposition agreed to 
decentralise communal governments and keep regions under the rule of an appointed 
Intendente (Garretón, 1992). This way, the decentralisation process within democratic 
regimes since 1990 has been reduced to the parties’ expediency instead of the openness of 
new spaces of dialog, democracy and devolution. 
Another important issue is that Chilean politics was shaped by the Dictatorship in 
three ways: socio-political division, fear of the past and the promotion of a neoliberal 
economic system. In order to understand how deeply society has been affected by the 
Dictatorship, the Chilean memory has to be unravelled because it is still divided by the 
opposition of interpretations and perceptions of what happened. The Chilean compulsive 
obsession to forget the past and what is uncomfortable may be because of extreme 
experiences normally blocking memories (Moulian, 1997), or as Stern (2006) argues, 
because during the Dictatorship that ruled the country for 17 years (1973-1990) the habit of 
denial was developed, or it may be because the truth is too hard and too horrible to cope 
with it; therefore, it is easier to act as if it had not happened. In any case for Chilean 
society the coup and the subsequent Dictatorship are still sensitive topics that are usually 
avoided; however, that period re-shaped the country in many ways: politically, 
economically and culturally. During the Dictatorship several seeds were sown, the most 
important were the current Constitution, the economic model, the privatization of public 
services such as education and health systems, and the transformation of the Chilean 
society from citizenry into consumers.  
Nevertheless it is not the intention of this thesis to analyse deeply the Dictatorship 
period in Chile, but to use it in order to give a frame for the divisions existing within 
Chilean society nowadays and how its legacy has shaped political decision-making in 
which the decentralisation process is being implemented. There are two main points that 
still affect decision-making in Chile from that experience: a deep division within civil 
society, which has percolated upwards to the political elite affecting politics, and the legal-
institutional framework given by the current Constitution and the Regionalisation process. 
Since the coup, in 1973, Chile has been divided between supporters and detractors of 
Pinochet’s Dictatorship; Stern (2006) explains how the construction of Chilean memory 
has a crucial role regarding this, because both sides have built their own story to justify 
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their beliefs, a dualism that can be explained by what Stern calls heroic memory and 
dissident memory. 
 
‘Many Chileans on all political sides, it turned out, had lived the ‘national’ experience of 
Pinochet’s Chile as a time that marked them personally and profoundly’ (Stern, 2006 p1). 
 
On the one hand, is what Stern calls the heroic memory or memory as salvation, in 
which the coup and Dictatorship are seen as something necessary to save the country from 
the chaos in which it had sunk. For many Chileans in 1973 the country was in a deep 
political, economic and social crisis and Pinochet was the hero who re-established the 
‘order’; thanks to him life could be normal again. Also, during the Dictatorship the 
citizenry was misinformed with two purposes, to justify the coup and to hide the truth. The 
justification was that the military had found out that Allende’s government was preparing 
their own coup in order to establish a communist dictatorship, which is known as ‘Plan Z’6. 
Thus the military did not want to make the coup; it was a civil war and they acted 
according to that, it was their duty toward the country and they would have actually 
preferred to stay in their barracks instead of intervening. In 1998 around 40% of Chilean 
population still remembered the coup as a ‘rescue mission’ (Stern, 2006). As Moulian 
argues, the military needed an excuse to rebuild the country on their own terms: the 
neoliberal economic project. For instance, it was common during the Dictatorship to hear 
that politicians and communists7 had brought chaos to the country, forcing the military to 
take control of it. Society was affected by the manipulation of communication media, 
censure and repression; as a result, people were afraid and disgusted with politics and with 
politicians. This way, not only were left wing ideas suppressed but also any kind of politics 
under the Dictatorship. The second reason for misinformation was to hide all the violations 
against human rights committed by the military; thus, for many years a great part of the 
Chilean population did not really know about or accept the brutal repression within the 
country. 
Conversely there is the dissident memory or memory as a rupture, in which 
dissidents of Pinochet see the Coup as the outset of the most horrible time in Chilean 
history; those who were considered ‘enemies of the fatherland’ were persecuted, tortured, 
killed and/or exiled. The numbers are devastating, in a country with 10 million inhabitants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The existence of this Plan is still controversial in Chile as many people still believe that it existed despite a 
wide range of international and national researchers and organisations agreeing that it was made up by 
military in order to justify the Coup. 
7 In Chilean common speech ‘communist’ was any idea or person that had even a slightly inclination towards 
the centre-left.  
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in 1973 there are 3,000 proven cases of people killed or ‘disappeared’, more than 12,000 
cases of torture, 82,000 documented political arrests and more than 200,000 people went 
into exile (Stern, 2006).  
 
‘Also important, was cultural shock. Many Chileans believed such violence by the state - 
beyond margins set by legal procedure and human decency - to be an impossibility. Fundamentally, 
their society was too civilized, too law abiding, too democratic. In 1973, many victims voluntary 
turned themselves in when they appeared on arrest lists' (Stern, 2006 p xxii). 
 
Therefore, for dissidents the Coup and Dictatorship mean a huge disruption to 
Chilean democratic tradition; for them the Dictatorship period is synonymous with treason, 
repression, violence, poverty, lack of liberties and no hope. Because of the history of 
democratic and civil political tradition in Chile, the brutal repression after the coup was 
more shocking than the Coup itself for civil society, and when the truth started to come out 
slowly during the late 1980s and early 1990s, many people could not believe it8 and some 
still cannot; there is a strong denial within Chilean society regarding this.  
Chilean history has two faces, on the one hand a Chile flourishing where everything 
seemed to be alright, where peace and liberty reigned; on the other hand a Chile full of 
fear, suffering and poverty. The continuous curfews were seen in opposite ways, for some 
they meant order and safety, whereas for others they were the announcement of raids.  
Pinochet’s influence over national life and power did not stop in 1990 when he left 
power, he remained as Chief Commander of the Army Forces until 1998 when he become 
a lifetime senator. Thus, even after being a democracy for more than 20 years, the 
Dictatorship legacy is still over shadowing the political decision-making process in Chile. 
From the Dictatorship three groups within Chilean society may be defined: the older 
generation, those that lived the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular) of President Allende, the 
Coup and the Dictatorship; ‘the children of the Dictatorship’, those who grew up 
afterwards under the Dictatorship or in exile; and ‘the children of the restored democracy’, 
those who grew up under the Concertación governments. Heroic and dissident memories 
have passed over these three generations reproducing the top-down and bottom up 
discourses. Thus the antagonism between Chileans has been endogenously reproduced; 
despite 20 years since the return to democracy, support for and rejection of the 
Dictatorship still divide Chileans. There are irreconcilable positions held by minorities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I have heard testimonies saying ‘I understand the Coup, I supported it, but I cannot justify what happened 
afterward’ 
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from the right and the left wing, although most Chileans prefer to avoid the topic; while the 
‘hard right wing’ still justifies what happened during the Dictatorship based on the chaos 
of Popular Unity, the ‘hard left wing’ is not able to forgive the repression suffered under 
the Military government. This is very important to take into account because politics in 
Chile has been defined by these extremes since the return to democracy in 1990.  
The Alianza and the Concertación, the two main coalitions from right and left wing 
respectively, have been exploiting arguments such as the fear of a communist state or of a 
repressive neoliberal government over the past 20 years in order to manipulate public 
opinion in almost every election, with the aim of invalidating or weakening opponents. For 
instance, during the last presidential elections (2009) there was a fake picture of the right 
wing candidate dressed in a military uniform in order to make a link between the right 
wing and Pinochet; meanwhile, he was using any opportunity to highlight that he had 
actually voted ‘No’ in the 1988 Plebiscite, that is to say, against Pinochet. This has had as 
a consequence a deepening of the difference between extreme political ideologies and the 
boredom of a part of the Chilean population towards politics, who have more moderate 
points of view or for whom the debate has become anachronistic. Many contemporary 
issues are still usually related to the Popular Unity or the Dictatorship periods, distorting or 
poisoning political debate in Chile. For example, the rise of regional claims is seen by right 
wing sectors as new seeds of communism and they blame Concertación parties for 
instigating them. However, these claims are not aimed against a particular government, but 
against the high centralism of Chile. Another example was the attempt of the current 
government to replace the word ‘dictatorship’ by ‘military regime’ in school texts in 
January 2012. The whole debate around what happened in Chile arose again and after 
several weeks of arguments the proposal was rejected. 
Over the last three decades Chilean society has experienced important changes, 
mainly derived from the Dictatorship’s period and the neoliberal economic model. Thus, 
under the influence of these two elements Chilean society has become a depoliticised and 
market society, in which there is no interest in public affairs and identities are constructed 
around possessions. 
The depoliticisation of Chilean society was one of the objectives of the Dictatorship 
(Mosovich 1997), in which over 17 years the propaganda told Chileans that politicians and 
politics were those responsible for the 1973’s crisis. Mosovich (1997) explained that since 
the first democratic elections of mayors (1992) after the return to democracy, the 
candidates have always been defined by the elites of the political parties, putting aside the 
social bases. Thus the depoliticisation and demobilisation of civil society were increased 
and there was little interest in getting involved in political parties, which was considered 
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pointless; as a consequence, there was a loss of interest in representative institutions. 
Therefore, public affairs are not attractive, but the opposite. Chileans’ interests are 
nowadays rooted in their close surroundings such as family and job, there is no real 
concern about society and the political citizen appears only through the vote (Moulian, 
1997). However, this has been changing over the last few years in which it is possible to 
see how part of civil society is starting to find its voice again. The case of students’ 
mobilisations is emblematic in this regard, as a claim that started from a very specific 
group spread all across Chilean society, obtaining the support of a great part of the country. 
There are also other examples such as the environmentalist movements against 
HidroAysén9 and thermoelectric stations, or regionalist movements in Magallanes, Aysén 
and Calama.  
On the other hand is the market society, which is the result of the implementation of 
the neoliberal economic model. During the Dictatorship the Chilean economy was 
transformed into a neoliberal economic model. Most of the companies and industries that 
had been nationalised during Allende’s government were privatised again. Some services 
that have been traditionally provided by the state, such as water, electricity and gas, were 
also privatised. This combined with the end of a free education and health system, and the 
disappearance of syndicates, influenced a change in work relations, which became 
individualised; thus, the exploitation model remained, as individuals have not enough 
strength to negotiate with the owners of the companies (Moulian, 1997).  Of course, in any 
market society it is possible to see the same patterns, this is not an exclusive characteristic 
of Chilean society; however, it is important to be aware that traditional Chilean identity has 
melted and mixed with market culture. For instance, the usual Sunday walks to the park or 
square have been replaced by visits to shopping centres. Thus there is no time or energy for 
active or even contemplative life outside work, consumption was used to ‘domesticate’ the 
political citizen in order to depoliticise him/her (Moulian, 1997): citizens have became 
merely consumers (Ominami, 2011).  
Furthermore, market society has exacerbated segregation; the privatisation of health, 
education and pensions has increased the gap between social classes. Although, the 
neoliberal economic model implemented by the Military Dictatorship brought economic 
prosperity for the country - which the elite use as an excuse in order to validate the hard 
governmental measures – it also plunged many people into poverty, increasing the gap 
between rich and poor (Moulian, 1997; Ominami, 2011). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 HidroAysén is a controversial project, which aims to build four dams in Aysén’s region in order to supply 
energy for elsewhere in the country.  
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Given its history, it is possible to see how centralism and verticality have been part 
of Chilean tradition since before the outset of the Republic, which was exacerbated during 
the Dictatorship. Its shadow still can be perceived over society, culture, politics and 
institutions. Chile is a long and narrow territory with multiple cultures within it; from the 
dry north to the rainy south, from the sea to the high mountains, the variety of ways of life 
of its inhabitants is sometimes dramatically different. As a consequence, the tension 
between subnational needs and the centre’s decisions has been a key issue over the past 30 
years. From the point of view of the central state, decentralisation should help to foster a 
more efficient performance of the state apparatus, however, recent social movements are 
indicative of pressures for greater autonomy.  
 
Political system 
 
This section explains Chile’s current political system based on the distribution of the 
three powers of the state – executive, judicial and legislative –, the Constitution, the 
parliamentarian’s election system and political parties. 
 
State’s power and Constitution 
 
The Constitution defines Chile as a Unitary State10, that is to say, it recognises one 
political and governmental centre, in which the power structure and political organisation 
is one and individuals obey one authority, live under one constitutional regime and the 
power of the state is exerted equally over the whole territory. Thus, Chile is centralised by 
law; however, the Constitution allows for administrative decentralisation or 
deconcentration, which means territorial or functional decentralisation but not political. 
Chile is a democratic republic with a presidential regime and its three powers of the 
state are separated and independent from each other; the Executive and Judicial Power are 
located in Santiago, while the Legislative is based in Valparaíso city (140 kms west of 
Santiago). Regarding this research the main focus will be on the Executive and Legislative 
power.  
The Executive is monocephalous11, headed by the President of the Republic, who is 
also the Head of the State; s/he is elected by popular vote every four years and is not 
allowed to serve consecutive terms12 (i.e. one 1-4 year term). The Legislative Power is held 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Art 3º of the Constitution 
11 One head.  
12 Art 24º, 25º and 26º of the Constitution 
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by the Congress, which is composed of two chambers: the Lower Chamber or Chamber of 
Deputies – with 120 members elected by popular vote every four years13 - and the Higher 
Chamber or Senate – with 38 members elected by popular vote every eight years. The 
number of parliamentarians per region depends on their population so that the more 
populous ones have more constituencies than the others (Fig 
4-114). For instance, Tarapacá Region has 2 senators and 2 
deputies, while Valparaíso Region has 4 senators and 12 
deputies; their respective populations are 238,950 and 
1,869,327 inhabitants, hence the representativeness is not 
only by region but also by population. This kind of 
representation in a country like Chile reinforces centralism, 
due to the clear tendency of population to concentrate in the 
Metropolitan Region and its surroundings; the regions might 
be better represented having equal number of 
parliamentarians.  
The relationship between the Executive and the 
Legislative is defined as of cooperation and coordination 
because they work together with clear and separated 
functions. However, the current Constitution has diminished 
the power of the Congress, strengthening the presidential regime to the point that the 
Congress cannot define its own agenda (Ominami, 2011); for instance, it is the President 
who prioritises the processing of projects in the Congress. Although the Congress has the 
faculty to monitor the Government – asking the Executive for information or calling a 
Minister to explain her/himself – it has no power to go further: the ministers are named by 
the President and only she/he can ask for their resignation. For this reason, Ominami refers 
to the Congress and politicians as people ‘who talk’ and to the President and its Cabinet as 
people ‘who act’; exacerbating that the current relationship of the Legislative and the 
Executive power leads to the discrediting of political action and parliamentarian work.  
The current Constitution was approved via referendum in 1980 under the 
Dictatorship of General Pinochet; it has been modified several times by the subsequent 
democratic governments, the most important amendments occurring in 1989 and 2005. The 
Reform of 1989 is the most emblematic and known by wider Chilean society; it was the 
result of an agreement between the Military regime – in power at those times – and the 
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14 Base Map Source: IGM / Content Source: Author 
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Concertación- the coalition of opposition, which had headed the victory against the 
Dictatorship in the plebiscite of 198815. At this point, it is important to take into account 
that the political transition towards democracy was made by a series of negotiations over 
many different topics such as human rights, democracy, repression, liberty and so on; these 
negotiations took place over the last years of the Dictatorship and the earlier years of the 
restored democracy, when Pinochet was still the Chief Commander of the Army Forces. 
The legitimisation of the Constitution was crucial for the right wing parties, after having 
lost the plebiscite of 1988 – when eight more years of Pinochet in power were rejected – 
because it was a way to validate the Military Regime. The Concertación accepted 
Pinochet’s Constitution with the condition of several amendments to it, which were 
incorporated in the Reform of 1989 and were approved via plebiscite by Chilean society. 
There were three main purposes of this reform: the recognition of international agreements 
on Human Rights, the incorporation of political pluralism and the legitimisation of the 
Constitution by the Chilean citizenry. The transition towards democracy in Chile was 
finally over with the Reform of 2005; this reform limited the role of military institutions, 
revoked the National Council for Security – composed of the President of Republic, a few 
ministers and the four chiefs of the army forces -, and deepened democracy. Regarding the 
latter, the elimination of senators for life and appointee senators is the greater achievement 
because it allows the Senate to be composed only of elected members, which means 
greater representativeness and suggests that the Senate should truly be the voice of the 
people - in the next section parliamentarian representation will be analysed further. Thus 
the 1989 and 2005 Reforms mark out the outset and the end of the Chilean transition 
towards democracy. In addition to these two emblematic modifications, the Reform of 
2009 has a great importance regarding decentralisation because it establishes the direct 
election of regional councillors. However, despite these changes, the presidential and 
neoliberal spirit of the Constitution is still in place.  
 
Binominal electoral system 
 
The electoral system for parliamentarians is called binominal16 because there are two 
seats available per constituency. The binominal system was created with the intention of 
guaranteeing political stability and it favours the biggest political coalitions at the expense 
of the smaller political parties. The Art 109º bis of the Law 18.700 establishes that each 
coalition or list can present no more than two candidates per constituency, as is shown in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In 1989 the Concertación was composed by all the spectrum from centre to left wing  
16 Art 49º of the Constitution; art 109º bis, 180º and 181º of Law 18.700 
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the example (see table 4-217). Each voter votes for one candidate, the two lists with the 
most votes get their highest-polling candidates elected; however if the leading list receives 
twice the votes of the next list they get the two seats; thus, usually the seats of a 
constituency are split by the two largest coalitions. The example shows three possible 
outcomes of an election in which six candidates – A, B, C, D, E and F - from three 
different coalitions or lists – 1, 2 and 3 - are running for 2 seats. In the first case candidates 
C and A are elected because they are the two with the most votes, which would be the 
same in a first-past-to-post system; however, anomalies are observed in cases two and 
three, in which the two most voted choices do not correspond to the two candidates 
elected. In the second case, candidates A and B are elected, even though B is the fourth in 
number of votes. Finally, in the third case, candidates A and C are elected, in which again 
the second candidate elected is not the second most popular. In none of the cases above is a 
List 3 candidate elected, even when in the third case candidate E has more votes than 
candidate C.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Source: author 
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Thus the electoral system privileges the biggest political coalitions taking into 
account firstly, the percentage of the list and secondly, the percentage gained by individual 
candidates. Therefore, the representativeness of the Congress could be questioned, as it 
might be said that the system is not truly democratic, because it does not respect the will of 
the voters and does not favour pluralism, but generates exclusion. Table 4-3 and figure 4-
218 show the results of the deputies’ elections since the return to democracy; it is evident 
that the two main coalitions have the control of the Congress, so every decision is made 
through the negotiations between those, leaving smaller political parties or coalitions aside. 
 
 
 
In addition, one must consider that parliamentarians are not necessarily from the 
territory they represent. The candidacy requirement of living within the constituency is 
usually fulfilled by people who have a second house/property in the regions; Santiago is 
where they live and spend most of their time. For instance, Senator Larraín represents the 
XIV Region de los Ríos since 2011 after 15 years being a local councillor of Las Condes – 
one of the 33 communes of Santiago – where he truly lives. This is a common practice 
because political parties usually nominate the candidates in their headquarters in Santiago. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Source: author with data from SERVEL (Electoral Service) 
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Therefore, representativeness in Legislative power is an important issue that has not been 
solved yet, despite the huge debate around it. Unfortunately, usually it is easier for 
politicians to talk about changes when they are candidates, but this tends to diminish once 
the seat has been won; political interests usually prevail. Thus, power struggles and 
negotiations between the Alianza and the Concertación have defined the path taken by 
Chile since the return to democracy.  
The Chilean case in this regard is no different from other countries, where political 
struggles between parties are framed for the desire of power. Both the Alianza and the 
Concertación have expressed dissatisfaction on several occasions with the binominal 
electoral system; however, no change has been made so far. Thus, power relationships 
between actors are crucial to understand politics within the Congress; parties’ interests – 
individuals as well - shape relations among actors giving ground for both coalitions 
behaving as a block in a self defence’ act to prevent a change in the Binominal, which 
would transform the status quo of the past 20 years. However, it is important to take into 
account the great progress regarding democracy over the last 25 years, when there was no 
Congress at all, more so considering that less than 10 years ago the period of transition 
towards democracy was officially finished. Every step has been taken with caution in order 
to prevent further conflicts or chaos. 
 
Political Parties 
 
In the early 1990s Chile was divided in two main groups: pro-Pinochet (right wing) 
and anti Pinochet (centre-left wing), and although the Pinochet factor was gradually put 
aside, these two main blocks remained. Nowadays there are three coalitions: ‘Alianza por 
Chile’19 - or just Alianza, ‘Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia’20 - or just 
Concertación - and Juntos Podemos (Fig 4-321), being the latter the smallest one. During 
the last elections for deputies 
(2009), Alianza got 58 seats, 
Concertación 57 and Juntos 
Podemos only got three seats 
(Table 4-3) - thanks to its 
association with Concertación. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 ‘Alliance for Chile’. It is also called ‘Coalition for the Change’ since 2009 because it joins three small 
parties in order to win the elections. 
20 ‘Union of parties for Democracy’  
21 Source: author 
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Alianza is from the right wing and it is composed of Unión Democrática Independiente 
(UDI) and Reovación Nacional (RN)22; currently it is the coalition in power. Concertación 
is from the centre-left and it is composed of Democracia Cristiana (DC), Partido Socialista 
(PS), Partido por la Democracia (PPD) and Partido Radical Social Demócrata (PRSD)23. 
Although Concertación was in power for 20 years – between 1990 and 2010 –the economic 
model adopted was neoliberalism, which had been imposed through the Constitution by the 
Military regime in the 1980s; as a consequence many of Concertación’s detractors argue 
that it was not truly a centre-left wing coalition but centre-right wing. Although this may 
be true, the comparison of the latter government’s programmes – Bachelet from 
Concertación and Piñera from Alianza – reveal the different emphasis of the coalitions; 
while Bachelet focused on democracy, equity and unity, highlighting that the main wealth 
of Chile is its people, Piñera is mainly focused on state efficiency, poverty, delinquency 
and economic stagnation. Table 4-424 summarises the current political parties. 
 
 
 
REGIONALISATION AND CASE STUDY  
 
This section contains two main themes: the regionalisation process in Chile and a 
brief description of the case study regions: Tarapacá and Valparaíso.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Independent Democratic Union and National Renovation respectively 
23 Christian Democracy, Socialist Party, Party for Democracy and Social Democratic Radical Party 
respectively 
24 Source: author, with data from SERVEL (Electoral Service) and political parties’ webpages 
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Regionalisation and political-administrative division 
 
Chilean’s political-administrative division has been traditionally centralist; during 
the colonial period the Captaincy General of Chile was divided into Corregimientos25 and 
after its independence Chile was divided into provinces and departments. It was not until 
1925 that regionalisation was incorporated into the public agenda due to the need to revert 
the increasing centralism of the country.  
There were two proposals before the current division took 
place. The first one was made by CORFO26 in 1950 and divided 
Chile in six regions according to their geographic characteristics. 
The second proposal was made in 1965 by ODEPLAN27 and 
divided the national territory into 11 regions plus a metropolitan 
area, Santiago and surroundings. This proposal was based on the 
theory of development poles; the aim was to promote regional 
centres in the belief that they would stimulate further economic 
development in the rest of the region. Although none of these 
proposals were implemented, the studies that supported them 
were used to design the current political-administrative division 
of the country, which was called Regionalisation. It is important 
to take into account that centralism was seen as a problem from 
an administrative point of view, the idea was to promote 
development and a more efficient state apparatus; therefore, 
regionalisation was promoted by the central state and designed 
by agencies from the central body. 
During the Dictatorship, the Military government created a 
new agency: CONARA 28 , which was in charge of the 
Regionalisation process. CONARA studied the proposals made 
by CORFO and ODEPLAN and designed a new political-
administrative division in 1974: 12 regions plus a Metropolitan 
area. The main purposes of the Regionalisation were to increase 
national integration, to develop a national security system 
(geopolitical conception) and to achieve economic development. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Spanish word for subdivisions within a certain territory during the Colonial period (16th – 19th century). 
26 Corporation for promoting production and trade (Corporación de Fomento a la Producción y el Comercio) 
27 Office of Planning and Development (Oficina de Planificación y Desarrollo) 
28 National Commission for Administrative Reform (Comisión Nacional de la Reforma Administrativa) 
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Each region was named with a Roman number – in order from north to south - and a name, 
except for the Metropolitan Region, which has number (XIII) but it is never used. For 
instance, I Region of Tarapacá, II Region of Antofagasta, etc; although lately the tendency 
has been to call regions by their name instead of the number, informally Chilean public 
servants still refer to regions as ‘the first one’, ‘the second one’ and so on, with the 
exception of the Metropolitan Region, which is called RM (see Fig 4-429). The number of 
regions cannot be eliminated because many laws refer to their numbers; therefore, 
eliminating them would involve change to a large part of the legal frame.  
Regionalisation started in 1974 but it has not finished yet. In 2007 two more regions 
were incorporated as a result of the subdivision of Tarapacá Region and Los Lagos Region, 
so the current political-administrative division 
contains 15 regions. The regions are further 
subdivided into provinces and communes, there 
being nowadays 52 provinces and 345 
communes in total. The heads of each level are 
the President, the Intendente, the Governor and 
the Mayor respectively (Table 4-530); however, only the President and the Mayor are 
elected by popular vote; both the Intendente and the Governor are appointed by the 
President of the Republic and they are positions of the exclusive trust of him/her. Despite 
the efforts made in regard of the regionalisation, regional identities have not been 
developed strongly and people identify more with the city they are from rather than their 
region or province.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Source: IMG (Instituto Geográfico Militar / Military Geographical Institute) www.igm.cl  
30 Source: author 
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The table 4-631 summarises the main milestones over the last 40 years. There are 
three periods: the Military government – a right wing dictatorship  - that ruled the country 
for 17 years; the four Concertación governments32, a democratic coalition from centre-left 
wing that ruled the country for the following 20 years; and Alianza, the current right wing 
coalition that rules the country since 2010.  
 
During the Military government there were two key events, regionalisation and the 
creation of SUBDERE. Regionalisation was a completely new political-administrative 
division of the territory and state structure, which more than an event is an ongoing 
process. There were some attempts in the former democratic governments to implement a 
new political administrative division but it was not until the military took power than the 
regionalisation of the country could be conducted. With the return to democracy, the 
debate around regionalisation started again and it has became one of the more important 
themes of decentralisation debates in the country. The second event, the creation of 
SUBDERE, Sub-secretariat of Regional Development, marked the will of the state to 
support the regions and that was understood as building a strategy toward further 
decentralisation, which has been one of the main tasks of SUBDERE since its creation. 
During the second period, the Concertación governments also achieved two 
important changes: the decentralisation of communal governments and the creation of 
regional governments. Regarding the former, until 1991 they were tied to the central body 
and their authorities were appointed; the first democratic election of mayors took place in 
1992 and in 1993 the Law of Municipalities33 was promulgated, which established their 
autonomy from the central body. The second change was related to regional administration 
and government. In 1993 Regional Governments were created as a body that had to 
administer and rule the region under the direction of an Intendente, who remains appointed 
until now. In 1997 the Regional Councils, whose members were indirectly elected, were 
created. SUBDERE, as the Agency in charge of regional development, has been evaluating 
the Regional Governments over the past looking for ways to improve their performance 
and increase their autonomy. As a consequence, two major reforms toward the 
reorganisation of the Regional Governments were made in 2005 and 2009, which will be 
analysed in this research.  
Finally, the Alianza government has been in power for just three years; so far it has 
supported SUBDERE in its task towards greater decentralisation for regions, fulfilling the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Source: author 
32 Aylwin (DC), Frei (DC), Lagos (PPD) and Bachelet (PS)  
33 Law 18.695 
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commitment that was made during the election process. Up to this moment, the main step 
regarding the Regional Governments has been the approval in June 2013 of the law that 
establishes the regulations for the popular election of the regional councillors. 
 
Case study: Tarapacá and Valparaíso regions 
 
 
 
The case study is centred on the responses of two regions, I Region of Tarapacá and 
V Region of Valparaíso, to the last steps towards greater regional decentralisation made in 
2005 and 2009. The choice of these regions was related to three aspects: distance from the 
national government - based in Santiago -, political weight, critical mass of population and 
identity. Figure 4-534 shows the location of each region in Chile and, also, their position in 
relation to Santiago. Tarapacá Region borders with the XV Region of Arica-Parinacota to 
the North, to the South with the II Region of Antofagasta, to the West with the Pacific 
Ocean and to the East with Bolivia. The main characteristic of this region is that it is 
located in the Atacama Desert, being the driest region of the country. Valparaíso Region 
borders with the IV Region of Coquimbo to the North, to the South with the Metropolitan 
Region and the VI Region of O’Higgins, to the West with the Pacific Ocean and to the East 
with Argentina. This region has a large variety of climates, landscapes and human 
activities, which makes it more complex than Tarapacá. Regarding to distance, Valparaíso 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Maps’ source (fig 4-5, 4-6 and 4-7) IGM www.igm.cl  
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Region is next to the Metropolitan Region, where Santiago is located, while the Region of 
Tarapacá is in the far north of the country. The city of Valparaíso, capital of Valparaíso 
Region is 120 kms. from Santiago, while Iquique, capital of Tarapacá Region is 1,800 kms. 
from Santiago35. 
 
 
 
Chile has four predominant geomorphologic areas from West to East: Coastal Plains, 
Coastal Mountains Range, Intermediate Depression and the Andean Mountains Range. 
Because of to the harsh living conditions – mainly related to the scarce water supplies – the 
population of Tarapacá is located predominantly on the Coastal Plains and western plateau 
of the Coastal Mountains in the cities of Iquique and Alto Hospicio, which together contain 
90.5% of Tarapacá’s inhabitants. Tarapacá has been subdivided into two province and 
seven communas, of which only Iquique and Alto Hospicio have large populations while 
the others are mainly sparsely populated rural areas (see fig 4-6 and table 4-7).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Santiago – Valparaiso by car is 2 hours app / Santiago – Iquique is 24 hours by car app and 3 hours by 
plane. 
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The distribution of the population of Valparaíso Region (see table 4-8) is different 
because it has more comfortable living conditions such as abundant water, good soils for 
agriculture, milder weather and good road infrastructure, so the population is distributed all 
across the region; its larger cities, Port of Valparaíso and Viña del Mar, are located on the 
Coastal Plain (see fig 4-7). 
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Comparing the tables 4-7 and 4-836 of population and density per commune the huge 
difference between both regions is evident, while the larger cities of Tarapacá have less 
than 100 inhabitants per km2, Valparaíso Region has plenty of examples that exceed this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Census 2002, INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas / National Institute of Statistics)  
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such as La Calera, Port of Valparaíso, Viña del Mar and Villa Alemana. The regional 
average density of Valparaíso region is 93.92 inhabitants per km2 while in Tarapacá it is 
only 5.65. The difference in the number of inhabitants is important because it defines the 
number of provinces and communes within each region as well as the number of 
representatives for the Congress, the Regional Council and the Communal Council. As a 
consequence, the political-administrative division of Valparaíso – 8 provinces and 38 
communes – allows it to have a greater amount of representatives in the Congress; 
therefore the political weight of Valparaíso is far bigger than Tarapacá’s, which has to face 
the disadvantage of less representation in the national sphere. 
Equally important is the critical mass of population. While Valparaíso has around 1.5 
million inhabitants (Census 2002), Tarapacá has little more than 200,000. In order to 
attract more population to peripheral regions the Chilean state has implemented several 
subsides such as ‘Tax free zone’ and territorial assignation37; therefore in Tarapacá Region 
there are no taxes on imports, so all the goods are cheaper than in the rest of the country; 
also, there is an increment of 40% over the normal salary in the public sector plus an extra 
seven days for holiday per year. Therefore, Tarapacá has better employment and living 
conditions, which allows it to attract qualified professionals from other parts of the 
country.  
Traditionally, Tarapacá based its economy on mining; over the 19th and first half of 
20th century the main exploitation was saltpetre. However, the region has diversified its 
economy with trade being the main activity, followed by copper mining. Also gold, silver 
and salt are exploited. Fishing is the third economic activity of the region and fish oil and 
fishmeal are produced and exported. Tourism is also an important activity in the region due 
to its beautiful and diverse landscapes: beaches, oases, mountains, high plateau, and also, 
because of its historical and archaeological legacy. Agriculture and farming are difficult 
because of the lack of water resources, however there are several oases – the most 
important is Pica – where there are fertile soils and agriculture is well developed. Cattle 
Raising is usually located in the High Plateau of Andes Mountains, where there is more 
water and natural grasslands. 
On the other hand, Valparaíso bases its economy on port activities - ports of San 
Antonio and Valparaíso -, agriculture –mainly in Aconcagua Valley - and tourism – Viña 
del Mar and along the Coastal Plains. The region is well known for the production of fruits 
and vegetables; its also worldwide reputation is for its wine. Fishing and mining are also 
important activities. Valparaíso has the third largest concentration of industries in the 
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country, after the Metropolitan Region and VIII Region of Biobío. Tourism is very 
important because of the variety of landscapes present and activities that can be done. In 
addition to its beaches, Valparaíso region has other touristic attractions such as the valleys, 
where it is possible to enjoy the country life; the Andes Mountains, where the are routes 
for climbing, walking and skiing; and Valparaíso city, which was declared ‘World 
Heritage’ because of its architecture. A large number of tourists come from Santiago; 
during weekends, holidays and vacations there are massive invasions of Santiaguinos to 
the region owing to its ease of accessibility. Another advantage is that the public goods and 
services tend to concentrate where there are more people as the ratio of cost-benefits. So 
Valparaiso Region has the advantage over Tarapacá, which has to face the huge 
disadvantages of distance from the political and economic centre of the country. 
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Figure 4-838 shows the political situation both at national and regional level through 
the comparison of the results in the deputies’ elections since the return to democracy. The 
red lines corresponds to Concertación, the blue to Alianza and the green to smaller parties. 
The bigger graph shows all the results for the national and regional levels, the second line 
– with the three smaller ones - decomposes those results for clarity, and the third line – the 
two graphs at the bottom of the figure – shows the results per region. For these data it is 
evident that the Concertación lost ground both at national and regional level, while 
Alianza’s grew. However, the Alianza managed to get more votes that the Concertación 
only in Valparaíso Region; votes went to the smaller parties and coalitions. From the green 
lines it is also evident that Tarapacá Region gives greater support to smaller parties than 
Valparaiso, which shows a similar behaviour to the national tendency. This might be 
explained by the rise of regional parties over the last 10 years; the most important 
regarding the number of affiliated is the Independent Regional Party (PRI). PRI was 
created in 2006 from the merger of two regional parties: the Independent National Alliance 
(ANI) and the party of Regional Action (PAR), created in 2002 and 2003 respectively; the 
ANI represented IX, X and XI regions, while PAR represented I, II and III regions. Thus, 
since 2003 Tarapacá has a regional representation.  
Regarding to the results by regions, historically Tarapacá had chosen one deputy for 
each coalition, Alianza and Concertación, however during the elections of Deputies of 
2005 a substantial change was produced, the candidate of the former PAR won a seat in the 
Congress. This showed the great need of representation of regions. Unfortunately, the 
deputy changed party later on and became part of the Alianza. Although the reasons the 
deputy gave to justify the change39 were accepted, it might be seen as a failure of the PAR 
after the big triumph of winning a seat.  
Despite this unique case, Tarapacá has supported Concertación more than Alianza 
over the years; however, during the last elections this changed and for the first time since 
the return to democracy the Alianza had more votes than Concertación in the deputies’ 
elections. The tendency over the last years has been a steady decline in the support for 
Concertación, from the 51.83% in 1997 to 34.49% in 2009 while the Alianza has kept 
around 30% during the same period. The explanation for the sudden victory over the 
Concertación might be because the Alianza was part of a coalition with two smaller 
parties, whose aim was to remove the Concertación government that had lasted 20 years. 
Moreover, taking into account that in the last elections for Mayor (2008), the Concertación 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Source: author with data from SERVEL (Electoral Service) 
39 There was a scandal about corruption implicating the President of the PAR in office and the Deputy 
wanted to show she was not involved. 
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did not win in any commune, what happened during the elections of 2009 regarding 
parliamentarians and also presidential elections was not a big surprise. Despite all of this, 
due to the binominal electoral system Tarapacá has had one deputy from the Concertación 
and one from the Alianza since the return to democracy – with the exception of Deputy 
Isasi, who won as a member of the PAR but turned to Alianza later on. 
The case of Valparaíso is different; the smaller parties seem to be out of the picture, 
while Alianza and Concertación have a vote-to-vote contest. Regarding Mayors, 
Valparaíso Region has twelve from the Alianza, fifteen from the Concertación, five from 
smaller parties and six independents. Currently Valparaíso Region has four senators and 
twelve deputies, half from the Concertación and half from the Alianza 
Finally, regional identity based both on historical and geographical issues is an 
important topic when shaping the relationship between each region to central level. On the 
one hand Valparaíso has been part of Chile since the very beginning (16th Century), which 
means that Valparaíso has the same history and evolution as Santiago and almost the rest 
of the country, while Tarapacá became part of Chile after the Pacific War at the end of the 
19th Century, having being Peruvian territory before that. Moreover, Valparaíso is part of 
the ‘central macro zone’40, which is composed of Valparaíso Region, O’Higgins Region 
and the Metropolitan Region. This fact may create a stronger sense of belonging and 
partnership with Santiago in comparison with other regions that might tend to see Santiago 
as an adversary.  
These characteristics raise the question as to how the relationship between the central 
state and the regions is shaped, considering the different realities of Valparaíso and 
Tarapacá. Is Valparaíso under closer control than Tarapacá? In other words, is Tarapacá 
freer because of its distance and sense of separation from the centre, meaning that the state 
has to make a bigger effort to control it? Is there a relation between power and 
geographical distance? How important is the political weight of each region in their 
relationship with the central level? What is the position of these regions in relation to 
decentralisation? Are they raising the same issues, considering one has been part of Chile 
for 130 years as opposed to the other’s almost 500 years? Is Valparaíso more empathic 
than Tarapacá toward Santiago because they share the same history and geographical area? 
These questions will be addressed in the results chapters (V, VI and VII). These regions 
were chosen in order to their differences which will allow to have an interesting 
comparison of the response of regions to the reforms recently implemented in the country. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Macrozona Central 
	   101	  
CHANGING NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES  
 
National structure 
 
Chile has a multilevel administrative structure: national, regional, provincial and 
communal. This administrative structure of the state will be described deeply at the 
national and the regional levels, which concern this research. Besides, the main focus will 
be on the Executive and the Legislative Power. 
As is shown in the figure 4-941, at the national level the Executive is under the 
President of the Republic, who has the faculty to design his/her Cabinet and to choose its 
members. Each ministry or sector - such as Transport, Public Works, Domestics Affairs, 
Housing and Urbanism, Planning and so on - has a Regional Office or SEREMI, which 
deals with regional affairs.  
 
 
 
The Law 19.175 of ‘Regional Governments and its Administration’ establishes that 
the government of the regions lies with the Intendente, and the administration of the 
regions lies with the Regional Government or GORE, which is composed of the Intendente 
and the Regional Council or CORE42. As a consequence, two roles are defined for the 
Intendente: ruler of the region, as the representative of the President, and administrator of 
the region, as Executive of the Regional Government - or just Executive. The Intendente is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Source: author 
42 Art 111º Constitution of Chile 
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directly named by the President of the Republic and can be removed any time the President 
so decides. Among his/her duties as Executive he/she acts as the President of the Regional 
Council; this is the reason why it is commonly said that the Intendente has ‘three hats’. As 
representative of the President, the Intendente is in charge of domestic affairs and in this 
regards he/she has to follow the guidelines, orders and instructions of the President and 
also to keep the President informed of regional issues and circumstances43; usually, this 
relationship is via the ministry of Domestic Affairs. As the Executive of the Regional 
Government, the Intendente is responsible for: coordinating and monitoring the work of 
the public services within the region; proposing to the President three candidates for the 
designation of Heads of SEREMIs and also their removal on occasion; administrating the 
resources of the Regional Government and presenting to the central level the needs of the 
region44. Finally, the Intendente presides over the Regional Council, in which he/she has 
the right of voice but not of vote unless there is for a casting vote regarding a specific 
decision. His/her main functions are to define the agenda of the Regional Council; to 
present plans and strategies for development, the regional budget and distribution of 
FNDR45 for its approval; and to propose programming agreements between the Regional 
Government and any other regional public service46. Two questions stems from this:  what 
is going to be the relationship between the Intendente and the Regional Council, as the 
proposal of Law states that the regional councillors will choose the President of the 
Council from among them.  And given this, what is going to be the relationship between 
the central state and the Regional Government, taking into account the influence that 
SUBDERE currently exerts over GOREs.47 
The administrative body of the Regional Government is currently composed of three 
Divisions (fig 4-1048): Planning and Development (DIPLAD), Analysis and Control of 
Management (DACOG) and Administration and Finances (DAF). The Constitution (Art 
114º) allows the transference of functions/competences from Ministries or other Public 
Services in conformity with the needs of the regions; therefore the structure of the 
Regional Government might change in the future. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Art 111º and 112º Constitution of Chile; Art 1º and 2º Law 19.175 
44 Art 23º and 24º Law 19.175 
45 Investment defined Regionally (IDR), in Chile is called FNDR (National Funding for Regional 
Development) 
46 Art 24º Law 19.175 
47 As the first election of regional councillors will be in November 2013, it was not possible to answer these 
questions, so the assessment of this particular issue should be address in a further research. 
48 Source: author 
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The Regional Council is part of the Regional Government and is composed of a 
President of the Council and the regional councillors, which are elected by local 
councillors from the local governments (Municipalities). The number of regional 
councillors depends on the inhabitants and the number of provinces each region has; thus 
Tarapacá has 14 councillors and Valparaíso 28. The main functions of the Regional 
Council are: to supervise the Intendente’s duties as head of the Executive, to approve 
regulations and planning instruments, to resolve the distribution of regional resources and 
to approve the Regional Government programming arrangement 49. 
 
 
 
So far, the regional councillors have been indirectly elected; local councillors from 
the Communal Government choose them. The local councillors, grouped by provinces, 
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elect a certain number of councillors – according to the number of inhabitants of each 
province. The votes of two local councillors or 0.5% of citizens’ votes are needed to be 
nominated as candidate. Tables 4-9 and 4-10 50  show the current number of local 
councillors and regional councillors by province, and also the number of votes regional 
councillors need to be elected in Tarapacá and Valparaíso regions; so those were the local 
councillors who chose the regional councillors at the end of 2008. Given that, is it possible 
to infer that a regional councillor needs between one and fifteen votes to be elected in these 
regions, depending on the province. For instance, in Iquique Province a councillor may be 
elected with just one vote – fourteen individuals have to choose eleven -, while in Petorca 
Province a councillor needs near fifteen votes to be elected – thirty individuals choosing 
two. The current election system of regional councillors is non-democratic, non-
representative and might lead to corrupt practices, which are the reasons that support the 
Reform of 2009 that will be explained in the next section.  
SEREMIs are the regional branches of Ministries and work under two lines: sectorial 
(Ministry) and regional (Intendente); thus, each Head of SEREMI has a dependency 
relationship with both levels. This is due to two reasons: firstly, each Head of SEREMI is 
appointed together by the Intendente and the Minister of the respective sector. The Art 2º 
letter k) of the Law 19.175 establishes that the Intendente proposes 3 names to the 
President of the Republic who, via the Minister of the respective sector, appointed the 
Head of SEREMIs. And, on the other hand, the same law in its Art 24º letter m), 
establishes the faculty of the Intendente to coordinate, supervise and monitor all the 
regional services. Therefore, each Head of SEREMI has two bosses (see figure 4-9), which 
might produce strain over him/her when sectorial and regional interests are in conflict.  
Figure 4-1151 shows the complexities of the power relations between levels within 
the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU), giving also the organisation of this 
ministry. The Minister and the Sub-secretary are the main authorities of the ministry and 
they have direct communication with the head of each SEREMI at the regional level. Also 
the Divisions may communicate instructions directly to the Departments, as it is shown 
with the example of DDU and DUI. The minister, the sub-secretary, the heads of Divisions 
and the heads of SEREMIs are currently political appointed positions, however until 2010, 
the heads of Departments were also appointed. The Department of Urban Development 
and Infraestructure (DUI) works directly with the Division of Urban Development (DDU) 
and follows its instructions most of the time. Thus, there are two main streams of power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Source: author, with data from Regional Government of Valparaiso and Tarapacá. 
51 Source: author 
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relations between levels, one from the minister and sub-secretary to the head of SEREMI 
and the other from the Divisions to the Departments.  
 
 
 
Current reforms 
 
The Regional Government has two roles: a national government role, in which the 
Intendente is the direct representative of the President of the Republic and a territorially 
decentralised role, in which the Intendente acts as the executive of the Regional 
Government and also presides over the Regional Council (OECD 2009).  
Before the 2005 and 2009 reforms, the administrative body of the Regional 
Government was composed of two divisions: DACOG and DAF. The former, has to 
support the construction of the budget project regarding the investment of Regional 
Government and also monitoring and controlling it - which means being in charge of 
FNDR (pre investment and investment). DAF is in charge of the administrative and 
	   106	  
financial management, of the formulation and execution of the budget and the provision of 
the general supplies for Regional Government52.  
 
 
 
Also, the Regional Council was composed of indirectly elected councillors; it was 
tied to the Intendente, who presided over it. Therefore, up to 2005 Regional Governments 
in Chile had the structure shown in the figure 4-1253. 
SUBDERE proposed two reforms; the first one (2005) was focused on giving 
Regional Governments a stronger internal structure, the creation of a third division in 
charge of strategic planning for the region was proposed. The second one (2009) was 
focused on democratising regional authorities and thus giving them more autonomy; 
therefore it proposed the direct election of the Intendente and the regional councillors. 
In 2005 the third division of Regional Government, DIPLAD was created by 
SUBDERE. The intention of SUBDERE was the modification of Art 68 of the Law 
19.175, which would allow each region to define their own internal structure according to 
their specific needs; however this was considered unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Art 68 Law 19.175 
53 Source: author 
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Tribunal and was rejected. However, it was possible to add into the Law 19.37954 a third 
head of a nameless division. Straightaway, SUBDERE used that legal loophole, arguing 
that as the law did not specify the tasks for this position, the Intendente – using the 
faculties established by Art 27º of Law 19.175 – had to define them. SUBDERE also 
approved a budget for hiring human resources in order to provide a team to help him/her to 
fulfil the tasks given by the Intendente. Thus, the Divisions of Planning and Development 
were created, which up to the present time have no name, functions and staff defined 
within the legal framework.  
DIPLADs were subject to the will of the Intendente, who was giving them tasks not 
necessarily related to what SUBDERE had previously defined. For them the main tasks of 
DIPLAD should be four: generation of a regional strategy for development (EDR), 
generation of a regional plan of territorial order (PROT), generation of regional public 
policies and the generation of a preliminary draft of proposals for regional investment 
(ARI). SUBDERE organised several workshops and training courses within Regional 
Governments in order to clarify these aims and to prepare people for the new division. 
Meanwhile, SUBDERE was negotiating within the central level for the transference of the 
EDR and PROT from MIDEPLAN and MINVU respectively towards the Regional 
Governments. 
A second important reform came in 2009, which was about the separation of 
Regional Government from the central level, proposing the direct election of regional 
authorities in order to give them more representativeness and to deepen democracy, which 
opened a huge political debate around the kind of decentralisation Chile is pursuing and to 
what extent; questions that have not been answered yet. Meanwhile, the modification of 
the Constitution was made in the following terms: the Intendente continues as head of the 
Regional Government and as representative of the President of the Republic, so he/she 
remains an appointed position; however, the regional councillors will be directly elected 
and they will choose the President of the Regional Council55. Thus, just one part of the 
changes proposed by SUBDERE was taken into account within the constitutional reform of 
2009.  
These two reforms are changing the face of the Regional Governments in Chile (see 
fig 4-1356), giving them more technical tools and resources (DIPLAD) in order to generate 
their own axis of development and, besides, giving them more autonomy for implementing 
them. There is still a long way to go and Chile is far away from real decentralisation, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ley de Planta de los Gobiernos Regionales (Law of the staff of Regional Governments) 
55 Art 113º of the Constitution 
56 Source: author	  
	   108	  
these milestones play a key role in the main picture in which decentralisation is being 
shaped. Both lines, the reinforcement of regional structure and the increment of political 
autonomy, seek to empower the Regional Governments; the implementation of a strong 
regional structure would allow the reception of the competences that have been transferred 
from the central level and also may define the procedure for new transferences in the 
future. Thus the formal structure of the Regional Government would be strong enough to 
hold more autonomy, which leads to the second strategic line of these reforms: political 
autonomy would help to empower regions in their relationship with the central level. 
Political authorities directly elected from citizenry are not tied to the will of the central 
level and may have more freedom to make a regional case and work for it. SUBDERE has 
a plan, which is being implemented step by step as far as possible. It is the aim of this 
research to go deeper into the analysis of these reforms, seeking a better understanding of 
how Chile is shaping political decentralisation.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In order to understand Chilean decentralisation processes the political, social, 
economic and historical context with all its complexities becomes crucial. A series of 
considerations have to be taken into account, such as the establishment of the Portalian 
model of the state, as a response to the necessity of a new order; the Chilean republic and 
the consolidation of the national sovereignty; the conservative tendencies of Chilean 
traditional elites, who have led almost every important event since independence; the 
neoliberal economic model implemented in the middle of the 1980s, in which the 
interventionist role of the state was diminished and business-people appeared as new 
political actors; the strengthening of the coercive role of the state during the Dictatorship 
and consequent division of Chilean society between left-right political views; and finally, 
the changes operated within society over the past five years in which those traditional left-
right wing divisions are being questioned by the new claims against centralism. 
The comparison of two so different regions is also an important point in this 
research; it will facilitate a better understanding of the central-local relationship and the 
shaping of decentralisation within a country so diverse but at the same time so centralised. 
Finally, understanding the complexities of Chilean legal, administrative and political 
context allows a better comprehension of decentralisation process and the key role that 
SUBDERE plays in it.  
The creation of DIPLAD and the direct election of the regional councillors are two 
important steps toward greater decentralisation; on the one hand the ‘hollowing out’ of 
some central state functions toward the strengthening of Regional Governments and, on the 
other hand, the greater representativeness of councillors. However, Chile has a strong 
vertical administrative and political structure, which only can be broken through legal 
reforms within the Congress; therefore, the support of parliamentarians is needed in order 
to succeed. Thus, the political system is very important because it means that any big step 
has to be done in agreement with the main political coalitions, Concertación and Alianza. 
In the next three chapters the research questions that stemmed from this research will 
be analysed: how decentralisation is understood and framed in Chile; how effective (real) 
is the empowerment of regional governments through top-down reforms; and finally, the 
institutional relationship between central state and the regions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The first question of this research concerns how political decentralisation is 
understood by actors and how this understanding shaped its application. In order to do that 
it is important to analyse what is understood by political decentralisation, how strategies 
towards decentralisation are designed and how they are implemented. Therefore the 
process from the conception up to the application of a decentralising reform is the focus of 
this thesis. The implementation of decentralised measures cannot be done only through 
legal reforms and top-down instructions from the central level; it has to be accompanied by 
practices within the institutional apparatus of the State. This informal application of 
decentralisation is also essential because it will constitute the real decentralisation of the 
country. In that sense the understanding of actors and their practices within the public 
institutions involved in the process is crucial.  
If linearly constructed and with just one actor involved, the analysis would be 
simpler; however, reality is complex, with multiple actors and spheres of action. This 
chapter aims to shed light on the entanglements in which the decentralisation process is 
embedded. In chapters III and IV (Case Study and Literature Review) the concept of 
decentralisation has been discussed in relation to the new paradigm of the state; also, the 
historical and cultural context of Chilean decentralisation and the national ethos has been 
analysed – the latter mainly regarding centralism and political identity. Therefore this 
chapter will outline the nuances of the framework constructed around political 
decentralisation when applied in this particular context.  
The first section aims to analyse how agents interpret and construct the three 
dimensions of decentralisation identified by this research: the philosophical, political and 
technical dimensions. The philosophical dimension is related to the framework and set of 
concepts that shape the agents’ understanding of reality. The political dimension is related 
to the decision-making process and the design of strategies towards decentralisation, which 
are framed by the main streams of thought that influence the construction of perspectives, 
arguments and discourses of decentralisation. And the technical dimension is related to the 
actions involved in order to fulfil those decisions. As actions are made by actors, their 
interpretations and understanding of reality are crucial to their performance. Thus, 
philosophical discourses frame both dimensions, political and technical, although specific 
actors are not always aware of that.  
The second section discusses the difficulties that Chilean decentralisation has faced 
so far. This research has identified gradualism as a major obstacle to decentralisation, 
which is a consequence of the attitudes of the actors involved and expressed by the state 
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personnel through open resistance, a reluctance to implement specific measures or inertia. 
The section also poses these issues as outcomes of Chilean reality; that is to say, a 
centralist culture, regional disparities and (in)capacities that lead to the misgivings the 
central level has about the regions, and the state of engagement which ties the government 
in office, preventing it from taking more radical measures towards decentralisation.   
 
PHILOSOPHICAL, POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
DECENTRALISATION  
 
The way that decentralisation is shaped is related to three issues: what is understood 
by political decentralisation, how the decision-making process is performed, and how those 
decisions are implemented; in other words, the philosophical, political and technical 
dimensions of decentralisation. In the next pages, figure 5-11 will be deconstructed in order 
to analyse the Chilean process towards decentralisation. 
 
Fig 5-1: Dimensions of decentralisation 
 
 
It is necessary to identify the agents involved in the process and what discourses 
drive them to understand how political decentralisation is shaped. Discourses are 
fundamental to understand the actors’ responses to a political conjuncture. Although 
theoretical, what is more interesting about discourses is how they are interpreted and 
translated into reality, therefore how they shape the actions towards decentralisation; in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Source: author 
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other words, decentralisation is highly influenced by the motivations, beliefs and interests 
of its agents. Thus, it is fundamental to grasp the different interpretations of 
decentralisation in order to understand the decision-making process and how those 
decisions are implemented.  
Besides the theoretical discourses, two spheres are identified regarding agency 
towards decentralisation: political and technical. The political sphere is related to decision-
making and the design of decentralising reforms; the actors involved here are the central 
government and parliament, and SUBDERE acts as the driving agent that designs and 
negotiates within the central level of the Executive and with the Congress over 
decentralising measures and policies. The technical sphere is related to the implementation 
of such policies; so the way that decisions are passed down to the regional level is crucial 
for their success.  
 
Philosophical dimension: discourses 
 
As was discussed in Chapter II (Literature Review) the main streams related to 
decentralisation are economic, cultural and political; however, nowadays the most 
important are political and economic, in which one is focused on development while the 
other focused on decentralisation itself2.  
Political and developmental streams frame the different perspectives that actors have 
of decentralisation, thus creating a set of arguments or discourses to justify its promotion 
and scope. The Chilean case shows the influence of both perspectives in the arguments 
identified for supporting the decentralising process. Interviewees developed four main 
arguments or discourses in order to justify decentralisation: regional autonomy, greater 
democracy, regional development and the improvement of state response.  
From a political perspective, regional autonomy, democracy and governance play 
important roles as goals of decentralisation, and are part of post Marxist theory. Moreover, 
in Chile these discourses were the strongest during the 1990s as the country had just came 
out of a 17 year dictatorship; therefore the democratization of all state institutions and a 
change of the practices within the state were very important. Both arguments, regional 
autonomy and greater democracy, are entangled, so in most of the interviews respondents 
use them together. 
 
‘Descentralización es cuando el poder central le atribuye capacidad y 
traspaso de competencias a otras regiones, para que ellas trabajen de manera 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Bardhan, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose et al 2003, 2008 and 2010; Monge, 2005 
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autónoma y crezcan de manera… Con lo que se llama el desarrollo endógeno. Eso 
es lo que yo entiendo, que es una mirada regionalista para la propia región, así va 
a tener más validez. En cambio un trabajo desde el nivel central, siempre va ser 
con una mirada centralista ‘ellos necesitan más infraestructura o el turismo’ 
pero el nivel central, como no vive en la región, no conoce la realidad. Entonces, 
la descentralización es el paso y traspaso de competencias desde el nivel central 
hacia las regiones.’ 
 
‘Decentralisation is when the central power and capacity assigns capacity 
and transfers competences to regions, so they can work autonomously and grow... 
by what is called endogenous development. That is what I understand, that it is a 
regional perspective for the region itself, so that it will have more validity. On the 
contrary, work from the central level will always be from a centralised point of 
view ‘they need more infrastructure or tourism’ but as the central level does 
not live in the region, it does not understand its reality. Then, decentralisation is 
the transfer of competences from the central level towards the regions. ’ 
 
 (INT 25 – Public servant, Tarapacá 2009) 
 
Regional autonomy refers to both the election of political authorities and the capacity 
of regions to make their own decisions. The interviewee emphasises the relevance of 
transferring decision-making processes to subnational governments in order to give the 
regions the opportunity to ‘think for themselves’, so that regional governments can have 
greater control over their territory and destiny. In order to achieve that autonomy, the 
transfer of resources, capacities, responsibilities and functions is fundamental. The 
transference of decision-making itself cannot give autonomy to the regions if their political 
officials are appointed; therefore respondents also highlight the need for elected political 
authorities, who should not be directly tied to the central level. Regional councillors and 
people from DIPLAD are the most supportive of the regional autonomy discourse. 
The second discourse is that decentralisation is the path towards greater democracy. 
Again, the cores of this argument are the transference of decision-making to the regions 
and the election of political authorities. However, it should go further than just the election 
of regional officials, it should involve the democratisation of the decision-making process. 
In the words of one interviewee ‘decentralisation allows more participation, therefore it 
strengthens democracy’3. This means the inclusion of more actors in the discussion – e.g. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 La descentralización permite mayor participación, por lo tanto se fortalece la democracia (INT 18 – Public 
servant, Valparaíso 2010) 
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increasing the number of public/private committees, improving the communications 
between the political and technical teams within public institutions, improving intersectoral 
coordination and multisectoral round tables, etc –, should result in a strengthening of 
regional governments and, therefore, of the regions. Public/private committees promote the 
construction of a merged agenda, in which some public and private interests are united in 
order to create synergies and to channel efforts towards specific goals.  
The lack of communication between the political and technical parts of a public 
institution many times causes delays and/or misunderstandings in decision-making. 
Political appointees do not always listen or understand public servants’ technical criteria 
when making decisions and public servants are not always aware of the political reasons 
behind a decision. The same occurs when technical teams present projects for the approval 
of the Regional Council.  
This lack of understanding between technical and political often affects the approval 
and/or application of certain policies, plans, programmes or projects – e.g. between 2002 
and 2006 U$14.7 millions were invested by the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism 
(MINVU) and U$6.2 million through other institutions (municipalities or regional 
governments) in order to complete the Regional Urban Development Plans (PRDU) for all 
the regions; the principal Intercommunal Regulator Plans (PRI); and to update all the 
Communal Regulator Plans (PRC) for all the communes (MINVU, 2006, p2). By 
December 2006 13 PRDU, 14 PRI and 139 PRC were finished; however, less than 10% of 
all these plans had been approved (Velásquez, 2008). Therefore, despite having concluded 
the technical stage, there were unresolved issues within the political approval of the plans, 
which resulted in a waste of resources and energy.  
Working in round tables is a common practice within the Chilean state; it is used 
whenever an issue cannot be solved by one sector4 alone. Regional governments should 
carry out the role of coordinator of intersectoral round tables. In sum, public/private 
committees, better communication between political and technical teams and a better 
articulation of intersectoral round tables improve and validate the decision-making process, 
as it is more participative and democratic. The discourse of greater democracy – although 
just in relation to the election of regional officials and the transference of decision-making 
– is mainly supported by academics, regional councillors and DIPLAD. 
Decentralisation changes the distribution of political power between the central state 
and the regions, and also within the regions - e.g. the relationship between the GORE and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Housing, Public Works, Health, Education, etc.  
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SEREMIs5. When regional government becomes the motor of the region and is able to 
articulate the other public services and to coordinate them with the private sector, the 
region becomes a whole body. Nowadays regions do not count on a proper regional 
government, but with a fragmented body of regional institutions that find it difficult to 
work co-ordinately, mainly because these institutions respond to different sectors of the 
central state. Decentralisation can give the strength and leadership GOREs need in order to 
have a collegiate body, coordinated and politically independent from the central 
government.  
Decentralisation means the empowerment of subnational levels, which may be an 
issue for the central state as they may construe it as losing power. However, it can also be 
seen as an opportunity for the state to prove its ability to adapt to the new scenario, which 
is the qualitative state defined by O’Neill (1997). In the following quote the interviewee 
argues that the role of the central state is to keep national unity and the consistency of each 
level regarding the others.  
 
‘El rol del Estado debe ser de cemento dentro de la comunidad nacional; 
es el que tiene que mantener la unidad. Cada nivel tiene un rol que jugar. Por 
ejemplo, el tema social, cultural y deportivo en el nivel local; infraestructura 
estructurante, desarrollo económico, innovación, en el nivel regional; y 
universidades, defensa, seguridad interior del Estado, relaciones internacionales, 
obras interregionales en el nivel nacional’ 
 
‘The role of the state should be the cement within the national community; 
it is who has to keep the unity. Each level has a role to play. For example, social 
issues, culture and sports at the local level; structuring infrastructure, economic 
development, innovation, at the regional level; and universities, defence, the 
internal security of the state, international relations, interregional works, at the 
national level' 
 
(INT 20 – Political Apointee6, Valparaíso 2010) 
 
Thus, having clear and differentiated roles by levels the whole state becomes 
stronger, as there will not be overlapping efforts among levels. The central state also 
becomes stronger after decentralisation because its role would be better defined, so it 
would not waste energy on spheres that are not its competence. Thus, the whole state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Regional Secretariats of Ministers, also called sectors. E.g SEREMI of Housing or SEREMI of Public 
Works 
6 Public servant who had been substituting for his boss for several months. 
	   117	  
apparatus would be more efficient. From this perspective, decentralisation can be seen as 
an opportunity for the central state to vindicate its primordial role and functions within 
society. During the 1970s and 1980s it seemed that the state stepped aside in favour of the 
market – mostly because of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation -; with political 
decentralisation the state is back in the game as an important agent of coordination and 
promotion at subnational and supranational level. Despite the above, interviewees 
highlight that the empowerment of the regions is pointless without the election of regional 
officials and greater participation of civil society. The fact that Chile returned to 
democracy (1990) is also important in order to understand the current process towards 
decentralisation, which is rooted in the early 1990s. Coming out from an authoritarian 
regime, regional decentralisation is highly associated with democratisation and pluralism, 
the same as happened in Germany and Italy after the Second World War (Keating, 1998). 
Following Fig 5-1 there are two more discourses or arguments to support 
decentralisation: regional development or regionalism and the efficiency of the state 
response, which come from a developmental perspective. Regionalism is a strategy based 
on the generation of ‘competitive territories’, which seeks regional autonomy from the 
central government by strengthening the coordination between public and private spheres, 
improving the participation of civil society and inter-institutional initiatives, and recouping 
the role of the state in the decision making process through empowering subnational 
governments7. This strategy follows a local/global dialectic, in which the region is seen as 
an administrative and operational unit to achieve endogenous development (Cuesta, 2006). 
The Chilean pursuit of regional development has been characterised by highly centralised 
policies, both in conception and administration – e.g. Law Arica 1 and 28. For regionalists, 
decentralisation is seen as a way to increase the political power that regions need in order 
to achieve development (Cuesta, 2006). Politicians from both national and regional levels 
are the main supporters of this discourse, as is shown in the following quote:  
 
‘La descentralización tiene que ver con los grados de empoderamiento que 
tengan que tener las regiones, sus ciudadanos, sus actores locales; con el grado de 
articulación que tengan en términos productivos, culturales, de desarrollo social. 
Los grados de gobernanza que logren entre sus instituciones y sus actores 
relevantes para poder tener una visión común de desarrollo. Esos grados de redes 
que se formen regionalmente yo lo vinculo con un grado de descentralización. 
Para mi no pasa por el tema administrativo, ni económico, ni político sino que 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Keating 1998, Finot 1999 and 2001, Lira 2003, and Montecinos 2005 
8 Ley Arica 1 y 2 are two laws created for tax benefits in Arica and Parinacota provinces 
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simplemente pasa por potenciar el desarrollo local, las instituciones y sus 
actores.’  
 
‘Decentralisation is related to the empowerment degrees that regions, 
citizen and local actors have; to the degree of articulation/linkage they have 
regarding productive, cultural and social development issues; the achievement of 
governance degrees among institutions and relevant actors in order to have a 
common vision of development. For me it does not go through administrative, 
economic or political issues, but through the promotion of local development, 
institutions and actors.’  
 
(INT 13 – Politician, Tarapacá 2010) 
 
Finally, the last discourse concerns the state response to community needs. Von Baer 
(2013)9, Head of CONADERE10, explains that the national level is overloaded, 
hypertrophied, so it cannot respond efficiently to local demands; regions can take better 
care of subnational issues. The key point here is Tocqueville’s principle of each level 
dealing with their own issues, because that is the best place to do it; people from regions 
will understand better their situation and will be able to develop more suitable solutions 
than the central level. The following quote explains the difficulties that the central state 
faces in order to respond appropriately to local issues. The quote comes from an academic 
who participated in the decentralisation workshops organised by SUBDERE in the early 
2000s.  
 
‘Yo creo que un país como Chile, donde la característica principal es la 
tremenda diversidad físico-natural, yo creo que no hay que explicar mucho por 
qué las decisiones no pueden tomarse de manera centralizada. A no ser que yo 
tenga tal nivel de capacidad de captura de esta diversidad y de respuesta a la 
carta, no de menú, como es la historia de Chile siempre. En la medida que yo 
desarrollo una capacidad de oferta a la carta , también puedo resolver el 
problema. Ahora, yo creo que esa capacidad de oferta a la carta es muy difícil de 
desarrollar porque la diversidad es tremenda. Me parece que lo que hay que hacer 
es descentralizar, que en el fondo es simplemente trasladar las decisiones (…) 
tratando de ir a la escala lo más precisa posible en el sentido de para qué me voy 
a mover a la escala local si de lo que estoy hablando es de las relaciones 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 El Mercurio 13th May 2013. Chilean newspaper 
10 Consejo Nacional para la regionalización y la decentralización. National Council for regionalisation and 
decentralisation. 
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internacionales de Chile, ahí me quedo en la escala nacional (…) Entre más me 
acerco a la escala adecuada más eficientes van a ser mis decisiones.’ 
 
‘In a country like Chile, in which the main characteristic is the great 
physical-natural diversity, I believe there is not much to explain about why 
decisions cannot be made centrally. Unless I have such capacity to capture that 
diversity and to respond ‘a la carte’, rather than with a set menu as has always 
been in Chilean history. Insofar as I develop ‘a la carte’ response capacity, I can 
solve the problem; however, I believe it is very difficult to develop it because the 
diversity is tremendous. It seems to me that what we should do is decentralise, 
which is basically transfer decision-making (…) trying to go to the most 
appropriate scale possible, in the sense that why should I go to the local scale if 
what I am talking about is Chile’s international relations - there I stay at the 
national level (…) The closer I get to the appropriate scale, the more efficient my 
decisions will be.’ 
 
 (INT 7 – Academic, Santiago 2010) 
 
This quote raises several points regarding Chile – although they are not exclusive to 
Chile. First of all, the fact that Chile is a long country – approximately 4300 kms long 
from north to south – encompassing a great geographical diversity, which leads to different 
issues within its territories – e.g. while the far north is a desert and the main issue is water 
supply for different activities, in the far south (Patagonia) there is plenty of water, but it is 
quite isolated from the rest of the world, therefore they face issues related to the high cost 
of living. Secondly, the response of the state so far has been centralised and universal – a 
set menu -, which has been proven not the most appropriate. Diversity requires specific 
answers regarding a particular reality; therefore, the interviewee explains that the central 
state could remain centralised if it was able to gather all data from every territory and 
respond to every issue ‘a la carte’. However, this implies a huge central state, with lots of 
resources allocated to specific issues in order to devise particular responses to each region. 
As this practice is too expensive and cumbersome, decentralisation seems the best solution. 
Finally, he explains that decentralisation is simply to allocate decision-making to the right 
level, emphasising that decisions are more efficient when they are made at the appropriate 
scale. Clear examples of this are the protests in Magallanes Region in January 201111 and 
the movement in Aysén (Chapter IV Case Study) in February 2012. Public servants from 
both national and regional level are the greater supporters of this discourse. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Demonstrations against the rising of natural gas prices. 
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Therefore, within the philosophical dimension, decentralisation is seen as a process 
that can be both a path to reach regional autonomy and increase democracy and as a tool to 
achieve regional development and to improve state response – an instrumentalist 
perspective. These streams are not separate, but mixed within actors’ discourses; nor can 
they be associated simply with right or left wing trends, although there are some tendencies 
from the right towards the developmental stream and from the left towards the political 
stream. Even so, there is a fine line between both discourses and most interviewees mix 
them in their arguments pro-decentralisation. As Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall  (2008) 
explained (see Chapter II Literature Review), there has been a switch from cultural and 
political discourses towards economic discourses, which explains why post Marxist 
arguments of the 1990s have given space to neoliberal arguments – such as new 
regionalism – in order to construct a new discourse in the 2000s. As Chile was returning to 
democracy after 17 years of dictatorship, in the 1990s the discourses towards 
decentralisation were driven by the increasing democracy – e.g. the decentralisation of 
local government, which are nowadays totally independent from the central state. 
 
Political dimension: decisions 
 
Discourses behind decentralisation show the philosophical background that supports 
the concept. The different interpretations that the actors involved make of these discourses 
shape decision-making, implementation and administration of reforms and policies 
towards decentralisation (see Fig 5-1). As a consequence, in Chile the political and 
technical dimensions are shaped by these four discourses, which do not seem to be tied to a 
specific goal. Actors within the political dimension are those who make decisions 
regarding strategies and policies’ designs, while those in the technical dimension are in 
charge of their implementation and management. 
SUBDERE is the driving agent behind the decentralisation process; it articulates 
both political and technical dimensions in order to reach greater decentralisation. In the last 
20 years SUBDERE has created the regional governments, the regional councils and the 
FNDR. Despite all these efforts, some interviewees argue that there is no real political will 
toward decentralisation at the national level. On the one hand, not all ministries are in 
favour of decentralisation, therefore SUBDERE has had to negotiate with each one in 
order to earn their support, e.g. the transference of territorial planning from the Ministry of 
Housing and Urbanism took several years and at the end of the negotiations, SUBDERE 
obtained only half of what was originally sought. Also, national politicians see political 
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decentralisation as a threat to their own power positions; some parliamentarians are afraid 
of the competition arising from regional authorities elected by popular vote. The next 
quotes illustrates the matter.  
 
‘Hay un tema de descentralización política, que es la que está menos 
clara. Quizás hay un avance en términos de descentralización de recursos fiscales, 
pero también en algunas cosas… Yo creo que no hay voluntad. O sea, está en el 
discurso, pero no se ve voluntad atrás. A nadie le gusta traspasar el poder, 
transferir poder (…) Yo veo que hay un discurso fuerte hacia la descentralización 
por parte del gobierno y a través de la SUBDERE. Y eso me parece que es una 
oportunidad, como que ahora están instalando un PGM de descentralización … Yo 
creo que hay ciertas medidas, como que dan señales de que quieren avanzar en ese 
tema… Pero como te dije, son soluciones más bien administrativas (…) Yo creo 
que políticamente, la descentralización política no va. No hay voluntad de la 
DIPRES, no hay voluntad de los senadores… ’  
 
‘There is an issue of political decentralisation, which is the less clear. 
Maybe there is some progress in terms of decentralisation of fiscal resources, but 
only in some things… I believe there is no will. I mean, it is in the discourse, but 
there is no will behind it. Nobody likes to pass power, to transfer power (…) I see a 
strong discourse from the government through SUBDERE. And that seems an 
opportunity to me, now that they are installing a PMG12 for decentralisation… I 
believe there are some measures, some signals that show they want to move 
forward on this issue… But, as I told you, those are administrative solutions  (…) I 
believe that politically, political decentralisation does not go. There is no will from 
DIPRES13, there is no will from senators…  ’ 
 
(INT 24 – Public Servant, Tarapacá 2010) 
 
Although the respondent recognised some efforts towards decentralisation, he was 
also very critical and explained that some of the steps that the central government was 
taking in order to promote decentralisation were in terms of administration and 
management rather than political. He blamed mainly Congress for its lack of will, 
explaining that even when it approved a law or reform, it was never the same as what the 
Executive had proposed in the first place.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Program for management improvement (Programa de mejoramiento de la gestión)  
13 DIPRES: Division of Budget (Division de presupuesto) 
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The decentralisation process in Chile is rooted in several contexts that go beyond the 
question to decentralise or recentralise. Chilean history has many examples of the tension 
between Santiago and the regions and the analysis of that tension depends mainly on the 
perspective actors have: what the country wants or does not want, what works or does not 
work are questions with different answers according to the point of view. Chilean culture 
reinforces the idea of the Portalian state: strong, vertical, hierarchical, conservative and 
centralist (See Chapter IV Case Study). The political context – with the different 
ideologies behind political parties – is also an important factor to take into account, 
especially when the issues discussed are somehow related to the dictatorship, such as 
changes in the Constitution, because there is still an emotional burden influencing actors 
(ibid). Also, the petty and self-interested politics, in which actors seek to keep their power 
and fulfil their personal agenda, cannot be put aside. 
Decentralisation in Chile is conducted through legal reforms; however there is no 
national policy for decentralisation. The Constitution establishes that decentralisation is an 
ongoing process, but it does not establish towards what end. In addition, so far there is no 
political consensus regarding the level of decentralisation that the country wants to 
achieve. Therefore, the legal framework is being modified without clear goals; actors seem 
to improvise over the political conjuncture and their own understanding of the process, 
which leads to contradictory results. For instance, in 2007 Tarapacá Region was divided 
into two regions: Tarapacá and Arica-Parinacota. From a political point of view, the 
original region has lost strength and political weight, as it is more segmented and so with 
less capacity to raise demands. In the words of one interviewee ’80,000 people cannot 
compete against 7 millions14’, which refers to the fact that regions have small populations 
compared to Santiago, so political efforts are usually allocated to the claims that Santiago 
raises. On the other hand, from an economic perspective, the original territory is receiving 
more money from the central level, as e.g. FNDR15 is apportioned equally to every region, 
so old Tarapacá was getting 1/13 from FNDR (13 regions), and now - being two regions – 
it is receiving 2/15 from FNDR (15 regions). However, to measure the degree of 
decentralisation through the amount of money that the central state allocates to each region 
is very limited; a clear goal is needed in order to develop more suitable strategies towards 
decentralisation and also in order to have more accurate results.  
In the political sphere, SUBDERE works on several fronts or tasks: to keep the 
decentralising process on the agenda of the government in office, to negotiate the 
transference of competences from the central level to the regions, and to raise awareness of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ’80,000 habitantes no pueden competir contra 7 millones’ (INT 28, Political Apointee) 
15 National fund for regional development 
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the importance of decentralisation reforms for their approval in Congress. Those three 
fronts are also entangled and highly dependent on the political conjuncture, which may tilt 
the balance from one side to another. In this scenario, decentralising decisions are made 
very slowly; it can take years before a policy is approved in Congress – e.g. the 
constitutional reform that allows the direct election of regional councillors took 7 years, 
although the whole process has taken longer. This specific issue was an initiative proposed 
in the middle of the 1990s – which also included the direct election of Intendentes, 
although that had to be dropped during the discussion in Congress – and currently is in the 
implementation stage. The first election of COREs by the citizenry should take place in 
November of 2013. The following quote summarises SUBDERE’s work in the political 
sphere.  
 
‘La Subsecretaría lo que hace es que aporta y propone modificaciones 
legales en función de un modelo prediseñado o estimado que ha salido de los 
programas de gobierno de los presidentes (…) Dada la estructura política, lo que 
dice el Presidente tiene viabilidad de éxito – ahora, si nosotros podemos poner los 
temas antes de que sea presidente, bien – pero ir más allá de lo que es el programa 
de gobierno, que ya es grande, tiene poca viabilidad. Por qué? Porque hay 
estructuras que están asociadas al poder y a las que no necesariamente le gusta lo 
que dice el programa de gobierno (…) entonces, son procesos muy largos y de 
mucho cuestionamiento. Sobretodo, porque no hay un modelo ideal de ‘hacia allá 
vamos’, la Constitución no lo da.’ 
 
‘What the Sub-secretariat does is make suggestions and proposes legal 
modifications according to a predesigned or estimated model that comes from the 
government’s programme of the presidents (…) given our political structure, what 
the President says is likely to succeed – now, if we can put the topics before s/he is 
president, good – but going further than the government programme, which is 
already big, has little viability. Why? Because there are structures associated with 
power that do not necessarily like the government’s programme (…) so, they are 
long processes, with a lot of questioning. Above all, because there is no ideal 
model saying ‘we are going towards there’, the Constitution does not give one.’ 
 
 (INT 28 – Political appointee, Santiago 2010) 
 
There are five points in this quote: SUBDERE works according to the government’s 
programme, the support of the President is essential for success, SUBDERE seeks to 
influence the government’s programme of candidates for President, there is resistance to 
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decentralisation from the power structures so decentralisation processes are long, and a 
national policy for decentralisation is needed.   
As there is no political clarity about the decentralising stage that the country is 
aiming for, SUBDERE’s work is based on two instruments: the government’s programme 
of the President of the Republic and her/his speech on the 21st of May16. Being a branch of 
the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, SUBDERE is a state institution that serves the 
government in office, so it cannot do anything that has not been expressed by the 
government. For example, as the direct election of Intendentes and regional councillors 
was in the government’s programme, SUBDERE worked on a legal proposal, which was 
sent to Congress; without that written desire, SUBDERE would not have been able to work 
on that topic. As the periods of government are shorter than the duration of legal reform 
processes – almost 20 years in this case -, SUBDERE needs the support of each new 
government in order to have continuity in its work. Following the example above, although 
the direct election of regional councillors was an initiative of the government of President 
Frei (1994-2000), the draft for the constitutional reform was submitted to Congress during 
the government of President Lagos (2000-2006) and it was approved during the 
government of President Bachelet (2006-2010). Thus, SUBDERE has to persuade the 
President in office in order to get support for the strategies designed, which implies the 
negotiation of those strategies and the development of specific policies. The results of the 
conversations with La Moneda17 are usually reflected in one of the two instruments 
mentioned above, which give the arguments SUBDERE needs to support its agency 
towards decentralising reforms. As SUBDERE cannot make decisions on its own, it takes 
very seriously its evangelising role to the whole spectrum of the political cast in order to 
keep decentralisation on the national agenda. Likewise, SUBDERE attempts to influence 
the candidates for President of the Republic before elections so that they include 
decentralisation issues in their proposals for the government’s programme.  
Negotiations with ministries are complex because even in the best case a minister 
will be in that position for only four years. Participants from SUBDERE pointed out that 
usually ministers do not want to take any important decision when they first come into 
office, arguing that they need time to settle in properly and to understand how that ministry 
works. Also, they explained, ministers are reluctant to take decisions when they are 
finishing their period, especially, if it is during an election year. The answer given to 
SUBDERE is usually that it is too late; they would not like to risk their reputation for last 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Annual account from the President of the Republic to the country (see chapter IV Case Study) 
17 La Moneda is the government house, located in Santiago (same as the Casa Rosada in Argentina, the 
White House in USA and Downing street in the UK) 
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minute decisions. In such cases SUBDERE has to wait for the new minister, which means 
a delay of a year, as the new minister will not take decisions at the beginning of his/her 
period. Therefore, SUBDERE has more or less three years at best to negotiate the 
transference of a specific function or competence from one ministry to the regional 
governments, as a change of authority in the middle of negotiations is always an 
opportunity to take a step back if the actors involved are not totally convinced. In the first 
stage of the creation of DIPLAD, the idea was to transfer competences from five 
institutions: Housing and Urbanism, Planning, Tourism, Labour and Agriculture. Of those, 
negotiations with Tourism and Agriculture failed; up to 2010 SUBDERE was still working 
with the Ministry of Labour without a final result; Planning transferred all competences 
after years of discussion; and, although with Housing and Urbanism negotiations were 
harder, at the end of two and half years one of the two functions that SUBDERE had 
requested was transferred. 
SUBDERE has no power to deal directly with Congress so it has to ask La Moneda 
for support in this matter, which can be through changing the priority of the issues that are 
being discussed in Congress18 and/or negotiating with political parties in order to achieve 
consensus in the political arena. After the amendment of the Constitution (2009) allowing 
the direct election of COREs, the next step for SUBDERE was to prepare a draft of a law 
that specified the guidelines for its implementation – i.e. defining constituencies, number 
of COREs per constituency, election by political party or by name, etc. At the end of 2009, 
the coalition in power – Concertación – lost the presidential election for the first time in 20 
years; therefore SUBDERE was facing the challenge of persuading the new coalition in 
power to continue with an initiative that came from its predecessor. Despite this, 
SUBDERE was in a favourable position regarding this particular issue: decentralisation 
was on the agenda of the new government and the Constitution had already been changed. 
Interviewees from SUBDERE explained that they were able to continue with the design of 
the draft while raising awareness of decentralisation process with the new officials. They 
were also gathering as many opinions as possible from Congress and political parties, so 
that once in the Congress, the approval process of the draft should not be too long. In his 
speech of May 21st in 2011, President Piñera undertook the submission of the draft to 
Congress before the independence festivities19 that year. With this announcement, La 
Moneda backed up SUBDERE’s efforts and gave it the power to finalise the pre-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The President of the Republic has the power to prioritise issues for discussion in Congress; thus a draft of 
law can be labelled as ‘low urgency’, ‘high urgency’ or ‘to vote on immediately’. Changing priority does not 
assure that the draft will be approved; however, allows the Executive to choose the best moment for 
discussion and/or vote, hence securing negotiation for further approval.  
19 Chilean Independence day is September 18th 
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negotiation process; hence the draft was submitted on September 12th. Although it was 
labelled ‘low urgency’20, SUBDERE hoped to get it approved before April 2012 in order to 
have the elections of regional councillors at the same time as the election of mayors and 
local councillors in October 2012. However, the student movement21 changed the agenda 
and the draft was not rated as ‘high urgency’22 until March 2012. The Chamber of 
Deputies approved it on January 22nd 2013, so it went to the Senate. In April that year, the 
President labelled it as ‘to vote on immediately’23 in order to ensure its approval before the 
speech of May 21st - the last annual account of the current government -, so that it was 
important for them to show as many achievements as possible. Thanks to that, the law was 
finally approved on May 15th 2013, taking less than two years – one year and nine months. 
The agency of SUBDERE in this matter was essential in 2011 when asking the 
government to undertake this particular goal and in discussing the most sensitive issues 
with parliamentarians before the draft submission; the law was promulgated in June 
201324.  
 
 
 
The process of the direct election of regional councillors is a good example by which 
to show how SUBDERE acts as the driving agent behind decentralisation, using mainly 
three actions: persuasion, negotiation and lobbying. As Table 5-125 shows, each of the 
measures described above is associated with specific actors and actions; in its role as the 
driving agent of decentralisation within the state, SUBDERE seeks to influence decision 
makers in different ways in order to gain support and achieve the results needed. This leads 
to the question of who sets the agenda for decentralisation, SUBDERE or the government 
in office, taking into account that some reforms can take 20 or 30 years? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ‘Urgencia simple’ 
21 During 2011 Chilean students demonstrated all over the country, demanding free and high quality 
education. The movement started a few years ago and it is still active, but 2011 was the threshold as it was 
strong enough to achieve the top position on the national political agenda.  
22 ‘Urgencia Suma’ 
23 ‘Discusión inmediata’ 
24 See the summary of the approval process in appendix 2 
25 Source: author 
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The agenda for decentralisation is not totally settled, but an ongoing construction, 
which is being renegotiated and redefined according to both the political conjuncture and 
the ideology of the government in office. Therefore the agenda is the result of a two-way 
relationship between the government and SUBDERE; as reform processes are very long, 
SUBDERE keeps its own agenda, which is composed of a list of tasks allocated by 
previous governments. In order to continue with the work defined in the past, SUBDERE 
seeks to influence the new governments to get support for the strategies designed, which 
usually implies to adapt them and to develop new specific policies. However, in this 
ongoing construction, La Moneda holds the power. In the case that the government in 
office was against decentralisation, it could block SUBDERE’s work by giving it different 
tasks. SUBDERE is the Sub-secretariat for Regional Development, which uses 
decentralisation as a strategy to develop the regions, but La Moneda could suggest another 
way to achieve it. Having a national policy for decentralisation would help SUBDERE to 
have more ground, as it would be the legal frame to support its actions regardless the 
government in office. Currently there is a trend towards decentralisation within the 
country; hence different governments have adopted decentralisation as a strategy to 
improve the situation in the regions, some of them very cautiously and others more 
daringly, depending on the actors involved. For this reason, participants from SUBDERE 
explained that they have to be flexible in order to modify their agenda regarding the 
requirements of the government in office. Interviewees explained that with politicians that 
are more familiar with the Spanish model, they work from the perspective of distribution 
of competences; on the contrary, with politicians closer to the unitary state, they use the 
French model from the perspective of the restructuration of the state. Thus SUBDERE 
secures support from politicians with different perspectives. 
The regions have no real voice in the political sphere. Although in theory 
parliamentarians should speak for regions, most of them are not from the regions they 
represent (see Chapter IV Case Study). As centralism and paternalism are an inherited 
situation, there are no strong regional expressions of desire for decentralisation; although 
lately there have been some social movements around specific regional issues such as in 
Aysén (ibid). The following quote expresses the regional desire for more participation, as 
the interviewee does not believe in the top-down process. 
 
‘Los promotores de la descentralización debieran ser las regiones, no el 
centro. Ellos, por cultura, van a tender a aminorar los procesos 
descentralizadores.’ 
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‘The promoters of decentralisation should be the regions, not the centre. 
They, due to their culture, will tend to lessen decentralising processes.’  
 
(INT 11 – Public Servant, Tarapacá 2009) 
 
There is consensus among regional actors that the central level is involved in 
regional matters, which could be considered good as the central level shows concern about 
regions and actually tries to do something. However, three problems arise: the delay of 
decentralising measures, the use of the centralist perspective in the design of solutions, and 
their homogeneous application to all the regions. This tactless approach to regions without 
taking into account their differences does not fully satisfy regional demands and leads to 
the conclusion that regional claims would be better channelled if the country adopts 
reforms transferring decision-making to that level. So far the main actors in this sphere are 
the central government and Congress with scarce or no participation of regional actors or 
civil society.  
 
Technical dimension: actions 
 
Once decisions have been made in the political sphere, these have to pass down to 
the technical dimension in order to be implemented. In the case of the example of regional 
councillors given above, once the law with the regulations for the election was approved, 
the agent in charge of its implementation was SERVEL26, at the national level27. In the 
case of the other reform - the creation of DIPLAD and the transfer of competence towards 
the regional governments – the actors involved are different, although again, the driving 
agent is SUBDERE. 
There are three steps when implementing decentralising policies: passing decisions 
down, the preparation of the regions and the transference of functions, which will be fully 
unpacked in Chapter VI Empowerment of Regional Governments - Fig 5-228 shows the 
steps and actors involved in this dimension.  
The key point from the above is how decisions are passed down from the political 
to the technical sphere because this will shape the way decentralisation will be 
materialised. Passing decisions down is related to the way decisions are communicated, 
which is influenced by the discourses analysed at the beginning of the chapter.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Electoral Service 
27 This research did not follow further steps on the implementation of this reform because its approval in 
Congress was after the data collection; it was pointless to interview SERVEL‘s staff before that. 
 
28 Source: Author 
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The crucial issues are how actors are going to interpret decisions, how those 
decisions will be communicated and how they will be implemented. At central level there 
are two main actors: the ministries and SUBDERE; ministries because they have given up 
some competences and SUBDERE as the agent who will actively transfer those to the 
regional level. At the regional level there are two main actors: SEREMIs and GOREs, 
which are informed of the changes by the ministries and SUBDERE respectively. How 
ministries communicate the situation to the technical team at the central level and to 
SEREMIs at the regional level is not directly related to decentralisation, however it might 
affect the ambience within the regions. For instance, MINVU was not happy about the 
transfer of territorial planning to the regional governments – actually, it only transferred 
the regional planning and it refused to give up the intercommunal planning (PRI). The 
decision to transfer PRDUs was not communicated by the central level of MINVU as an 
opportunity for strengthening the plan, as having it located in GORE would be a way to 
facilitate their approval and further implementation. Instead the idea of transferring the 
planning competence towards GORE was interpreted as an impertinence of SUBDERE by 
the staff of MINVU, causing some resentment. One respondent29 explained that at that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 INT 34 – Public Servant, Tarapacá 2009 
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moment GORE was doing a specific plan – the Coastal Border Land Use Plan – so when 
GORE shows its capability in making it, then they could think in asking for the PRDU.  
Although at that time, legally, the PRDU was still part of MINVU, in practice 
SEREMI MINVUs were told to drop their work on that plan, as DIPLAD’s personnel were 
already working on PROT30. When the Head of DDU31 informed SEREMIs about the 
transfer of regional planning to GORE, he gave the impression that actually MINVU gave 
up PRDU32 because those plans were a ‘hassle’ for the ministry and they were not worth 
the trouble, moreover if they were just a guidance instrument, not regulatory such as the 
intercommunal planning.33  
 
‘Desde el punto de vista de lo que nos ha informado el jefe de la DDU, no 
tiene ninguna importancia que se lleven el PRDU al GORE. De hecho el PRDU es 
indicativo. En lo personal no me molesta. El importante sí, es el intercomunal, que 
es normativo. Mientras el PRI siga siendo del MINVU está todo bien.’ 
 
‘From what we have been informed by the Head of DDU it is not important 
that the PRDU is transferred to GORE. In fact, the PRDU is a guidance. 
Personally, it does not bother me. The important one is the intercommunal, which 
is regulatory. As long as the PRI belongs to MINVU everything is alright’ 
 
(Public Servant, Tarapacá 2008)34 
 
This interpretation of the process affected the relationship between SEREMI 
MINVU and GORE. On the one hand, the poor reputation of GOREs is reinforced, as the 
ministry gives them what is not important; and on the other hand, to pose the negotiation 
process as a ‘fight’ in which another institution was trying to take something from the 
ministry, gives the impression that SUBDERE and GORE are the ‘enemies’. Both issues 
are elements that can delay and/or block interagency cooperation, thereby preventing the 
generation of synergies within the region35.  
Giving away some functions means that ministries need internal restructuring to 
adapt themselves to the new circumstances. SUBDERE does not intervene in this, because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 PROT is the new name of PRDU 
31 Division of Urban Development, central level of MINVU 
32 PRDU (Regional Plan for Urban Development) renamed as PROT (Regional Plan for Territorial Order), is 
a plan that gives guidelines for the use of the land. Is also known as the territorial expression of EDR 
(Strategy for Regional Development). As it is a guideline, it is not legally binding, therefore decisions could 
be made despite what the plan recommends.  
33 This information was giving to me off the record for a public servant of SEREMI MINVU, who a was 
unwilling to repeat it during the formal interview. 
34 Interview made during my master research. Public servant from SEREMI MINVU. 
35 This will be fully discussed in Chapter VI 
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it understands its role of empowering and helping regions to develop by supporting and 
strengthening the regional governments.  
 
SUBDERE works directly with GOREs, it communicates and prepares regional 
governments for the new competences they are going to perform. Regional officials such 
as the Intendente and other headships of the Regional Governments - although political 
appointees - act as intermediaries, passing information from the central level to the 
technical personnel. They have had no participation in decision-making in the political 
dimension, therefore they just have a technical role in decentralising policies. However, 
they also act as filters through which decisions may change in emphasis or orientation. For 
example, with the creation of DIPLADs, some Intendentes – instead of seeing them as an 
opportunity to reach more autonomy – used them as tools to fulfil their specific agenda; 
therefore, at the outset of DIPLADs much of the effort was spent on gathering information 
to support the ideas or projects that the Intendente in office wanted to implement within the 
region. Although this can be seen as a certain degree of autonomy, actually there is a little 
margin for action and it did not truly affect the implementation of the new division. After 
the intervention of SUBDERE, the guidelines for DIPLAD were re-established. Therefore, 
the central level makes decisions, drawing boundaries within which regional actors can 
play, leaving little room to be creative.  
SUBDERE also works directly with the technical teams of GOREs, which leads to 
the second and third steps in the fig 5-2 - to prepare regional governments to receive the 
competences that have been transferred and to start working on them. In this regard 
SUBDERE plays an important role informing and training staff in order to create capable 
teams. Thus SUBDERE organises meetings, workshops and training courses all over the 
country, gives guidelines, seeks internal or external advice and hires people with specific 
skills to improve the team when necessary. SUBDERE works from Santiago with a person 
in charge of each region, which means that s/he acts as a bridge between GORE and 
SUBDERE’s decision-makers. These steps will be further explained in the next chapter. 
 
MAIN DIFFICULTIES FACED BY CHILEAN POLITICAL 
DECENTRALISATION SO FAR 
 
During the period of data collection (2009 – 2010) there was optimism amongst 
actors supporting decentralisation; for them Chile was facing a transition period from 
centralism towards decentralisation because there was discussion about the role of regional 
governments and the relations they should have with the central level and the 
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deconcentrated regional services. For example, Interviewee 15 (below) explained that 
regions usually depend on the good will of the government in office. For instance, during 
President Bachelet’s government, the political decision that no sectoral investment should 
be done without at least informing the region involved was made; this was an important 
step towards including the regional government as a valid actor. ‘This is the first time I feel 
that there truly is a process, there is absolute awareness in the head of the government’36 
says the interviewee37. The mood was high, mainly because the reform for the direct 
election of regional councillors had recently been approved (2009). 
Despite the above, contradictory forces can be identified regarding decentralisation; 
while there are several examples supporting the idea of Chile moving towards greater 
decentralisation, there are also signs that show the reverse. For example, since 2009 any 
territorial plan made by the Regional Office of Housing and Urbanism must have the 
approval of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism before it can be implemented. This 
clear step back in decision-making leads to questions of coordination between the actors 
involved, who leads the process and how much power the driving agent really has. 
SUBDERE can negotiate with the ministry about the transference of functions but is not 
allowed to interfere in the internal structure of them; therefore, on the one hand, it is a state 
institution working for decentralisation while, on the other hand, it shows signs of re-
centralisation. These contradictory forces might be explained by the lack of clarity of the 
goals that Chilean decentralisation is pursuing, but also the specific political context should 
be taken into account. In the case of territorial planning, regarding the Ministry, the 
decision to step back to the central level was for three reasons: a) there were technical 
issues with some instruments, so that the national unit for territorial planning (from 
Division of Urban Development – MINVU) decided that it was better to check what 
regional offices were doing, b) there was an issue regarding a specific intercommunal plan 
that was in conflict with some interests at the central level, and c) the negotiation between 
MINVU and SUBDERE regarding the transference of territorial planning towards regional 
governments was in progress, therefore this might have influenced the decision to re-
centralise decisions regarding those instruments38. As a consequence, although the 
decentralising process seems to be irreversible, its intensity and speed is directly related to 
the government in office and political conjuncture. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 ‘Esta es la primera vez que siento que realmente hay un proceso, hay consciencia absoluta en la cabeza del 
gobierno’ 
37 INT 15 – Political Appointee, Valparaíso 2009 
38 More details of this case will be given in chapter VII (Relationship between the regions and the central 
state). 
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As has been explained in the first section of this chapter, the Chilean decentralisation 
process is very slow – e.g. 20 years for the direct election of Regional Councillors. This 
gradualism – as is shown in Fig 5-339 – responds to three actions from the actors involved: 
resistance, reluctance and inertia. The latter are consequence of three aspects of Chilean 
political culture: centralism, state of engagement and regional realities. These obstacles, 
actions and outcome will now be discussed. 
 
 
 
Nowadays Regional governments have some functions and powers, but embedded in 
a centralist culture, which basically means that control remains in Santiago. As the 
Constitution defines the unitary character of the state, there is a great fear from many 
sectors of loosing this national unity, which is the main argument made against 
decentralisation. However, a few interviewees – from Tarapacá and from SUBDERE - 
argue that this unitary character is fictitious, artificially created by the central state through 
education and history, to reinforce the value of national patriotic symbols. The fact that 
some interviewees from SUBDERE use this argument against the unitary state might mean 
that they are evaluating federalism as an option, even if they are not saying so officially. 
Despite this, most respondents – from both central and regional level - are convinced that 
the Chilean state should remain unitary and decentralisation should not endanger that. 
Another sign of centralism is political appointees. Regionalisation (1974) was based 
on administrative and military criteria in which decisions were transferred to a single 
person’s authority, one appointed by the central power in order to increase vertical control 
over the subnational level (Garretón, 1992). Therefore, at its conception, Regionalisation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Source: author 
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was not designed to decentralise and give autonomy to the regions but to have better 
control over them; while appointed officials remain in the system, the regions will be 
subordinated to the central level. SUBDERE plays a significant role negotiating with 
politicians at the central level in order to change the law and have elected regional 
authorities. However, having still a great number of political appointees within the state – 
such as head of SEREMIs, head of Divisions, Intendentes and Governors – is an major 
obstacle to decentralisation and one of the reasons the regions do not pressure for greater 
autonomy.  
A second situation to take into account is related to what is called the ‘State of 
Engagement’, which means that the government in office is trapped by coalition 
agreements. As there is no political party strong enough to be in power by itself, 
agreements are necessary in order to achieve power and then retain it. Above all, political 
parties create coalitions to win elections; in that context the coalition parties’ members 
negotiate over who will be the presidential candidate, the content of the programme of 
government, the parliamentarian candidates, the membership of the cabinet of ministries 
and so on. Once in power, the coalition in office needs the support of Congress in order to 
make changes in the legal framework, such as changes in education or health national 
policies and to get the approval of the national budget every year. Therefore, the 
government negotiates with the opposition in order to have support in Congress; as usually 
this has roughly an equal split between parliamentarians from the two main coalitions, any 
change in the law has to be negotiated between the government and the opposition. As a 
result, governments are trapped by a network of agreements within their coalition and with 
the opposition, which prevents them from going further. Some interviewees argued that 
this gives more stability to the country; however, this also stops more radical changes. 
Thus, the power of the government is partial because its actions are limited by agreements 
and negotiations; power is therefore an illusion. 
The third situation that can be an obstacle is related to regional realities: knowledge 
of the disparities, capacities and political identities of the regions is essential to understand 
the misgivings of the central level. Due to geographical diversity and the centralist culture, 
the regions present disparities regarding natural resources, population, investment and 
economic development. As a consequence, each region has a different degree of 
development and needs. Detractors argue that decentralisation can increase those regional 
disparities, especially, when the central level questions regional capacities. The centre’s 
mistrust of regional capacities is mainly rooted in the lack of competent professionals, 
which is related to the lack of critical mass of most regions. The regions cannot compete 
with the Metropolitan Region; therefore it is difficult for them to attract highly qualified 
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personnel from the rest of the country. Also, as Santiago has the biggest and most 
prestigious universities of the country; many students move there for higher education and 
many do not go back afterwards to their regions. As a result, the regions usually do not 
count on a wide range of professionals so their competence is mistrusted; moreover, when 
people from Santiago go to work in the regions, this increases an assumption of the low 
quality of regional professionals. This has led to the central level’s general distrust of 
regional capacities, as is shown in the following quote.  
 
‘O sea, autoridades poco empoderadas, autoridades temerosas… y 
también un tema que tiene que ver con el capital humano, autoridades mediocres 
(…) a lo que voy es que yo creo que para que haya auténtica descentralización, los 
cambios culturales deben ir además de la mano del desarrollo del capital humano 
(…) Intendentes poco empoderados, Intendentes que no son capaces… por eso yo 
te digo que lo primero es que tú tienes autoridades que no son capaces de pararse 
de igual a igual a su contraparte. O sea, un Intendente en Chile no se para frente a 
un Ministro de Estado de igual a igual. No se para… y se supone que el Intendente 
es el representante del Presidente en la zona. Incluso en la escala de sueldo el 
Intendente gana lo mismo que un Ministro de Estado y que un Parlamentario. Pero 
por una cosa cultural, y también por una cosa de capacidades, que se nota cuando 
hay un Intendente… voy a poner el ejemplo de Jaime Tohá. Es un tipo que ha sido 
2 o 3 veces Ministro de Estado, lo ponen de Intendente de la VIII… se nota el 
switch… tiene vínculo directo con los ministros, me entiendes?’ 
 
‘So, underpowered officials, fearful officials ... and also an issue that is 
related to human capital, mediocre officials (...) My point is that I believe that to 
have genuine decentralisation, cultural changes must be down the path of 
development of human capital (...) underpowered Intendentes, incapable 
Intendentes... because of that I think the first thing is that you have officials that 
are not able to stand as an equal to his/her counterpart. An Intendente in Chile 
does not face a minister of the state as an equal. Does not ... and one presumes that 
the Intendente is the representative of the President in the region. Even his/her 
salary is the same as that of a minister of state and a parliamentarian. But due to a 
cultural issue, and also because capacity issues are what you notice when there is 
an Intendente ... I will use the example of Jaime Tohá. He is a guy who has been 2 
or 3 times a minister of the state. When he was Intendente of the VIII40 ... you can 
see the switch ... he has a direct link with the ministers, you understand me? 
(INT 61 – National Politician, 2010) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 VIII Region of Bío-Bío 
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It is obvious from this quote that politicians have no faith in regional officials, when 
using strong words such as ‘fearful’, ‘incapable’ and ‘mediocre’ to describe them. This is 
due to the structure of regional governments with appointed personnel, who have to answer 
to the central level for their actions, and also because of a lack of self-confidence of 
regional officials. At the national level, most of ministers and other appointed officials 
come from the economic and political elites of the country, so they are used to dealing with 
the national and international leaders of their fields. For them, being in the government is 
another step in their careers and once they leave power, they will continue with their 
previous activities and the same standard of living. On the other hand, due to the lack of 
‘human capital’, regions do not have the critical mass to produce politicians with high 
capacities - educational, financial and political -; as a consequence that regional officials 
often exhibit a lack of confidence when they face political officials and politicians at the 
central level. Top regional officials in general are people who have not had so much 
contact with the national elites and they have reached their positions due to political 
patronage. An example is that in practice the relationship between an Intendente and a 
Minister is unequal, even though both officials have the same grade, are appointed directly 
by the President and earn the same salary. Regional officials often adopt a submissive 
attitude of inferiority, which implies a bad start for negotiations. The interviewee used the 
example of Jaime Tohá, who was minister in the governments of President Aylwin (1990-
1994) and President Frei (1994-2000), and later on was Intendente of the VIII Region of 
Bio-Bio. As Jaime Tohá had experience of being a minister, its achievements when he 
became Intendente of Bío-Bío region were remarkable, as he acted as an Intendente 
should; today Bío-Bío is the second most developed region after the Metropolitan Region.  
Together with these two elements – regional disparities and (in)capacities – is the 
lack of regional political identity. Nowadays the regions are administrated by the political 
coalition in power at the central level. As political officials are appointees, there is no 
possibility for other political parties to have any representativeness in powerful positions 
with the sole exception of the Regional Council; regional councillors are elected by local 
councillors, who themselves are elected by the citizenry every four years. Therefore the 
Regional Council is the only institution that might reflect the political preferences of a 
region. However, as they are indirectly elected, people do not know them and do not 
identify with these politicians; moreover, some people do not know regional councillors 
exist. As a consequence, regional political desires are not necessarily represented by 
political officials, due to those officials being agents of the central government in office. 
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Because of the above, some interviewees – mainly politicians in favour of greater 
decentralisation - propose that the regions should have elected regional governments with a 
four-year government programme, the same as the national government. Then, they argue, 
the regions would have governments composed of the most popular party, there would be 
greater clarity of the path regional governments are following and also more accountability 
for their actions. An elected regional government would be empowered, able to generate 
proposals, and able to negotiate them with the central level. A regional government able to 
challenge the centre, having a voice (and using it) would make stronger regions that would 
be a different and better way to build the country together.  
The above is very important taking into account the regional disparities that Chile 
presents – and as a consequence the range of needs and claims. Therefore while the 
regional actors do not take the leadership, there is little that they can do for decentralisation 
and the process will remain top-down; in other words, if regions do not find their voice, 
decentralisation will be based on centralist criteria.  
The role of key actors is fundamental in policies’ design and implementation. Jones 
et al (2004) argue that state personnel can increase the chances of success or failure of 
political projects regarding their individual skills and power context. In addition, their 
commitment to a specific policy should be taken into account. Regardless of the 
qualifications that a public servant might have, if s/he does not commit to a certain task – 
due to different beliefs, interests or just s/he does not think it is a good idea – that policy or 
task is unlikely to be successful. The beliefs and interests of the individuals involved on 
the project will affect the outcomes.  
Three actions to block or slow down decentralisation have been identified in the 
figure 5-3: resistance, reluctance and inertia. Resistance refers to an open action against 
decentralisation, such as detractor discourses and rejection of decentralising reforms within 
the Congress. Reluctance applies when there is no faith in the action, so it is unwillingly 
done, without determination, e.g. someone who does the minimum, who is not proactive, 
or who adapts the new tasks to the same way s/he has worked over the last 20/30 years. 
And inertia is when the system operates as always regardless of the changes in the 
paradigm, e.g. presidential delegates, institutional habits and practices. These three 
situations can appear alone or combined, depending on specific contexts.  
From a centralist perspective, there is resistance to give up power. Interviewees 
argue that there is no social mobility or equality of opportunities within Chilean society; 
therefore, power is reproduced by endogamy, which means the same elites (from Santiago) 
monopolise the political, economic and intellectual power. Those elites control the 
country, so they oppose decentralisation. For example, a great number of parliamentarians 
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who are representatives of regions are from Santiago and their knowledge of ‘their’ regions 
is partial, almost anecdotal; therefore, a centralist vision predominates within Congress. 
‘There is no vision to oppose the centralist vision’41 said a deputy. For parliamentarians the 
election of regional officials is a threat because those officials could rise as potential 
competitors in future parliamentarian elections, and because it is likely that an elected 
regional authority would hold the same political weight as a parliamentarian – of course, 
depending on the number of votes -, so s/he could pressure those parliamentarians to vote 
or stand for things against their own interests, such as a change in the centralist paradigm 
of the Congress. 
The same situation – fear of losing power - is pointed out by interviewees from 
DIPLAD, who identify two main obstacles to greater decentralisation in this regard: public 
servants are not used to working coordinately in inter-sectoral round tables and they do not 
want to lose power over some decision-making, which underpins the resistance of some 
public servants to the changes proposed by SUBDERE. An example to illustrate this is the 
case of the former PRDU, today PROT42. Decisions related to the PRDU were made 
within the SEREMI MINVU43, despite the plan affecting the whole region; in some cases 
inter-sectoral round tables were implemented in order to have a holistic vision of the 
region. The problem with this - and one of the reasons for the transfer of the plan - is that 
sectoral institutions cannot summon each other; they can only invite each other to 
participate in a round table, which mean institutions can decline. As a consequence, at the 
design stage, when decisions were made without the participation of some institutions - 
e.g. CONAMA44 - it could happen that areas that should be protected were assigned to 
other uses, as the institution that hold the information of those areas is CONAMA. Thus, 
the lack of participation of institutions during the design stage could cause mistakes or 
disagreements regarding the use of some areas. Problems emerged during the approval 
stage, in which most of PRDUs got stuck, as the institutions have the obligation to express 
their consent to the plan. Therefore, after designing PRDU, MINVU usually have to 
negotiate witch each one of the institutions in order to get their approval, despite those 
institutions had had the opportunity to participate in the design of the plan. In order to 
avoid the sometimes endless one-by-one negotiations between SEREMI MINVU and the 
other public services, the plan was transferred to the Regional Government, which 
hierarchically has the power to summon all regional institutions to round tables. Therefore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 ‘No hay una visión que se contraponga a la visión central’ (INT 62) 
42 The PRDU, Regional Plan for Urban Development, was designed and implemented by the Department of 
Urbanism and Infrastructure of SEREMI MINVU. The plan was transferred to DIPLAD in the Regional 
Government and its name was changes to PROT, Regional Plan of Territorial Order.    
43 Regional branch of Ministry of Housing and Urbanism 
44 Regional branch of Ministry of Environment	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they can make collective agreements at the design stage of the plan and thus avoid the 
problems within the approval system. This example shows some of the difficulties of 
working with round tables, because public servants are not used to being summoned by 
colleagues from other institutions. On the other hand, in a one-by-one negotiation public 
servants from other institutions might have a better chance to keep their point of view than 
in open round tables. For them it was more comfortable to keep decisions centralised 
because that way they can still have some power in sectoral decision-making, while having 
to coordinate and negotiate those decisions at round tables might be considered as losing 
power. So that, according to interviewees from DIPLAD, many public servants from the 
deconcentrated branches of ministries block/resist decentralisation. 
Interviews with people from the central level illustrate the reluctance that most of 
them have towards decentralisation. What is interesting is that their opposition is not 
against the concept, but based on their conviction that regions are not ready to be 
autonomous. For instance, one interviewee pointed out that due to ministries having 
different degrees of decentralisation, it is not easy to coordinate integral planning.  
 
‘Nosotros vemos que son muy pocas las regiones que tienen equipos 
técnicos que se puedan manejar con autonomía técnica, por decirlo así… Y vemos 
que los planes reguladores siguen teniendo errores, a pesar de que nosotros 
hacemos instructivos permanentemente… Malas interpretaciones, las que están 
más atrasadas, o que no le llega la información a las personas que están 
trabajando directamente en eso… O sea, hay mucho que hacer en lo que tiene que 
ver con el apoyo técnico a las regiones.’ 
 
‘We see that there are very few regions that have technical teams that can 
work autonomously, so to say... We see that regulatory plans continue to contain 
errors, in spite of us issuing guidelines continuously. Wrong interpretations from 
the most backward or where the information does not reach those who are working 
directly on that. So, there is much to be done in what concerns technical support 
for the regions.’  
(INT 58 – Public Servant, Santiago 2010) 
 
The quote above shows the concern of public servants from the national level over 
regional capacities and also their willingness to help, which is consistent with our 
paternalist culture. Although there is goodwill towards regional personnel, these practices 
slow down decentralisation processes. However, it is important to take into account that 
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more and continuous training should be offered to regional personnel, as some SEREMIs 
have a high turnover of personnel. 
Finally, inertia refers to continuities with the same centralist practices despite a 
change of paradigm towards decentralisation. An example of this is the way that 
SUBDERE is leading the process; one of the respondents related how SUBDERE has 
operated regarding the creation of DIPLADs and the transfer of planning policies to the 
regional governments.   
 
‘Entonces la SUBDERE contrató un estudio con de la CEPAL, donde 
trabajó un listado de expertos para ver hacia donde debería apuntar la tarea de la 
planificación territorial en los Gobiernos Regionales. Dentro de los expertos 
estaba yo. Después de muchas reuniones, conferencias telefónicas, discusiones, 
etc, hay un documento que está dando vueltas, un documento complejo y que tiene 
de todo (…) Finalmente, el documento es bien intencionado, pero es una ensalada. 
Ahora, la SUBDERE, que necesita copar lo antes posible este espacio que se le 
abrió, quisiera transformar ese documento en un reglamento. Eso es lo que me 
pone nervioso porque cuando eso ocurra, una vez más en Chile es el nivel central 
el que decide como, en que condiciones y con que estructura se debe elaborar un 
IPT, en este caso PROT (…) Entonces se corre el riesgo de caer en lo mismo de 
siempre, que el “clarividente” nivel central - en este caso, a través de la 
SUBDERE - decide cual es la metodología que se debe seguir para que funcione 
esta división y para elaborar estos instrumentos.’  
 
‘SUBDERE hired a study with CEPAL, in which several experts worked in 
order to identify to where should point the territorial planning within the Regional 
Governments. I was among those experts. After many meetings, phone conferences, 
discussions, etc. there is a document going around, a complex document that has a 
bit of everything (…) Finally, it is a well intentioned document, but it is a salad. 
Now, SUBDERE, which needs to fill the space that has been opened as soon as 
possible, wants to transform that document into a set of regulations. That’s what 
makes me nervous because when that happens, once more in Chile it is the central 
level who decides how, in what conditions and with which structure an IPT has to 
be designed (…) therefore, there is a risk to fall into the same old thing: the 
‘clairvoyant’ central level – in this case, though SUBDERE -, decides what is the 
methodology to follow in order for this Division to work and to design these 
instruments.’  
(INT 7 – Academic, Santiago 2010) 
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The interviewee stated that those are well intentioned actions from SUBDERE and 
the central body towards decentralisation, but from his point of view are being 
implemented wrongly. Thus, the inertia of the system infects even those institutions 
charged with changing it through decentralisation. 
The Chilean situation – centralism, state of engagement and regional realities – plus 
the actions or inaction against decentralisation – resistance, reluctance and inertia - explain 
the gradualness of Chilean decentralisation. Respondents from all groups agree that the 
decentralisation process has been implemented gradually in order to allow the state to 
adapt to the changes. This is related to the dialectic hollowing out of the state and filling in 
of regional governments, in which the former refers to the transfer of functions from the 
national level to subnational levels, and the latter also involves the period of transition or 
adaptation of regional governments to the new reality. Thus the existing structure can be 
re-configured and new working cultures developed, having as a result the strengthening of 
those subnational levels to which functions were transferred (Shaw and MacKinnon, 
2011). However, so far what happens in Chilean decentralisation is that the transfer of 
functions from the central to the regional level – i.e. the hollowing out of the central state – 
has been only partial, as SUBDERE still has control over the regional governments. Thus, 
the transfer has been done from regional sectoral institutions to a regional institution with a 
holistic perspective, but still tied to the central level. Interviewees that are supporters of 
greater decentralisation argue that this gradualism has been excessive, holding the political 
elites’ conservatism represented in the Congress responsible; they also assert that although 
the decentralisation process is slow, it is also irreversible. Interviewees argue that although 
there is a political discourse toward decentralisation, regionalisation, transfer of 
competences and autonomy for regions, there is no real will towards decentralisation 
within the Congress, resulting in the slow approval and application of decentralising 
reforms during the four governments of the Concertación (1990-2010) 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has broadly discussed the Chilean decentralisation process, relating it to 
three dimensions: philosophical, political and technical. It addresses different practices 
within the state apparatus in order to give a better understanding of how policies are 
designed and implemented. Actors and interpretations are also fundamental in the 
decision-making and implementation of decentralisation, in which SUBDERE seems to be 
the main actor, as driving agent of the process both in the political and the technical 
spheres. Decentralisation in Chile is being made step by step without a clear goal in mind, 
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although SUBDERE seeks to create a national policy for decentralisation in order to have a 
better defined path. 
Decentralisation is understood as an ongoing top-down process, whose emphasis 
depends on the will of the presiding government and Congress, the practices of public 
servants and the inherited centralised structure of the state. Interviewees highlight the fact 
that over the last 20 years, decentralisation has been part of the political discourse of every 
government; however, they have not acted with the same strength to implement 
decentralising policies. For instance, President Bachelet’s government focused their efforts 
on political decentralisation more than the former government of President Lagos; so far 
the current government (2010-2014) appears to have changed the emphasis from regional 
to local decentralisation, whilst strengthening the sectors and increasing verticality at the 
regional level.  
Most of the interviewees agree that the implementation of political decentralisation 
in Chile is confusing and tangled. Nowadays, Chile is immersed in a transitional period 
discussing how to organise the regional governments, which is positive because it permits 
greater inclusivity. It is not something imposed by the central body; SUBDERE’s initiative 
inviting regional actors to participate in workshops and round tables about decentralisation 
is an example of this. The question is how willing SUBDERE is to incorporate ideas that 
differ from its own strategies or agenda. Nevertheless, the fact that it is opening spaces for 
discussion is positive and gives regional actors the opportunity to generate synergies that 
might result in greater bottom-up demands and, therefore, a more nimble response from the 
central level, particularly from the Congress.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter seeks to respond to the second question of this research, which is to 
what extent the regional governments are being empowered by the reforms of 2005 and 
2009. In other words, it is concerned with the impact of those reforms on the decentralising 
process in Chile. The first one (2005) created of the Division of Planning and Development 
(DIPLAD) within the Regional Governments, while the second (2009) refers to the direct 
election of the regional councillors and their nomination of the Head of Regional Council 
from among them.  
The chapter has been divided into four sections. The first section focuses on the 
desired outcomes of the reforms and relates them to the discourses identified in Chapter V. 
The section poses that the creation of DIPLADs is related to both the regional development 
and the state response discourses, while the direct election of the regional councillors is 
driven by regional autonomy and greater democracy discourses. The desired outcomes of 
the reforms are identified as the autonomy of the Regional Council from the Intendente 
and the change of the gravitational centre within the region.  
The second section analyses the role of individuals in the construction and outcomes 
of policies, in other words, how policies created and designed in the capital are received 
and implemented in the regions. The third section refers to the implementation of 
DIPLADs in the Valparaíso and Tarapacá regions, discussing the three main steps to do 
that: passing decisions down, the preparation of the regions and the transfer of functions.  
The fourth section addresses the positionality of DIPLAD within GOREs, and within 
the region, the latter mainly related to the relations of GOREs with SEREMIs. The 
personnel of DIPLAD faced the challenge of earning credibility within the Regional 
Government, in which the existing personnel viewed the arrival of this new division with 
misgiving. Secondly, DIPLAD as part of GORE had to position itself in the regional 
scenario not only as a valid and capable actor, but also as the leader of strategic and 
territorial planning.  
 
DESIRED OUTCOMES OF THE REFORMS 
 
This section discusses the outcomes expected from the implementation of the 
proposed reforms (see Chapter IV) to empower the regional governments. With the direct 
election of regional councillors, SUBDERE seeks the total autonomy of CORE from the 
Intendente. Meanwhile, with the creation of the Division for Planning and Development 
(DIPLAD) and the transference of competences, SUBDERE seeks to change the regional 
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gravitational centre to GORE. These reforms are political decisions – made at the national 
level – that have been framed by the developmental and political streams that support 
decentralisation; in other words, they are the practical expression of the philosophical 
discourses analysed in Chapter V (Shaping Political Decentralisation).  
 
 
 
Figure 6-11 shows how these reforms are related to the three dimensions – 
philosophical, political and technical – described in Chapter V. The direct election of 
regional councillors is related to the political stream of decentralisation: regional autonomy 
and greater democracy, while DIPLAD is associated with the developmental stream: 
regional development and the state response. In the technical dimension, the figure shows 
no action for the election of regional councillors at the regional level, as all the steps 
regarding that reform have been done at the central level2. Finally, the figure shows the 
outcomes expected from both reforms. As the election of regional councillors has not 
happened yet, it is not possible to assess its success; however, the disposition of the actors 
involved in the process can give some hints of the scope of this reform regarding the 
decentralisation process. Similarly, it is too soon to make a proper assessment of 
DIPLADs, as the information for this thesis was gathered in 2009 - 2010, when the new 
division had been working for only three years. However, it is possible to reach early 
conclusions about the process so far.   
 
The Regional Council  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Source:	  author 
2 The proposal and the draft of the law was made at the central level, as well as its approval (political 
dimension) further steps towards the implementation of the elections are also located at the central level 
within the Electoral Service. See Chapter V. 
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The direct election of regional councillors is a consequence of the political streams 
towards decentralisation and seeks to increase regional autonomy and democracy. The next 
quote is a good example of the issues related to these two elements within the regional 
government. 
 
‘El modelo de descentralización que estamos siguiendo en Chile es el 
modelo de la descentralización administrativa. Así lo establece el Art 3º de la 
Constitución. Ahora, en el nivel del que estamos hablando no se cumplen todos los 
requisitos de esa descentralización (…) Por ejemplo, no se cumple que las 
autoridades sean elegidas democráticamente – estamos hablando de los 
Consejeros Regionales y del Presidente del Consejo. No se cumple eso. En la 
experiencia comparada se cumple: en Francia se cumple, en Perú se cumple, en 
Bolivia se cumple (…) En todas las otras experiencias comparadas se dividen las 
competencias de gobierno interior con las competencias de administración 
regional… Porque, lógicamente, uno de los conceptos importantes es que ese 
órgano sea independiente del poder central. Entonces resulta que con un 
Presidente3 que es representante del Presidente de la República no puede ser. Y 
ese es el problema que tenemos (…) y bueno, habría que agregarle otros 
elementos, que son los elementos de la participación, que no habría que dejarlos 
de lado. Porque efectivamente son principios básicos del mismo diseño 
institucional que tenemos. El Art 14 establece que uno de los principios de la 
descentralización regional es la participación ciudadana. Cosa que es el principio 
más debilitado que tiene la Ley Orgánica. O sea, de eso no hay. No hay plebiscito, 
no hay consulta, no hay elecciones, no hay derecho a audiencia, no hay 
presupuestos participativos… no hay nada. ’ 
 
‘The model of decentralisation that we are following in Chile is the 
administrative decentralisation model, that is established in the 3rd Article of the 
Constitution. Now, at the level we are talking, not all of the requirements of that 
decentralisation are met (…) For example, officials are not democratically elected 
– we are talking about regional councillors and the Head of the Regional Council. 
That does not happen. In comparative experiences it happens: in France it 
happens, in Peru it happens, in Bolivia it happens, in Colombia (…) In all 
comparative experiences the competences of domestic affairs are divided from the 
competences of regional administration… Because, logically, one of the important 
concepts is that this entity is independent from the central power. So, with a Head 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Presidente del Consejo Regional 
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who is representative of the President of the Republic this cannot be. And that is 
the problem we have (…) And well, we would have to add other elements, which 
are the elements related to participation – which we shouldn’t put aside, because 
those are essential principles of our institutional design. The 14th Article 
establishes that one of the principles of regional decentralisation is citizen 
participation, which is the weakest principle of the Organic Law4. That is to say, 
there is nothing of that. There is no referendum, there is no public consultation, 
there are no elections, there is no right of audience, there is no participatory 
budget, there is nothing.’  
 
(INT 17 – Regional Politician, Valparaíso 2010) 
 
The quote above describes the situation of the Regional Council before the 2009 
reform - although at that moment (2010) the Constitution had been recently amended 
regarding the election of regional councillors, there were no further steps yet (see Chapter 
V) - and it highlights three elements that concern the interviewee: democracy, the 
autonomy of the regional council and citizen participation. He expresses these concerns in 
aspects such as the nil participation of the citizenry in elections and decision-making, 
regional officials not being elected and the merging of administrative and government 
functions within the regional government.  
The reform of 2009 addresses two of these concerns, the democratic character of the 
Regional Council and its autonomy. In other words, it changes both the form of election of 
regional councillors – to be by popular vote - and the fact that the Intendente will not be 
the Head of the Council. The method to elect the regional councillors before the reform 
was not truly democratic as in practice it was the result of political quotas. Although they 
were formally elected by the local councillors, actually they were chosen on the basis of 
cronyism, politics or patronage. Therefore, currently regional councillors are not 
representative of the citizenry or the territories that indirectly choose them as they should 
be; the citizenry has no real participation in their election. Having direct elections can 
ensure the representativeness, legitimacy and validation of the Regional Council (Eaton 
2004), which will empower it; it should develop a more balanced relationship between the 
Regional Council (CORE) and both the Intendente and the central government. Thus the 
Regional Council would reflect for the first time the political identity of its region5. 
SUBDERE’s original proposal also included the direct election of the Intendentes, as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ley Orgánica Constitucional sobre Gobiernos y Administración Regional o Ley 19175/ Constitutional 
Organic Law of Regional Government and Administration or Law 19175 
5 See Chapter V Shaping Political Decentralisation  
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election of subnational authorities is a fundamental step towards regional autonomy 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003); however, that initiative did not gain support within 
Congress. This raised the question of what kind of state Chile wants and, again, the 
discussion between federalism and the unitary state divided opinions in the political 
sphere. SUBDERE dropped the point from the reform and highlighted that what was 
imperative was the need to separate the functions of the Intendente from those of the Head 
of the Regional Council. 
Currently, the Intendente is the Head of the Regional Council. He sets the agenda of 
the Council and has a casting vote when it is a draw among the regional councillors6. As 
the Intendente is appointed by the President of the Republic, there is scarce room for the 
regional councillors to act freely; they are tied to the will of the Intendente and, therefore, 
of the central government. To avoid the conflict between national and regional interests 
within CORE, the reform establishes that the Head of the Council will be the regional 
councillors with the most votes7. This way, the Regional Council should be totally 
independent of the central level; that is to say, the central government will not be able to 
interfere in CORE’s agenda. Also, the political parties’ intervention should be limited to 
the same degree of influence that they might have over any other democratically elected 
politician.  
The proposal has three elements: territorial basis, number of Regional Councillors 
per region and electoral lists. Firstly, territorial basis: electoral districts for regional 
councillors are different from those of mayors or deputies – i.e. there are different 
constituencies for mayors8, deputies and regional councillors. This is because there is a 
need to give regional councillors a more regional character - so far they are only 
representatives of the local councillors who elect them9. In the case of deputies, it is so as 
to have a different electoral universe so that COREs are not a threat to deputies. Secondly, 
it was a presidential commitment in order to keep the same number of regional councillors 
per region, which was fulfilled. And thirdly, the discussion was around whether to have a 
locked or unlocked list. RN10 wanted a locked list, which means people would vote for a 
political party; however, the idea that prevailed was of the unlocked list because Chileans 
are used to vote for a person and that way the regional councillors would be more 
representative of the citizen’s voice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 see Chapter IV Case Study 
7 Law 19175  
8 Head of communes 
9 Local councillors are members of the Communal Council 
10 National Renovation (Renovación Nacional), one of the parties of the government coalitions and the party 
of the President Piñera 
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One important issue that has arisen in the debate is the threat that the direct election 
of regional authorities may be for parliamentarians; many of the interviewees highlighted 
this topic as a main concern. SUBDERE, however, holds a different point of view: those 
kinds of arguments are just an excuse to prevent further decentralisation processes simply 
because politicians do not want to lose power. A regional councillor directly elected by the 
citizenry might have the same political weight as a deputy. Also, being known by citizens, 
people should go to their regional councillors - instead of to their parliamentarians – with 
their problems and demands. In general the response to this reform has been positive; most 
of the interviewees agree that it is a great improvement toward democracy, transparency 
and accountability. The reaction of regional councillors to this reform is also quite positive, 
as they think it is the way to empower the Regional Council. However, SUBDERE also 
warns that the current regional councillors will be the most affected, because they have to 
adapt to the new system. 
The reform is far from solving all the issues related to regional autonomy and 
democracy discussed in Chapter V, but it is a step; it certainly addresses these two 
elements in order to strengthen COREs, validating their existence as the voices of their 
regions and representing their political identity. Although the autonomy of the Regional 
Council is an important step towards decentralisation, some important issues have not been 
considered in this reform, such as the fact that regional councillors are not full time 
positions. This is an important issue as it has consequences over their performance. The 
salary of the regional councillors is around 625 pounds per month –paid only if they attend 
the meetings11 - so that most of them have other jobs. The following quote, illustrates this. 
 
‘Entonces, no es cuestionable que nadie se dedique a esto. Esto es casi un 
hobby. Todos tienen su trabajo y vienen acá en su tiempo libre (…) entonces nadie 
profundiza nada, hay poco seguimiento de los proyectos, no hay un consejero que 
lidere algo (…) debiera haber un nivel de negociación pero no existe. Por qué? 
Porque cada consejero anda en la de ellos (…) Nos encontramos en la sala de 
reuniones cuando hay proyectos que nos compete ver, pero no tenemos ningún tipo 
de relación (…) La capacidad de los consejeros actuales, entre los cuales yo me 
incluyo, está lejos de lo que se debiera esperar de un Consejo, de la toma de 
decisiones que tiene. La mitad de ellos obedecen a partidos políticos. O sea todos 
son pertenecientes a partidos políticos, pero la mitad de ellos votan esperando 
cual es el elemento político de donde vienen los proyectos (…) Por ejemplo, los 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The councillors are paid for their attendance of to the meetings of the Regional Council. The law does not 
require anything else in order to pay them. 
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consejeros de la UDI aprueban cualquier cosa que venga de la IMI12 porque la 
alcaldesa también es UDI’ 
 
‘So it is not questionable that nobody is dedicated to this. This is almost a 
hobby. Everyone has their work and they come here in their free time (…) so 
nobody goes deeply into anything, there is little follow-up of projects, there is no 
councillor that leads something (...) there should be a level of negotiation but it 
does not exist. Why? Because each councillor is concerned about their own 
business (…) We see each other when there are projects we have to analyse, but we 
do not have any kind of relationship (…) The capacity of the current regional 
councillors, among whom I include myself, are far from what they should be. Half 
of them obey political parties, I mean, all of us belong to political parties, but half 
of them vote regarding the political source of each project (…) for example, 
councillors from the UDI approve everything that comes from the municipality of 
Iquique because the mayor is also from the UDI.’ 
 
(INT 13 – Regional Politician, Tarapacá 2010) 
 
The absence of exclusive dedication to the work of a regional councillor dilutes the 
effort that they could make for the region, which has had as a direct consequence, a weak 
Regional Council in comparison with the Intendente and all the technical and 
administrative body that supports him. Negotiations with the Intendente are not impossible 
but difficult, as many times regional councillors lack the knowledge or skills to understand 
certain projects. This also results in the low reputation that regional councillors have 
within the region among public servants and institutions; however, it is pointless to blame 
the councillors, as they are only paid for the number of official meetings they attend (those 
called by the Intendente). If regional councillors were full time positions, they could be 
blamed for their lack of knowledge they have, as they should be using their time to really 
understand the projects they are approving. 
Therefore the natural questions around CORE are not only about having elected 
members known to the citizenry, but also how the regional institutionality has been 
constructed and how it can be improved in order to make it more democratic and efficient. 
The Regional Councils should be the core of the regional political body, supported by 
DIPLAD as a technical body; however, nowadays that is not possible, as CORE seems to 
be an isolated institution both within the Regional government and within the region. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 IMI: Ilustre Municipalidad de Iquique 
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Division of Planning and Development (DIPLAD) 
 
The creation of DIPLAD is related to the developmental stream of decentralisation - 
regional development and state response - as was pointed out in Fig 6-1. All groups of 
respondents express support for the new Division; however, there is also apprehension 
about the possible outcomes. The essential goal of DIPLAD is to become the brain of 
regional governments, generating strategic plans in order to guide public management and 
to promote regional development, as illustrated in the following quote.  
 
‘A donde deberíamos ir, lo dicen todos los documentos de transferencia, 
fundamentalmente en como es posible generar un sistema de planificación, con 
instrumentos de planificación que permitan orientar de mejor forma la gestión 
pública y la inversión. Y, al mismo tiempo, cuando ya esté en su plena madurez, 
pueda desarrollar buenos análisis de la región y pueda manejar buenos sistemas 
de información con respecto a la región (…) Ahora, en concreto la División de 
Planificación debiera , a mi juicio, apoyar al Gobierno Regional, es decir al 
Consejo Regional y al Intendente, en la planificación del desarrollo - 
fundamentalmente elaborando instrumentos de planificación y tratando de ayudar 
a la implementación de ellos -, y teniendo buenos sistemas de análisis y de 
información para el desarrollo.’ 
 
‘Where we should go fundamentally as said in all the transfer documents, 
is how is it possible to generate a planning system, with planning instruments that 
allow public management and investment to be directed in a better way. And, at the 
same time, when it is fully mature, it can develop good regional analyses and 
manage good information systems regarding the region (…) Now, from my point of 
view, the Planning Division should support the Regional Government, that is to say 
the Regional Council and the Intendente, in development planning – fundamentally 
elaborating planning instruments and trying to help their implementation -, and 
having good systems of analysis and of information for development ’ 
 
(INT 20 – Political Appointee, Valparaíso 2010) 
 
Respondents also emphasise that DIPLAD might improve the efficiency of the state 
in the management of the region and that planning functions are better in the Regional 
Government than in sectors. Before the creation of DIPLAD the function of strategic 
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planning was based in SEREMI MINVU13 and SERPLAC14, which designed the PRDU 
and EDR respectively. Those plans needed to be approved by the regional government 
before they could come into force. The approval process became so cumbersome that it 
was actually longer than the making-process of the plans; besides, once approved, their 
impact was limited as they were already outdated and because they were made from a 
sectoral perspective. Transferring both plans to the regional governments seeks to solve 
those problems; making the plans within the Regional Government (GORE) should secure 
faster approval, as the regional councillors can be involved in the making-process from the 
beginning. Also, a plan developed in the regional government has the hallmark of the 
Intendente, therefore - due to the regional structure of the state - SEREMIs should align 
with it and follow its guidelines when making their own sectoral decisions15.  
There is nothing new in EDR or PROT16 but the change of the institution charged 
with making them. This reform aims to reorganise strategically some functions among 
regional institutions (see Eaton, 2004). As SEREMIs are concerned only about their sector, 
their point of view is partial, while the regional government has a more integral and 
holistic perspective. Also, transferring these functions from deconcentrated branches of the 
ministries to GORE is an opportunity for the regions to develop their own strategic 
planning. Although its autonomy is questionable - due to the appointed Intendente and the 
influence of SUBDERE over regional governments – DIPLAD helps to strengthen regional 
government in order to coordinate SEREMIs generating synergies among them, and 
therefore, developing better responses to regional needs.  
Thus, the transference of competences from the sectors to DIPLAD strengthens 
regional governments; it gives them more political weight within the region as GORE is 
making the regional strategic decisions17.  
Figure 6-218 pictures the transference of Regional Plan of Urban Development 
(PRDU) and Strategy for Regional Development (EDR) to the Regional Government. On 
the surface this might be interpreted as a concentration of competence within GORE, as 
these functions were located in two different regional institutions. However, it is essential 
to take into account that in the Chilean state’ structure SEREMI MINVU and SERPLAC 
are not autonomous but highly dependent on their ministries at the central level; so they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Regional Office of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism and the Regional Office of the Ministry of 
Planning 
14 PRDU: Regional Plan of Urban Development and EDR: Strategy for Regional Development  
15 EDR and PROT are both not mandatory, but guidelines. There is no legal bond to them. 
16 New name of PRDU, it means Regional Plan of Territorial Order 
17 Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003, Montecinos 2005 discussed the importance of the transfer of power and 
resources towards subnational governments 
18 Source: author 
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not only have a sectoral perspective but also a centralist guidance in all their actions and 
decisions (see Chapter VII). In other words, the central level institutions interfere in 
regional affairs through their regional offices, which resemblance the tentacles of an 
octopus. However, the transfer of functions from deconcentrated institutions to GORE on 
the regional chessboard gives it more weight and allows it to be the centre of strategic 
planning, displacing SERPLAC and SEREMI MINVU. This is an important step in order 
to strengthen the regional governments and place them in a better position within the 
regional arena.  
 
 
 
 Summarising, both reforms – election of regional councillors and the creation of 
DIPLAD - were designed and developed at the national level within the frame of the 
political and developmental discourses discussed in Chapter V. The aims of these reforms 
are the real autonomy of the Regional Council and the change in the gravitational centre of 
the region. Figure 6-1 goes then to the technical dimension at the regional level, in which 
the implementation of DIPLAD is the main action. This will be analysed further in the next 
sections. 
 
There will be three lines of argument in the next sections. Firstly, the three steps of 
implementation described in the fig 5-2 (Chapter V) – passing decisions down, preparation 
of regions and transference of function -; secondly, the challenges of positioning DIPLAD; 
and thirdly, the role of actors in the success or failure of the reform. Those lines are not 
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separated but entangled in practice, so the text often mixes them - as they cannot be 
analysed separately. Figure 6-319 clarifies all the elements involved. 
 
 
 
ROLE OF ACTORS  
 
Fig 6-3 shows in red the role of actors, who are key elements for the success or 
failure of a policy (Jones et al, 2004; Peck and Theodore, 2010). Actors have specific skills 
and professions that give them different perspectives of an issue (Peck and Theodore, 
2010). Therefore, the role of individuals is fundamental to the implementation of public 
policies (Jones et al, 2004), as they are susceptible to certain interpretations and/or 
reactions, which determine its probability of success. Throughout this chapter there have 
been many examples of how actors act and react towards policies, which have influenced 
the success or hindered some decisions. Therefore it is important to know who they are and 
what motivates their actions. 
First of all, actors are embodied in society; they belong to communities and share 
certain values and beliefs. The main issue that stemmed from this research was the 
regionalist feeling of many of the participants. This feeling, although milder in Valparaíso, 
drove many of their responses and reactions to DIPLAD. The following quote shows the 
animosity that some respondents have towards Santiago and, therefore, towards any 
decision that comes from there.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Source: author 
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‘Primero, en Santiago, si tú te das cuenta, los profesionales… La mayoría 
de la gente de Santiago no son de Santiago p’, son gente que ha llegado allá, se 
fue a estudiar a la universidad y se quedó allá en Santiago. Segundo, Santiago, 
desde el punto de vista de la salud mental, son la gente más enferma, porque 
tienen problemas de estrés, los más altos niveles estrés, los más altos niveles de 
contaminación… Entonces uno podría pensar que se trata de, primero, de gente 
que llegó a un lugar donde no tiene ninguna identidad, porque ser santiaguino que 
es lo que es po’… nadie sabe lo que es. Porque un huaso de Colchagua es huaso 
po’, un chilote, es chilote, come papas… qué sé yo…un gallo del norte, es nortino. 
Pero un santiaguino ¿Qué es lo que es? Nadie sabe lo que es po’, o sea no es 
nada. Te fijas? No tiene una identidad territorial, que lo que…  No existe… Tiene 
todos estos problemas de salud mental… tiene problemas graves de 
contaminación… Por ejemplo el plomo te daña el cerebro, por lo tanto, tú piensas 
más mal, no piensas mejor por estar en Santiago. Sin embargo, ellos nos tienen 
convencidos a todos de que la cosa tiene que decidirse en Santiago, te fijas? Es 
medio extraño….’ 
 
‘Firstly, in Santiago, if you notice, the professionals… Most of the people 
of Santiago are not from Santiago. They are people that have arrived there, that 
went to study at university and stayed there. Secondly, from a mental health point 
of view, they are the most ill people, because they have stress problems, the highest 
levels of stress, the highest levels of pollution20… then one could think that it is 
about firstly, of people that arrive at a place where there is no identity, because 
being ‘santiaguino’, what is that? Nobody knows. Because a ‘huaso’21 from 
Colchagua is a ‘huaso’, a ‘chilote’22 is a ‘chilote’, eats potatos… I don’t kow… a 
guy from the north is a ‘nortino’… but a ‘santiaguino’, what is that? Nobody 
knows. That is to say, it means nothing, you see? They do not have territorial 
identity which… It does not exist… (Santiago) has all these problems of mental 
health… It has serious pollution problems… For example, lead damages the brain, 
therefore you think worse, you do not think better for being in Santiago. However, 
they have convinced us all that decisions have to be made in Santiago, you see? It 
is a bit odd…’  
 
(INT 26 – Public Servant, Tarapacá 2009) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The interviewee is referring to air pollution (smog) 
21 Folks that live in the countryside in the central zone 
22 Folks that live in Chiloe, in the south of Chile 
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Although this interviewee chose a particular way to show his strong feelings against 
Santiago and its people, most of the respondents from Tarapacá referring to the capital 
shared similar feelings. Thus, being in Tarapacá entails a strong mistrust towards any 
decisions that come from Santiago, and as well as to arrivals from the capital. 
A second element to consider is that actors are also embedded politically and 
organisationally. An important issue regarding the degree of acceptance or suspicion of 
DIPLAD from regional state personnel is related to the contradiction between centralism 
and regionalism within the regions. Interviewees from regions highlight the fact that the 
central level imposes its policies, usually from their point of view; therefore new policies 
are viewed with suspicion by the regions. However, most of SEREMIs personnel – who 
frequently complain about their lack of autonomy – disapproved of DIPLAD. This is 
related to the power balance within the region, but also because individuals are part of 
organisational structures so they tend to keep the status quo. SEREMIs personnel feel 
different to GORE’s as they belong to the ministries; their loyalties are first to their 
ministry and then to the region. Chapter VII will explain this further.  
Finally, is also important to take into account the backgrounds of individuals, as that 
can shape their thoughts and prepare them for new situations. For example, the next quote 
is from a public servant that has lived and worked in many regions, which has given her a 
wider understanding of Chilean realities. 
 
‘Por ejemplo, yo llegué a Iquique y es otro Chile para mi… Yo nací en la 
IX Región, que también es otro Chile, distinto al Chile de Santiago… Y esos 
mundos tan distintos… Entonces, no sé, la descentralización quizás responde a un 
llamado de ‘yo soy iquiqueño’ y que eso venga con una definición de que es lo que 
hacen, que es lo que… Yo creo que apunta a temas de identidad. No sólo a que las 
regiones tomen sus propias decisiones sino que también se vea la propia identidad 
de cada una de las regiones.’ 
 
‘For example, I arrived in Iquique and it is another Chile to me… I was 
born in the IX Region, which is also another Chile, different from the Chile of 
Santiago… And those so different worlds … So, I don’t know decentralisation is 
perhaps a response to the claim ‘I am Iquiqueño’ and that comes with a definition 
of what they do, that is what I … I believe it addresses identity issues. Not only that 
the regions take their own decisions but also the real identity of each region is 
seen.’  
 
(INT 25 – Public Servant, Tarapacá 2009) 
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Therefore, actors with a wider understanding of Chilean realities are better prepared 
to implement decentralising policies and are less suspicious of the central decisions. Public 
policies are not rigid, but ongoing constructions that are being modified every time they 
are transferred and applied, as realities and actors change. Peck and Theodore (2010) point 
out the concept of ongoing policy construction, referring to the transformation that border-
crossing policies suffer. They explain how policies might be modified regarding the needs 
and characteristics of the country of destination, so the original policy is not the same 
when applied elsewhere. In a similar way, a policy designed at an upper level and applied 
at a lower level might suffer modifications by being interpreted in different ways; 
therefore, the original idea is transformed by actors at both national and regional level. 
Thus, it can be said that policies are alive - moving, transforming and adapting, depending 
on realities, actors and contexts that frame their application. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DIPLAD 
 
Implementation corresponds to the third dimension explained in Chapter V, which is 
related to technical actions required to consolidate DIPLAD. This step should be simple to 
execute – hence the green colour chosen for the boxes in Fig 6.3 – as there are specific 
steps to be done. However, the acceptance of DIPLAD by the regional governments and 
within the regions has faced difficulties due to the misgivings and tension between the 
central state and the regions, and the change in power balance within both regions and 
GOREs23. The role of actors has been essential facilitating or hindering DIPLADs - the red 
colour represents the key role that individuals can have over the result of a certain policy. 
Actors are embodied in communities with specific beliefs, interests and socio-cultural 
backgrounds, and influenced by certain ideas. They are also part of organisational and 
political fields that situate them in a net of interests and power struggles – some limited to 
one institution, some within regional interests and some of national character.  
The regional structure of the Chilean state is composed of two sets of institutions: 
deconcentrated branches of ministries (SEREMIs), which are the tentacles of the central 
level in the regions, and the regional governments (GOREs), which are highly dependent 
on the central level both financially and politically24. The main difference between the 
regional governments and SEREMIs is the competence they exert; while every SEREMI is 
focused on one sphere or sector, the regional government holds the overall coordination of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The yellow colour represents those difficulties 
24 See Chapter IV Case Study 
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all sectors of the region. Thus, the tensions between levels are not just Santiago vs. the 
regions, but also SEREMIs vs. GORE. In addition, SEREMIs personnel are usually a 
mixture from the region and from elsewhere, mainly from Santiago. Once on the staff of a 
ministry it is possible to move from one region to another; there are several state initiatives 
aiming to improve the quality of human capital in the regions, so there are inducements – 
e.g. higher salaries, more holidays, taxes exemptions and so on – to encourage people to 
work there instead of Santiago. 
Therefore, the struggles that DIPLADs have faced positioning themselves within 
GOREs and within the regions are related to both the tension between the centre and the 
regions and the origins of state personnel. DIPLAD’s creation is an initiative from the 
centre; it is the national level interfering, even imposing a reform over the regions. In 
addition, SUBDERE hired personnel from all over the country and distributed them among 
regions, so that the teams were composed mainly of incomers, which increased the 
misgivings of the regions. Thus, DIPLADs were not very welcome at start.  
Usually, in Chile every new policy or structure is applied equally and at the same 
time over the whole country, but due to the rejection of its first proposal in Congress (see 
Chapter V), SUBDERE had to work with each region individually in order to create the 
divisions. Therefore Valparaíso and Tarapacá have different histories; while the new 
division was created in 2007 in Tarapacá, in Valparaíso the office had already existed for 
several years and just had to adapt itself to the new organisation of GORE.  
DIPLAD’s experience in Valparaíso Region is unique. In 2003 the Intendente in 
office was Luis Gustavino - who had worked in SUBDERE for several years. As he knew 
SUBDERE’s plans regarding the restructuring of the regional governments, he took two 
departments from the Division of Analysis and Control of Management (DACOG) and 
made them into a third division, which was called the Division of Regional Development. 
The Division was composed of public servants from the former departments and of people 
hired in order to strengthen it. When SUBDERE and MIDEPLAN signed the transfer of 
regional planning (EDR) to GOREs, in 2007, Valparaíso just transformed it into the 
Division of Regional Development to transform it into the Division of Planning and 
Development (DIPLAD). On the other hand, after a workshop organised by SUBDERE 
with public servants from DACOG – in 2006 - four professionals were hired in order to 
strengthen Tarapacá Region’s Unit of Planning. This is what became DIPLAD and it 
constituted a whole new division within the Regional Government. This is reflected in 
substantial difference between these regions; the objection to DIPLAD was less in 
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Valparaíso than in Tarapacá region and it also had less issues regarding incomers than 
Tarapacá25. 
SUBDERE announced the creation of DIPLAD and that the competence of project 
appraisal would be transferred from DACOG to the new Division without warning. There 
was no negotiation - neither persuasion nor lobbying26 - as it was with the ministries at the 
national level; it was just the imposition of a decision from the central level on the 
Regional Government. The manner of passing decisions down (Fig 6-3) is important as it 
can affect the outcomes of a policy. Making it properly can assure the allegiance of the 
actors involved and therefore avoid resistance to it from the technical sphere. On the 
contrary, when decisions are ill communicated actors feel bypassed so they make no effort 
for them to succeed. The evidence shows GORE’s personnel’s discomfort as decisions 
were made at the central level and as they were informed rather than included in the 
decision-making process. Besides, project appraisal is an important function because 
managing the regional portfolio implies control over resources, decision power within the 
region and influence over the Intendente and the Regional Council. Losing this 
competence means that the Head of DACOG would lose power and his/her position as the 
second on board after the Intendente; DACOG was not happy with this announcement. 
Actors are located in specific organisational and political fields (fig 6-3) so they will resent 
a change that diminishes their position within their institution and their sphere of influence. 
Passing this particular decision down was a sensitive issue, to which SUBDERE did not 
give enough importance. Moreover, SUBDERE did not fully explain what DIPLAD was 
going to be, or its main strategic axes or the schedule for the steps they were going to take 
in order to have DIPLAD fully implemented within the Regional Government. GORE’s 
personnel were in limbo regarding the start of the new Division and the time when 
DACOG had to actually transfer project appraisal to DIPLAD. As each region followed a 
different path in the implementation of DIPLADs, SUBDERE could not really give an 
accurate schedule to GOREs for the steps they were going to take; however, this is not 
reason enough to explain SUBDERE’s failure in passing this decision down. The above, 
plus the hiring of personnel from other parts of the country, set a bad start for the team of 
the new Division. At the moment of the field trip (2009-2010) SUBDERE did not show 
any regret regarding the way it passed decisions down to GOREs. This reflects a centralist 
attitude when handling communication with the regions, even coming from an institution 
that works for the decentralisation and the empowerment of the regions. The next quote 
shows how SUBDERE sees its relationship with the regional governments. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This will be fully explained later in this section 
26 See table 5-1 Chapter V 
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‘Yo creo que tenemos una relación de amor y odio. Amor cuando vienen a 
pedir plata y odio cuando uno les pide los productos. Tienen una sensación 
equivocada. Yo creo que ellos se creen autónomos, cosa que no son (…) El 
Gobierno Regional está absolutamente tutelado por la Subsecretaría… Si bien 
ellos tienen personalidad jurídica distinta del fisco y tienen la institucionalidad, 
ellos no son autónomos. Ahí hay un problema de percepción de lo que es 
autonomía (…) Ellos creen que son descentralizados y nosotros les hacemos creer 
que así es… Ni un peso de la región es decidido por la región. Nada.’ 
 
‘I believe we have a love-hate relationship. Love when they come to ask for 
money and hate when we ask for results. They have the wrong perception. I believe 
they think they are autonomous, which they are not (…) The Regional Government 
is absolutely supervised by the Subsecretariat27… although they have a different 
juridical personality from the central state and they have the institutionality, they 
are not autonomous. There is a problem of perception about what is autonomy (…) 
They think they are decentralised and we make them believe so… Not one penny is 
decided by the region. None.' 
 
(INT 28 – Political Apointee, Santiago 2009) 
 
The quote illustrates two main issues: the control that the central level exerts over 
regional resources and the disdain towards regional comprehension and capacities. Chapter 
IV explains that GORE ‘decides’ the investment of FNDR28 (25% approximatly of the 
regional public investment), however the respondent explains that the ARI29 has to be 
approved by the central level so that, when it is consistent with the national priorities for 
the region there is no problem, but when there are projects that they do not like, those 
projects are rejected. Thus, not a penny is spent without the consent of the central level. 
For this reason, the regions could have the illusion that they are autonomous, but actually 
they are not.  
On the other hand, the language used by the interviewee undermines the capacities of 
GOREs, as he seems to believe that regional personnel do not realise the game SUBDERE 
plays ‘letting regions think that they are decentralised’. Actually, GORE’s personnel often 
complained about the attitude of the central level treating them as if they were unable to 
understand these kinds of games; frequently, the central state’s personnel underrate the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 SUBDERE: Subsecretariat for Regional Development 
28 Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional – National Fund for Regional Development 
29 Anteproyecto Regional de Inversiones – Preliminary draft for regional investment 
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regions, bypassing and distrusting them. In addition, the central state’s personnel often 
confuse the culture of assistance30 with supporting the regions, which is obviously a wrong 
approach when the goal is to decentralise. Thus the misgivings between the national and 
the regional level are enhanced by this attitude.  
When centralist culture and practices were discussed in Chapter V as one of the main 
obstacles to decentralisation, it was also pointed out that the main issue was to keep the 
control in the capital; the relationship between SUBDERE and GOREs is almost as 
hierarchical as the relationship between the SEREMIs and their Ministries. Therefore, a 
reform designed for decentralisation becomes a paradox when is implemented using highly 
centralised practices; one interviewee defined this paradox as the schizophrenia of the 
Chilean state31. The creation of DIPLADs has two goals: the strengthening of the regional 
governments and a change in the gravitational forces within the regions32. However, as this 
measure is being led by SUBDERE, a paradox is produced when implementing it, as the 
central state - with its centralist perspective - is driving a decentralising process. The 
problem is not whether the job is properly done but how it is done. There is no doubt about 
the commitment of most of the personnel from the central state; however, applying 
centralist point of views shows a lack of understanding of the regional needs regarding 
autonomy. Improving the communication with the regions and including them in the 
decision-making process could assure a better disposition towards national policies, hence 
a higher probability of success. 
There is also a failure in the communication between the political and technical 
spheres (see Chapter V), which lead to misunderstandings and even misgivings. What 
happens is that often public servants receive the guidelines with instructions for the new 
policies without further explanation of the strategy behind the policy, so that they usually 
act blindly and, in consequence, many times without good will towards the changes. For 
example, when asked about the transference of regional planning policies to regional 
governments at the very beginning of the creation of DIPLAD (2008), a regional public 
servant said ‘Why does the Regional Government want so much power? What is the 
idea?’33 This clearly shows two things: misgiving towards GORE at the regional level and 
a lack of understanding of the whole process. Firstly the misgiving within the regional 
level towards GORE is related to its origin in 1993 and secondly, the transference of 
functions obeys central government’ strategies, in which regional governments have had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Asistencialismo 
31 INT 4 – Academic, Tarapacá 2010 
32 Although the change of gravitational forces was not mentioned by respondents it seems to me an obvious 
consequence of the transfer of function from SEREMIs to GOREs 
33 ¿Por qué quiere tanto poder el Gobierno Regional? ¿Cuál es la idea? 
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no participation; however, they were blamed for ‘taking’ functions or power from 
SEREMIs, when in fact everything was done through negotiation between SUBDERE and 
Ministries at the central level. 
As the decision of the creation of DIPLAD was badly communicated, public servants 
were unhappy with the arrival of the new Division, which resulted in given a pejorative 
nickname: ‘the third division’, referring to the football teams’ lowest league. This shows 
the resentment of the Regional Government’s personnel for having a Division they did not 
ask for imposed on them; moreover, they felt bypassed once again by the central level. 
This could have been avoided if SUBDERE had approached GOREs with a more inclusive 
attitude. Although SUBDERE gave DIPLADs the option to organise themselves regarding 
the needs of each region, the personnel of GORE complained that SUBDERE did not 
include them before the creation of DIPLAD and that the workshops that led to its creation 
did not include regional state personnel. This tension affected the implementation and 
positioning of DIPLADs within GOREs; the new personnel were received with misgiving. 
The following quote shows the steps of DIPLADs during its first year.  
 
‘Cuando yo entré la gente decía ‘pero bueno, ¿qué hacen en la DIPLAD? 
No sabemos lo que hacen’. Entonces, ha sido un trabajo de posicionamiento con 
los pares, continuo (…) Y me da la impresión de que cuando llegamos y se crea la 
DIPLAD todos los cachos, todas las cosas engorrosas las tiran para allá 
‘Tírenselos a ellos, son nuevos. Pa’ la DIPLAD, pa’ la DIPLAD’ (…) y la DIPLAD 
no es para ejecutar o hacer proyectos, es para planificar ’ 
 
‘When I arrived (to DIPLAD) people said ‘well, but what do they are do 
in DIPLAD? We don’t know what they do’. So, it has been a continuous work 
of positioning among colleagues (…) And I have the impression that when we 
arrived and DIPLAD was created, all the tricky and cumbersome things were sent 
there ‘Give it to them, they are new. For DIPLAD, for DIPLAD’ (…) and 
DIPLAD is not for executing or making projects, it is for planning' 
 
(INT 27 – Public Servant, Tarapacá 2009) 
 
Both DIPLADs, from Tarapacá and Valparaíso Region, describe their first steps in 
the Regional Government as a time when the lack of clarity and the lack of a legal 
framework was used to give them all the tasks nobody else wanted. As SUBDERE 
promoted the idea that each DIPLAD should organise itself regarding their needs, DACOG 
took the opportunity to transfer them cumbersome tasks. In addition, they explain that, 
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unfortunately, the Intendentes in office – 2007 - did not really understand that DIPLAD 
should be the ‘brain’ of the regional government, so s/he gave DIPLAD tasks that were not 
what they were trained for, and used the new team to promote his/her own agenda34.  
Legally, there is no Division of Planning and Development within GOREs, but the 
law establishes besides the Head of DACOG and the Head of DAF35, a third Head of 
Division – unnamed, with no functions and no personnel – that can advise the Intendente. 
SUBDERE took advantage of this loophole for the creation of DIPLAD and as it is the 
Intendente who sets the agenda for DIPLADs, SUBDERE sought to give them all the same 
tasks: EDR, PROT, Regional Policies and ARI36. This explain the ‘chaos’ during 2007 
when the Division started, as everyone tried to take advantage of the new structure: 
Intendentes to have more technical support to implement her/his ideas and GORE’s 
personnel in order to get rid of cumbersome or annoying tasks.  
Personnel in Valparaíso also point out that the fact that the region had the first 
DIPLAD does not necessarily mean that they are currently in a better position than other 
regions. Moreover, they explain it was a disadvantage, as there was a lack of clarity about 
what was going on and the team had to change their work logic in order to adapt to 
SUBDERE’s requirements. Both, the change in working logic and the misunderstanding of 
political officials held back the DIPLAD in Valparaíso, being nowadays more less at the 
same stage as in the other regions. The advantages that Valparaíso should have had due to 
the early creation of the Division of Regional Development did not result in a better 
articulated office. 
Several workshops and training courses on regional planning and on the role 
DIPLADs should have within GORE and the region were organised during 2007, both in 
Santiago and regions in order to prepare the regions for the transference of functions (see 
Fig 6-3). Thus, when training in Santiago, all personnel from DIPLADs were sharing their 
experiences and when training in the regions, SUBDERE was dealing with specific issues. 
Due to the large amount of training received during the first year of the Division, 
DIPLAD’s personnel were ‘accused’ by the other public servants within GORE as not 
really working. One interviewee described how his colleagues from the other divisions 
were often saying ‘you spend all the time attending courses’37, which made the acceptance 
of DIPLAD within GORE even more difficult.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Projects that s/he considered important in her/his period for the region. 
35 Division of Administration and Finances 
36 See chapter IV (Case study) for further details  
37 ‘Ustedes se la pasan en cursos’ (INT 23, Political Appointee, Tarapacá 2010) 
	   164	  
POSITIONING DIPLAD 
 
Positioning is understood in this thesis as the set of circumstances that affects the 
power to act of an institution. As DIPLAD was a new institution, it needed to define its 
status and find a place within the regional chessboard. 
Positioning DIPLAD was not an easy task; the new division faced problems related 
to being imposed by the centre, the power balance within GORE and the diversity in 
origins of its personnel. Valparaíso and Tarapacá regions claim that Santiago does not truly 
know their realities – misinterpreting their needs – so that the policies designed to solve 
their problems are not appropriate. For example, SEREMI MINVU38 complains about 
LGUC and OGUC39, which establish rules consistent with cities situated on flat terrain and 
with an Mediterranean climate – such as Santiago. However, most cities in the country are 
in areas with different geographical characteristics – e.g. Valparaiso city is spread over the 
Coastal Hills40 and Iquique is in the Atacama Desert. SEREMI MINVU explains the 
difficulties of fulfilling the law when the characteristics of a city are so different that some 
rules become absurd, e.g. requirements of gardens and green areas in Iquique. Thus, 
regions do not usually trust measures promoted by the central government, as they are not 
always suitable for them. Both regions also complain that SUBDERE is not working for 
the regions but for Santiago. Besides, the obvious resentment of DACOG due to its loss of 
power increased the natural antagonism that regions would have towards DIPLADs. In 
Valparaíso this was milder than in Tarapacá, as the Division was created several years 
earlier.  
The arrival of incomers is a big issue for regions, even more when they are from 
Santiago. As Valparaíso region is located close to Santiago, commuting between the 
capital and the cities of the V Region is quite common. Thus, the GORE of Valparaíso 
accepts more easily personnel from other parts of the country than the GORE of Tarapacá. 
This might be because Valparaíso’s history is tied to Santiago; it has been Chilean territory 
since the Spanish conquest and colonisation in the 16thC, and it fought for Independence 
during the 19thC. Therefore, they share the same history and more similar points of view 
regarding the country than the peripheral regions. On the other hand, Tarapacá was 
Peruvian territory until the late 19thC so that its inhabitants do not share the same past as 
Santiago and in some way they feel different from Chileans. There is a strong local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Regional Office of Housing and Urbanism. 
39 LGUC: General Law of Urbanism and Construction / OGUC: Ordinance of Urbanism and Construction 
40 Cordillera de la Costa 
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identity41, for instance, one interviewee explained ironically that actually ‘the problem of 
Iquique is that it is full of Chileans’42, alluding to the increment of immigrants in the last 
25 years. Incomers are seen as intruders, they are called ‘outsiders’ or ‘people in transit’43. 
Being a desert and mining region, Tarapacá has a long history of immigrants that came to 
exploit its resources and then went back to their countries/regions. The misgiving towards 
incomers might be related to the experience of waves of people seeking wealth by 
exploiting mineral resources – e.g. saltpetre, silver, copper and so on – and then leaving; 
they feel used and abused by incomers. It is a common saying that people who stay in 
Tarapacá are people from Tarapacá, as they are hard enough to endure the life within the 
driest desert of the world. The next quote shows this feeling within the Regional 
Government: 
 
‘La mayoría (autoridades regionales y funcionarios de la DIPLAD) no son 
de acá, no los veo comprometidos 100% con el futuro de Tarapacá… Si tú le 
preguntas al Intendente ‘si usted se ganara el Kino, no sé 500 millones de 
pesos, que haría?’ , que crees tú que te va a responder? ‘Me compro una 
parcelita en La Ligua po’ o un fundito por ahí por Curicó’. Entonces, como 
dijo Abraham Lincoln tú eres del lugar donde tienes tus muertos o de donde 
quieres morirte. Te fijas? … Cuando la persona está pensando que aquí está de 
paso nunca va a ser regionalista (…) Esas personas no están comprometidas, 
desde el origen no están comprometidas ’ 
 
‘Most of them (regional officials and DIPLAD’s personnel) are not from 
here, I don’t see them 100% committed to Tarapacá’s future… If you ask the 
Intendente ‘what would you do if you won the lottery, I don’t know, say 500 
million pesos44?’ What do you think he would answer? ’I would buy a piece of 
land in La Ligua, obviously… or a farm near Curicó’45 … So, as Abraham 
Lincoln said, you are from where your dead are or where you want to die. You 
see? …. When the person is thinking that s/he is in transit they will never be 
regionalist (…) those people are not committed, from the beginning they are not 
committed’ 
 
(INT 26 – Public servant and Deputy Official, Tarapacá 2009) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Tarapacá’s inhabitants called themselves ‘Iquiqueños’ or ‘pampinos’ regarding where their families come 
from. The former are those from the coast (Iquique) and the latter come from ‘pampas’, in the inlands, where 
saltpetre and silver was exploited in the 19thC and early 20thC. They do not call themselves ‘Tarapaqueños’. 
42 ‘El problema de Iquique es que está lleno de chilenos’ (INT 4 – Academic, Tarapacá 2010) 
43 ‘afuerinos’ / ‘gente de paso’ 
44 620.000 pounds app 
45 La Ligua is located in V Region of Valparaíso and Curicó in the VII Region of Maule 
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The quote is a good example of the feelings towards incomers working in the 
regions. The same interviewee also explains that the problem is not that outsiders do not do 
their job, actually he praised DIPLAD’s personnel emphasising that they are very 
enthusiastic and hard workers; however, he believes that not belonging to the region makes 
them lack commitment towards Tarapacá, as they will stay just for a few years and then go 
somewhere else. He is convinced that incomers see their positions in Tarapacá as a step in 
their careers, so they will take any opportunity that comes, probably a higher position 
within the central state in Santiago. Other interviewees from Tarapacá also comment that 
this desire is understandable: Iquique cannot provide them with all the things they could 
access in Santiago, such as better schools for their children, better hospitals, a greater 
number of museums and theatres and so on. Again, for them, who stays in Iquique is who 
loves their land enough to not care about the lack of those luxuries. Thus, it is essential to 
understand that actors are embodied in communities that share certain beliefs and values 
that will make them react in a certain way towards a new policy. Taking into account the 
feelings of Tarapacá’s citizenry towards new comers would make the implementation and 
positioning of DIPLAD easier. 
2008 was the first year DIPLAD was operational and SUBDERE transferred regional 
planning to them. All regions started with the elaboration and design of EDR, some of 
them also worked on the Land Use Plan for the Coastal Border (ZBC) and specific regional 
policies. Due to these tasks DIPLAD’s were interacting with other public services, which 
helped them to enter the regional chessboard. In Tarapacá respondents explained that for 
them 2009 was the year of consolidation46, as the Division was well known among public 
services in the region, communication within GORE and the public apparatus was fluent 
and they were expecting the approval of EDR for the beginning of 2010. Also, in 2009, 
DIPLAD was analysing each regional project presented to the regional government in 
order to evaluate its consistency with the strategic lines defined by EDR – appraisal 
project. The following quote shows the optimism regarding the Division at the moment of 
the interview.  
 
‘El trabajo de la DIPLAD estos tres primeros años ha sido duro porque ha 
tenido que ser un posicionamiento dentro del GORE, con los servicios públicos y a 
nivel nacional con la SUBDERE y MIDEPLAN (…) Desde mi punto de vista, 
nosotros nos posicionamos como división el año pasado, porque hicimos harto 
trabajo técnico con los profesionales de los servicios públicos y con la sociedad 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Take into account that interviews in Tarapacá were made mainly in late 2009 and early 2010 
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civil. Entonces tengo la impresión de que se avanzó por ese lado. O sea, la imagen 
de la DIPLAD fue más conocida, la gente sabe lo que hace la DIPLAD por lo 
menos (…) Se han ido ganando espacios poco a poco (…) la división empieza a 
adquirir mayor importancia, porque el que tiene las lucas es el que tiene el peso 
(…) la visión estratégica no tiene peso concreto si no se vincula a la cartera de 
inversiones y a la definición del presupuesto.’ 
 
‘The work of DIPLAD over these three years has been hard because it has 
had to position itself within GORE, with the public services47 and at national level 
with SUBDERE and MIDEPLAN48 (…) From my point of view, we positioned the 
division last year, because we did lot of technical work with professionals of the 
public services and with civil society. So, I have the impression that we have 
advanced on that side. I mean, the image of DIPLAD was more known, at least 
people know what DIPLAD does (…) We have been gaining spaces step by step 
(…) the division starts to have more importance, because who has the money has 
the power (…) the strategic vision does not have weight if it is not related to the 
investment portfolio and to the definition of the budget’  
 
(INT 23 – Political Appointee, Tarapacá 2010) 
 
The interviewee made a positive assessment of the first three years of the Division 
and links its success to the fact that once having the EDR they could recommend the 
acceptance or rejection of projects to the Regional Council. The technical team of 
Tarapacá see themselves as builders of the Division, so for them a strong internal 
relationship is essential as they trust each other and face each challenge united. Thus, they 
have periodic meetings in order to be highly coordinated internally and also to improve the 
Division.  
In Valparaíso things were a little bit different, as they already existed; the team did 
not have to position itself within GORE, but mainly with the other public services. 
However, the problem they faced was that they were leaderless, as they have had several 
Heads of Division, which affected practices within the division and the positioning of 
DIPLAD within the region due to their different approaches to the job. For example, one 
Head of Division used to send the public servant in charge of the topic in discussion to 
meetings outside GORE, which resulted in a restriction of those topics to one or two 
people, as when the person briefed his/her boss on return the Head of Division did not 
inform the rest of the team. On the contrary, another Head of Division preferred to go to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Also called sectors or SEREMIs 
48 Ministry of Planning 
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every meeting him/herself and then to inform the whole team about all topics, so everyone 
knew what was happening. These different practices caused confusion among the 
personnel, GORE and the rest of the region. One recently appointed Head of DIPLAD 
explains: 
 
 ‘Mira, yo creo que falta, falta bastante (posicionamiento). Por lo mismo 
de que yo soy nuevo, yo creo que se perdieron 8 meses. O sea, el DIPLAD anterior 
no sabía mostrarse, no salía a terreno, no salía a eventos… No iba a todas las 
reuniones a las que tenía que ir… cometía el error de que de repente iba a 
reuniones que no tenía que ir y dejaba de ir a reuniones importantes. Así que, ahí 
se genera un tema en que yo ahora tengo que ser super discrecional con lo que 
tengo que hacer. Tengo que discernir que es realmente lo importante y que es lo 
que no. Y ese es el tema que… Porque si haces bien esa parte, la notoriedad de la 
DIPLAD y el posicionamiento va a ser inmediato’  
 
‘Look, I think we need more, much more (regarding positioning DIPLAD). 
As I am new, I think we have lost 8 months. That is, the former Head of DIPLAD 
did not know how to present her/himself49, she/he did no go into the field… she/he 
did not go to events, she/he did not go to all the meetings she/he had to go… She/he 
made the mistake of going to meetings she/he should not have to go and did not go 
to important meetings. So, now I have to discern very carefully what is really 
important and what is not. And that is the thing… Because if you do well that part, 
immediately DIPLAD’s reputation will increase’ 
 
(INT 19 – Political appointee, Valparaíso 2010) 
 
He adds that the Intendente giving DIPLAD the task of monitoring the fulfilment of 
presidential goals gave them the opportunity to have a stronger position within the region, 
as the other public services should respond to DIPLAD. Therefore, the support of the 
Intendente was essential to improve the image and position of the Division. 
Positioning DIPLAD within the region depends on the three elements identified in 
fig 6-3: the natural misgivings from public services towards GORE, which is rooted in its 
bad reputation among the state personnel, the change of power balance and the resentment 
of public services for losing functions. These three elements affected the credibility of 
DIPLAD, so since its outset DIPLAD was not only facing issues within GORE but also 
with the public services it should coordinate. The following two quotes illustrate the 
feelings of SEREMI MINVU and SERPLAC towards DIPLAD, which are the only two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 It was not possible to identify the gender of the person from the quote. 
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services included in this research besides GORE, as they were holding the functions of 
planning that were transferred to DIPLAD. So that these opinions might not represent the 
whole regional state apparatus, but give an idea of the relations between public services. 
 
‘Yo creo que es una buena idea. A mi me parece que es una buena idea en 
términos de que hay una mirada transversal a la región. En términos de su 
proyección en todos sus ámbitos. Yo creo que pal MINVU, particularmente pal 
departamento de Desarrollo Urbano se ve como una amenaza. Tengo como esa 
sensación. Me da la impresión de que por años hemos tenido instalado el tema de 
que el territorio es un tema nuestro, ya? Y no se entiende que el territorio es un 
tema de todos. Y eso yo creo que… Así como lo miramos como MINVU, le debe 
pasar a las otras SEREMIs de que ‘este tema es mío y por qué lo tienen ahí’… 
Debe ser complejo trabajar ahí. Les debe costar encontrarse con la facilitación de 
los otros… Pero yo creo que sí, es una buena decisión tener una División como esa 
(…) Yo creo que pa’ nosotros, como te digo, es un tema que nos provoca recelo. 
Porque aquí se hizo el Plan Regional de Desarrollo Urbano, un tema muy nuestro. 
Entonces, soltarlo…’  
 
‘I believe it is a good idea (DIPLAD). It seems to me a good idea in terms 
that there is a transversal vision of the region, in terms of the projection of all its 
scopes. I believe that for MINVU, especially for the Dept. of Urban Development, 
it is seen as a threat. I have that feeling. I have the impression that for years we 
have entrenched the idea that the territory is our topic, and it has not been 
understood that the territory is a subject for everyone. And that I believe… Just as 
MINVU see it, might be happening to all SEREMIs, that of ‘this is my topic, why 
they are having it?’… It must be complex to work there (DIPLAD). It must be 
difficult to find help from the others… However, I believe that yes, it is a good 
decision to have a Division like that one (…) I believe that for us, as I told you, is a 
topic that provokes misgiving. Because here the Regional Plan for Urban 
Development was made, an issue that was ours. Then, let it go...’ 
 
(INT 52 – Political appointee, Valparaíso 2010) 
 
‘Ahora recién se creó la División de Planificación del GORE… Y ahí está 
po’, con cero aporte po’… Cero aporte… Claro, son un equipo con mucha gente 
joven, pero necesitan que alguien con experiencia los lidere, los guíe. En cambio 
el que está hoy día de líder de ellos, es un funcionario joven con cero experiencia. 
Entonces, yo digo, está bien que el sector público está añoso pero igual hay que 
considerar la experiencia de los que llevan años trabajando en el sector. Entonces, 
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yo espero y tengo harta confianza en que la División de Planificación del GORE, 
sea exitosa… Y eso, con un costo a lo mejor de 3 a 4 años… Ya llevamos dos años 
(...) Desde que la SERPLAC no planifica - desde hace ya tres años que nos dijeron 
que iba a ser el Gobierno Regional – que no ha habido ni siquiera un intento de 
planificación en esta región. Están trabajando con el mismo documento de 
planificación que nosotros hicimos para el gobierno de Lagos’ 
 
‘Just now the Division of Planning of GORE was created … and there it is, 
with zero contribution... zero contribution… It’s true, they are a team composed of 
many young people, but they need someone with experience to lead them, to guide 
them. On the contrary, he who is leading them at the moment is a young public 
servant without experience. So, I say, it’s ok that the public sector is aging but still 
the experience of those who have been a long time in the sector should be 
considered. So, I hope and I have a lot of confidence that the Division of Planning 
of GORE will be successful… And that, at a cost of 3 or 4 years… It has already 
been 2 years… (…) Since SERPLAC does not plan – there have been three years 
since we were told that planning would be done by GORE – that there has not been 
even an attempt of planning in this region. They (DIPLAD) are working with the 
same document we made for Lagos’ government’ 
 
(INT 41 – Public Servant, Tarapacá 2009) 
 
These two quotes show the attitudes of the former institutions in charge of planning 
towards DIPLADs. Once again, Valparaíso’s reaction is moderate while Tarapacá’s is 
more extreme. The language used by the public servant of SERMI MINVU (INT 52) is 
mild and conciliatory. She speaks of the positive elements of this new Division, although 
she also recognises that the transfer has been painful for MINVU. On the other hand, the 
officer from SERPLAC (INT 41) shows animosity although he tries to be polite. He clearly 
disapproves of DIPLAD and explains that it achieved nothing in three years, blaming 
SUBDERE for this failure. His last statement about there had been no planning since 
SERPLAC transferred the function is not accurate, as at that moment DIPLAD was 
working in three different lines of planning: the boarder costal land use plan, the strategy 
for regional development and several regional policies. The quotes reflect how difficult the 
transfer of functions has been for the state personnel from SEREMI MINVU and 
SERPLAC, as they were used to working on regional planning with their methodology and 
sectorial perspective. For them is not only a change of power balance within the regional 
chessboard, but also the need to adapt themselves to other tasks.  
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Paradoxically, although SERPLAC’s animosity towards DIPLAD, SEREMI MINVU 
of Tarapacá Region and DIPLAD work very closely, while in Valparaíso Region – that has 
not showed any animosity - there was no contact between them. The explanation could be 
in the fact that the Department of Urban Development of Tarapacá changed more than half 
of its personnel between 2007 and 2008 and the new personnel did not have any of these 
prejudices; furthermore, the new staff – the head of DUI among them - was very 
sympathetic towards DIPLAD. However, respondents exposed the difficulties for DIPLAD 
when working with sectors in both regions, as public services distrust the Division and are 
reluctant to cooperate.  
Seldom has Chile had the opportunity to be creative when applying public policies, 
as they are usually strongly tied to laws and guidelines. However, due to the path that 
SUBDERE chose to create DIPLAD, each GORE has been freer to imprint its hallmark on 
the new Division. For instance, in Valparaíso the Intendente gave DIPLAD the task of 
monitoring the compliance with presidential goals, which made DIPLAD the institution 
that was supervising all the public services within the region. This has had opposite 
consequences; on the one hand, as there are rare occasions when a policy has no guidelines 
from the national level, there was some resistance from GORE itself and the other public 
services – at both national and regional level -; and on the other hand, the positioning of 
DIPLAD depends mostly on the ability of its personnel to ingratiate themselves with the 
Intendente. The latter makes DIPLAD’s position vulnerable, as they are constantly seeking 
the validation of their colleagues and officials. They became particularly sensitive, as the 
new government coalition (Alianza) was very legalistic; it did not want to make any 
mistake, as it was the first time in 40 years that a democratic right wing coalition was in 
power. The same people that felt bypassed by SUBDERE with the creation of DIPLAD 
took the opportunity to point out to the new officials that DIPLADs have a questionable 
origin, as the law is ambiguous. This increased the uncertainty of DIPLAD’s personnel, as 
they felt questioned about every aspect of their work.  
Despite these attempts, the Alianza did not abolish DIPLADs, although their position 
diminished in some regions. Therefore, 2010 was the year of ‘adaptation’ more than the 
‘harvest’ as many people expected; DIPLAD’s work was reviewed and some tasks 
modified before their approval. For example, EDR Tarapacá was finished and ready for its 
approval by the Regional Council at the end of 2009; however, the regional councillors 
were unwilling to discuss the plan as there were uncertainties regarding the new 
	   172	  
government50. Once President Piñera took power, EDR was checked and modified in order 
to give it the stamp/hallmark of the new government; it was finally approved during 2011. 
Here SUBDERE’s support was crucial to keep DIPLAD in the game. Most of DIPLAD’s 
officers agreed that they needed one more year to have had the EDR and ZBC approved, 
then their position within GORE would not have been so weak during Alianza’s first year. 
The approval of those instruments - before the change of government - would have 
strengthened their position, as they could have shown concrete results. In Tarapacá 
DIPLAD’s personnel were very disappointed with the new head of Division and they felt 
not taken into consideration. By contrast, in Valparaiso the new head of Division seemed 
very proactive and forceful. Unfortunately, the data collection of this research finished at 
the beginning of the Alianza government, so it is not possible to make further analysis of 
the situation.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The main question of this chapter is the scope of decentralising reforms regarding the 
strengthening of the regional governments. It is difficult to assess the outcome of the direct 
election of regional councillors, as the first election will be in November 2013. The 
analysis of the data shows optimism among respondents from every group, as the Regional 
Council should be more autonomous for two reasons: because its members will be directly 
elected by the citizenry - not as a result of negotiations between political parties -, and 
because the Intendente will not be the Head of the Council anymore. Thus, the Regional 
Council will not be politically bound/tied to the central level. Being an autonomous body 
will allows CORE to fulfil its role monitoring and overseeing the Intendente’s 
performance. Also, regional councillors will be able to set their own agenda, which will 
give them the strength to balance the power of the Intendente and SEREMIs. Besides, the 
direct election will make regional councillors known among the citizenry, which should 
make them more accountable to the people that voted for them.  
This reform can be considered a good first step towards the empowerment of 
regional governments, but other steps must be taken. For instance, regional councillors 
should be full time jobs and have salaries according to their responsibilities; also the 
functions of the Regional Council should be checked in order to give them the right 
faculties according to its role within the region. The latter is highly related to the degree of 
decentralisation that Chile pursues, which is still a matter of debate.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Presidential elections were in Nov 2009 and the second round in Jan 2010. Therefore that period was 
particularly sensitive within political institutions such as CORE and Congress.	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DIPLADs had been working for three years when the data was collected for this 
research, which allows some preliminary conclusions regarding their achievements. The 
new Division meant the reorganisation of GORE, which has resulted so far in its 
strengthening even considering the strong resistance that DIPLAD faced at the outset. The 
change of the gravitational centre within the region has increases the importance of GORE 
in regional decision-making; the regional governments are nowadays recognised as the 
institutions that lead regional planning, so they are in a better position within the regional 
chessboard.  
So far the development of regional capacities through decentralisation have not 
challenged the idea of the unitary state that Chileans’ hold. All the guidelines and policies 
are still coming from Santiago and there is no great participation of the regions in policy 
making. While this situation endures it will be difficult to talk about real decentralisation. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Much has been said throughout this thesis about the contradiction of a top-down 
decentralising process, which means that decentralisation is promoted, designed and 
implemented from the central level; therefore the construction of decentralisation is 
through a centralist perspective. This decentralisation, with all its nuances, is therefore 
shaped by the relationship – struggles, tensions and practices - between the national and 
the regional level. Thus the understanding of that relationship becomes very important in 
order to frame the institutional context where the reforms of 2005 and 2009 have been 
placed.  
This chapter aims to address the third research question, which is: what is the 
relationship between the central state and the regions? This relationship will be analysed 
through the case of the Regional Secretariat of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism 
(SEREMI MINVU) in its relation with the central level – that is to say, the Ministry of 
Housing and Urbanism (MINVU). All SEREMIs have more or less the same regulatory 
frame; so any one of them is a good representative of the state administrative structure. 
SEREMI MINVU was chosen, as MINVU is one of the two ministries that have 
transferred planning competences to the Regional Governments; so it is a pioneer in this 
matter. The other institution involved in the transfer of planning competences was the 
Ministry of Planning; as this Ministry no longer exists1, to analyse its former structure and 
relations in the context of the decentralisation process is not relevant.  
The chapter has been divided into two sections in which two key themes will be 
discussed: formal vs. informal channels and regional dependence vs. regional autonomy. 
The first section will explore formal and informal channels such as the legal status of 
SEREMIs and the role of individuals within the institution in order to understand how 
those elements interact to create cooperative spaces within vertical structures. The relation 
of dependence and autonomy of SEREMIs will be analysed in the second section mainly 
regarding regional capacities and inter-level coordination in order to explain that autonomy 
and dependence is not only regarding the legal status of the institutions, but also related to 
working practices and the capacities of state personnel. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In 2009 after the transfer, the Ministry of Planning became the Ministry of Social Development.  
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SHAPING MINISTERIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND THE 
REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
Decentralisation not only challenges constitutions and ideologies, but also 
institutions (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). For this reason it is fundamental to 
understand the relationship between levels within state institutions, thus their degree of 
autonomy and their stage of decentralisation can be known.  
The relationship between national and regional level within a ministry are shaped 
by both formal and informal channels, which are focused on the legal framework and the 
role of individuals respectively. The state is a reflexion of the society in which it is 
embedded (Jessop, 2007), so when formal and informal relations are analysed within state 
institutions the understanding of that society facilitates the shaping of those relations. The 
first thing to take into account is that Chilean society is highly legalist, which means that 
Chileans have an excessive adherence to law (Ominami, 2011; Mires, 2012). Secondly, 
Chilean history and culture show a strongly paternalist society in which vertical relations 
are common, as dependence relationships are still reproduced from the traditional landlord 
system of the 19th Century (Bajú, 1975; Palma, 2009; Prat I Catalá, 2009; Ominami, 2011). 
Thirdly, holdovers from the dictatorship still remain in the legal framework and 
authoritarian practices such as the binominal system and the high amount of political 
appointee positions. And finally, Moulian (1997) states that Chileans have changed from 
being citizens to be consumers as Chilean society has become more individualistic and less 
interested in its political role, which reflects the influence of neoliberalism (Moulian, 
1997)2. These characteristics – that goes both directions: from society to the state and from 
the state to society - shape the relations of Chilean society and the state as well as the 
relations and practices among and within institutions.  
Regional and sectoral laws set the legal framework of SEREMIs. The former is 
mainly the Law 19.175 of the Regional Governments and Administration while the latter - 
in the case of SEREMI MINVU - is the General Urbanism and Constructions Law 
(LGUC) and its Ordinance (OGUC3), which contain the instructions for house building, 
housing development, urban development and urban planning; also there is a huge amount 
of specific regulations that compose the legal framework of the Ministry of Housing and 
Urbanism, which are called DDU circulars4. Those circulars are specifications for every 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See chapter IV Case Study 
3 General Urbanism and Constructions Ordinance  
4 DDU circulars of DDU are produced in the Division of Urban Development, hence its name. Individual 
circulars are called DDU and followed by a number. DDUs are instructions for specific issues that clarify or 
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function that the ministry has, for instance DDU55 set the technical steps and criteria for 
the design of communal plans. A common saying among state personnel is ‘the public 
sector does only what the law says it can do, while the private sector can do everything that 
the law does not forbid’5. On the other hand, the state is a peopled organisation (Jones et 
al, 2004) so the role of individuals is essential to facilitate or hinder the success of public 
policies6. The role of key actors within the Ministry can also exacerbate or diminish the 
degree of verticality between the central and regional level defined by the law, as 
individuals can influence formal relations. Thus, cooperative social relations and practices 
can be built within a vertically structured institutionality. 
Thus, the legal framework establishes specific codes for administrative, economic 
and political relations between levels, while within informal relations, the skills of the 
technical teams, the experience of the heads of departments7 and the political expertise of 
the Head of SEREMIs are crucial for the creation of proactive spaces. These elements 
define the capacity of interpretation and adaptation8 that SEREMIs have regarding public 
policies in order to make them more suitable for regional realities; therefore, a good 
combination of skills, experience and expertise can open new spaces for proposals within 
SEREMIs towards the central level.  
Figure 7-19 summarises the above. It also shows how formal and informal channels 
built different relations; the former establishes dependents relations within a vertical 
structure, while the latter might aim at more autonomous relations and the construction of 
cooperative spaces within a ministry. Although separated in the figure, formal and 
informal relations interact as informal practices are embedded in the formal structure of the 
ministry. Formal relationships are usually referred to all procedures SEREMIs do in order 
to fulfil the law and regulation of its sector. It also includes direct conversations between 
the Head of SEREMI with the Minister or Sub-secretary, while all the official orders and 
reports between levels are made by written documentation10. Informal relationships refer 
mainly to the communication between the personnel of SEREMIs and the central level or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
expand what is said in the law – e.g. for territorial planning are DDU9 (regional), DDU26 (Intercommunal) 
and DDU55 (Communal).  
5 el sector público sólo puede hacer lo que la ley le dice que haga, mientras que el sector privado puede hacer 
todo aquello que la ley no le prohíba hacer 
6 See Chapter VI Shaping Political Decentralisation 
7 As s/he acts as bridge between technical teams and political headships – e.g. head of SEREMI 
8 See Chapter II Literature Review Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008 
9 Source: author 
10 In Chile this is called ‘via oficio’, which means that written documents back up every step that is done. 
When the relationship is more formal almost everything is made this way, but when the relationship is less 
formal the written documentation is just enough to do things properly. That is to say there are not hundreds 
of official documents with minor questions or information – those are made by email or by phone calls -, but 
just one document that summarises everything 
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other SEREMIs that are not formally documented –e.g. informal meetings, phone calls, e-
mails and so on. 
 
 
 
Administratively, ministries have a unitary character that reinforces the 
identification of public servants with their sectors rather than with their regions, as they 
can move from one region to another, while still belonging to the same institution. For 
instance, when the Ministry of Planning was transformed into the Ministry of Social 
Development, the personnel of SERPLAC11 were offered the chance to move to 
DIPLADs12 - where they could continue working on planning -; however, the feeling of 
belonging was so strong that public servants preferred to stay in their ministry and share its 
fate rather than change institution. SEREMI MINVU has even some units that respond 
directly to the central level; they only inform the Head of SEREMI in office, such as the 
case of the Urban Project Unit and of the Programme ‘I love my neighbourhood’13. 
Therefore, administratively, SEREMIs are strongly tied to the central level. Almost 
everything must go through the national bureaucracy, such as hiring regional personnel or 
making improvements of regional ministerial infrastructure. The Division of 
Administration (DIVAD) at the central level must approve the new hires in the regions, so, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 SERPLAC: Regional Secretariat of Planning and Coordination. It is the regional branch of the Ministry of 
Planning 
12 DIPLAD: Division of Planning and Development, Regional Government  
13 Programa ‘Quiero mi barrio’ 
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firstly, SEREMIs ask for permission to create a position there, and then, once a candidate 
has been chosen, s/he must be confirmed by the central level. The same happens when 
SEREMIs need to renew/repair buildings or to buy new furniture/equipment, SEREMIs 
must ask for permission and funds from DIVAD.  
Economically and politically, SEREMIs are also dependents of the central level - 
they do not have their own budget - as the investment is allocated by the Ministry – 
Division of Finance and Division of Urban Development -, which is done with a centralist 
perspective i.e. projects that have a greater impact are prioritised. Usually the criterion is 
population – the more people that are benefited the better -; therefore, public investment of 
this ministry is usually allocated to the most populated territories i.e. the central macro 
zone14. Tarapacá region has a great disadvantage in this regard, as its population is very 
small (238,950 inhabitants). An interviewee from SEREMI MINVU Tarapacá explained 
the frustration he felt, as many times initiatives that were very important for SEREMI have 
not been incorporated in the budget because Santiago does not consider them priorities for 
the country. The following quote illustrates it: 
 
‘Hay una serie de compromisos que se realizan en la región que son en 
realidad comandados por el nivel central, definidos por el nivel central. Pero que 
nosotros tenemos la libertad de… ‘libertad’ entre comillas en realidad, porque 
siempre hay marcos regulatorios que nos dicen que es lo que debemos hacer. En 
este caso, por ejemplo, respecto a inversiones nosotros tenemos estimada una 
inversión dentro de los próximos siete años en obras urbanas de $7.500 millones 
en promedio - incluyendo el Plan Integral en Alto Hospicio. Sin embargo, para 
nuestro convenio de programación nos fijaron un marco de $4.500 y sobre ese 
marco no nos podemos mover, no nos podemos pasar sobre ese marco… lo que 
nos significó… Es decir, la descentralización funciona en la medida que nos 
ajustamos a los marcos que nos rige el nivel central. ’ 
 
‘There are a range of commitments that are being implemented in the 
region that are actually commanded by the central level, defined by the central 
level. But we have the liberty for… ’liberty’ in quotation marks actually, because 
there are always regulations that tell us what we must do. In this case, for example, 
with respect to investment, we have estimated an investment of $7,500 million15 for 
the next 7 years in urban works for the region – including the ‘Plan Integral’ 
program of Alto Hospicio. However, our Programming Agreement was fixed at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 V, VI and RM Regions 
15 £1 = $760 (chilean pesos) ! $7,500 millions = £9.86 million; $4,500 millions = £5.92 million (7th Feb 
2012) 
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$4,500 and we cannot exceed it… which meant for us… that is to say, 
decentralisation works to the extent that we adjust to the limits that the central 
level defines.”  
 
(INT 39 – Political appointee, Tarapacá 2009) 
 
Thus, the ministry defines the budget of the whole country, while regions make 
their proposals and negotiate them with the central level. The interviewee added that 
within that budget the SEREMI can only implement those projects that are in the same line 
of investment defined by the Central level – e.g. the road system within urban areas is 
defined by SECTRA16. Therefore, SEREMIs have to adapt their needs not only to the 
budget that is given to them, but also to fulfil the requirements of the central level of any 
investment; therefore SEREMIs work on the central level’s terms.  
Political relations are mainly defined by the verticality of the state structure as 
political decisions are usually made at the central level (see chapter V, political 
dimension). Within the legislation there are certain issues that are decided by the SEREMI 
such as land use change in rural areas, and interpretation of IPTs17 regulations. The legal 
framework and guidelines from the central level frame those decisions; it is a delimited 
autonomy - a conditioned autonomy - in other words, an autonomy restricted to set 
margins. In the next quote a political appointee emphasised the omnipotent role of the 
central level and expressed her frustration and disappointment as being proactive and 
propositional does not guarantee the implementation of those proposals.  
 
 ‘(La relación con el ministerio) es autoritaria. El nivel central respecto a 
nosotros es autoritario. Si bien es cierto, la LGUC le da funciones específicas a la 
DDU y los DUIs en cada una de las regiones, siempre es una suerte de 
autoritarismo. La región propone ciertos proyectos al nivel central y el nivel 
central estima cual se hace y cual no. No es una decisión local. Yo puedo tener una 
determinada prioridad y el nivel central estima que esa no es la prioridad… La 
región propone y Santiago dispone (se ríe) (…) Hay algún tipo de diálogo, hay un 
nivel de acuerdos… en la medida que yo no esté afectando algún interés particular 
que tenga el nivel central.’ 
 
‘The relationship with the ministry is authoritarian. The central level is 
authoritarian with us. Although it is true that the LGUC18 gives specific functions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 SECTRA: Secretaría de Planificación de Transporte / Secretariat for Planning of Transport 
17 IPTs: Instrumentos de Planificación Territorial - Territorial Planning Instruments.  
18 Urbanism and Constructions General Law 
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to DDU19 and DUIs20 in each region, there is always a kind of authoritarianism. 
The region proposes some projects to the central level and the central level decides 
which will be implemented and which will not. It is not a local decision. I can have 
a certain priority and the central level deems that this is not the priority… the 
region proposes and Santiago disposes (she laughs)21 (…) there is a kind of 
dialogue, there is a level of agreement… as long I am not affecting any of the 
central level’s specific interests.’  
 
(INT 49 – Political appointee, Valparaíso 2009) 
 
SEREMIs’ autonomy in the decision-making process is not only limited by the 
legal framework of its sector but also by the conjuncture and priorities of the central level, 
in which SEREMIs do not participate. Thus autonomy and decision-power is exerted only 
while things are flowing through channels previously created by the central level; anything 
out of it might generate ‘noise’ and could imply the intervention of central level. Despite 
this, most respondents from SEREMIs MINVU recognised that in comparison with other 
ministries, Housing and Urbanism is not that bad. In the following quote a public servant 
complains about the scarce autonomy heads of SEREMIs have and highlighted that having 
headships afraid of losing their jobs does not help to make the right decisions for the 
regions.  
 
‘Hay esfuerzos de descentralización, pero no se aprecia completamente. 
Por ejemplo, en Obras Públicas todo lo deciden en Santiago. Tú mandas una 
consulta al MOP y tienen que mandarla a Santiago. No hay decisiones autónomas 
(…) Yo creo que debiéramos ser autónomos, porque estamos siempre con el peso 
de que ‘y si hago esto y me equivoco? Me van a echar del cargo’ Un jefe de 
servicio, por ejemplo. Y no po’. Porque si el tipo está ahí y toma una decisión, y 
está seguro de lo que está haciendo y de que es por el bien de la región… tiene que 
asumir eso, como lo hace un ministro a nivel de decisión ministerial para una cosa 
que va a ser para el país. Bueno, esa misma autonomía que tiene un ministro para 
tomar decisiones a nivel país, que la tenga un SEREMI para tomar las decisiones 
a nivel de región’ 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Division of Urban Development – central level 
20 Department of Urban Development and Infrastructure – regional level 
21 She is mocking a common saying in Chile ‘the man proposes and god disposes’ (el hombre propone y dios 
dispone) 
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‘There are efforts towards decentralisation, but you cannot fully see it. For 
example, in Public Works22 everything is decided in Santiago. You send a question 
to MOP and they have to forward it to Santiago. There are no autonomous 
decisions (…) I believe that we should be autonomous, because we are always 
worry about ‘and if I do this and I make a mistake? I’ll lose my job’ in the case of 
a Head of SEREMI for example. And [I strongly disagree with this] 23. Because if 
the guy is there and takes a decision, and he is sure of what is he doing and that it 
is for the good of the region… he has to be accountable, as a minister does at the 
ministerial level for something that is for the country. Well, the Head of the 
SEREMI should have the same autonomy when making regional decisions as a 
minister has in national decision-making.’  
 
(INT 51 – Public Servant, Valparaíso 2009) 
 
Thus political decisions are not fully autonomous at the regional level and Officials 
are too cautious when making decisions, as they are afraid of losing their jobs. The 
interviewee gave the example of MOP as one of the most centralised ministries in Chile, as 
that ministry made all decisions at the central level. Even while recognising that their 
situation is not that extreme, respondents from SEREMI MINVU complained about the 
lack of space they have for regional decision-making through formal channels. However, 
they also explained how they have developed some practices in order to influence 
decision-making process in Santiago, which will be explained further in the following 
pages. 
Informal channels depend mainly on the characteristics of the people within the 
institutions (fig 7-1). Most of the respondents from SEREMIs pointed out that the 
dynamics inside the institution might change direction when there is a change of headship 
or the arrival of new staff; team building is an ongoing task. Proactive individuals are more 
willing to develop alternative practices and to strengthen informal channels - as the law 
cannot be changed by anyone but the Congress – in order to achieve certain goals (see 
Jones et al, 2004). The streams of thoughts than influence people are also important, such 
as governance and democratic discourses, which have been gaining ground in Chile since 
the 1990s through thematic round tables and the inclusion of new actors in the decision-
making process. In the case of MINVU, the Minister Poblete, during Bachelet’s 
government, made an important step in this matter. Several respondents from SEREMI 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ministry of Public Works, also called MOP 
23 This Chilean expression used by the interviewee is a strong way to reject the idea she was explaining. It 
means a solid and outright NO 
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MINVU pointed out that the Minister advocated horizontal relations within the ministry, so 
she promoted the idea of all of them being colleagues; so there were no differences 
between regional and national personnel. Thus, the Minister was incorporating ideas of 
collaborative work between levels instead of the traditional top-down imposition of the 
Chilean structure. The interviewees from SEREMIs were pleased with this new behaviour, 
as they felt more valued and taken into consideration.  
 
‘Yo creo que el nivel central… O nuestros compañeros de Santiago, como 
nos hace llamarlos nuestra Subsecretaria – porque a ella le molesta mucho que 
hablemos del nivel central – es un ente consultivo. Ahora, ellos te dan su opinión, 
pero la responsabilidad de tomar la decisión la tienes tú (...) Por eso es que 
nuestra Ministra y nuestra Subsecretaria hablan de compañeros de trabajo en 
Santiago y no de autoridades nacionales que están por sobre las regionales. Hablo 
de mi ministerio, no puedo hablar de los otros.’ 
 
‘I believe that the central level… Or our colleagues of Santiago, as our 
Sub-secretary makes us call them – because she is very upset when we talk of the 
central level – is a consultancy entity. Now, they give you their opinion, but the 
responsibility of taking a decision is yours (…) Because of that our Minister and 
our Sub-secretary talk about colleagues in Santiago and not of national authorities 
that are above regional officials and headships. I talk of my ministry, as I cannot 
talk about the others.”  
 
(INT 40 – Political appointee, Tarapacá 2010) 
 
The minister in office was very forceful regarding this topic. However, other 
Ministers of Housing and Urbanism have not had the same perspective and have used a 
legalist approach, which is the formal structure between levels, i.e. vertical relationships. 
Thus, the minister is a key actor in the definition of the relationship between the national 
and the regional level. Despite the latter, the legal framework has to be considered when 
different practices are applied - as a minister cannot change the law by her/himself – and 
SEREMIs still need the ‘OK’ or confirmation of the central level for most of their 
decisions. However, having a minister who promotes horizontal relations means that the 
central level tends to accept SEREMIs’ proposals more easily – e.g. SEREMIs should be 
less questioned regarding technical decisions.  
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The promotion of more horizontal relationships within MINVU is a consequence of 
the decentralising practices24 that Bachelet’s government encouraged during her 
presidential period. Thus, Bachelet sought to improve regional and inter level polity25, so 
that public servants would not be trapped in hierarchical and subordinated relations 
between levels when proposing solutions or applying certain criteria instead of others 
when making decisions. This shows an attempt from the government in office to achieve a 
state in which levels are different rather than superior to another. The above stems from a 
top down perspective, that is to say, the head of the institution promotes some practices in 
order to build more cooperative and collaborative spaces instead of imposing the national 
will over the regions. The dichotomy is produced when some public servants behave in the 
opposite way, which is understandable because of the long centralist tradition of Chile, 
meaning that a change of paradigm is not instantaneous. Thus even with the top-down 
promotion of horizontal relations between levels some public servants, from both the 
central and the regional level still replicate vertical relationships. This is a consequence of 
Chilean society characteristics regarding paternalism and legalism. From the national 
perspective the issue of misgivings about regional capacities usually arises; for them is 
difficult to encourage horizontal relations when mistrusting judgement and skills of 
regional personnel. From the regional perspective it is usually related to the central level 
not knowing regional realities. The next quote illustrates the centralist perspective: 
 
‘Las SEREMIs nacieron como brazos del nivel central y se acostumbraron 
a ser el brazo del nivel central ¿me entiendes? Entonces, como que el pensamiento 
estaba acá y ellos eran los ejecutores. Entonces, les faltó capacidad para detectar 
ellos cuales son las soluciones a sus problemas. Se acostumbraron a preguntar 
siempre y a hacer lo que les estaban ordenando. Eso se da mucho, se da mucho… 
Y cuando lo quieren hacer, ¿sabes cual es el problema? (…) las regiones que son 
medias independientes no lo han hecho bien. No lo han hecho bien porque 
desconocían, por ignorancia de cómo operar. Incluso ignorancia de la 
competencia que tenían (…) normalmente es el nivel central el que da las líneas, el 
que da las políticas. Y eso es lo que hay que transmitir. Porque tu materia es 
técnica, pero tienes que acentuar pa’ donde va la micro.’ 
 
‘SEREMIs were born as branches of the central level and they were used 
to being branches of the central level, you know? So, the thinking was here while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Bardhan, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2003; Monge, 2005; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Sagall, 2008; and Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010. 
25 Burns, et al (1994) favour the strengthening of local institutions in decentralising processes and also 
encourage the inclusion of civil society. 
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they were the executers. So they lacked capacity to find solutions to their problems. 
They were used to always asking and doing what they were ordered. This happens 
a lot, a lot… And when they want to do it (find their own solutions), you know what 
the problem is? (…) The regions that are more autonomous have not done it well. 
They have not done it well because they did not know, due to ignorance of how to 
operate. Even, ignorance of the competence they had (…) usually it is the central 
level that gives the paths, that gives the policies. And that is what we have to 
communicate; because your theme is technical, but you have to emphasise towards 
what direction’  
 
(INT 57 – Public Servant, Santiago 2010) 
 
This interviewee expressed a lack of confidence in regional capacities arguing that 
SEREMIs personnel being used to receiving orders, meaning that regional public servants 
do not usually have initiative and when they have it, they make mistakes. Although she did 
not mention it, it is highly probable that she meant the problem with the IPTs that ended 
with the central level interfering in their approval (see below).  
The promotion of horizontal relations and cooperation between levels is also 
possible from bottom up. This will depend on three factors: the skills of the personnel 
(Finot, 2001b)26, the experience of the headships of departments and the expertise of the 
heads of SEREMIs (see fig 7-1). The construction of proactive spaces requires the 
combination of these factors as when united, they can empower SEREMIs and balance 
their relationship with Santiago; a power-balanced relation between levels is essential for 
decentralisation (Keating, 1998). A well-trained technical team with the right skills and 
enough experience is powerful, as they can develop good analyses and solutions for 
regional issues. Powerful regional teams also make stronger arguments when making 
technical decisions and proposing new initiatives. The next quote illustrates the experience 
of Valparaíso:  
 
 ‘Nosotros la verdad es que no pedíamos visto bueno. Nos manejábamos 
bastante autosuficientes porque consideramos que tenemos bastante conocimiento 
de los temas, por lo tanto no íbamos a escuchar ninguna opinión distinta llamando 
a Santiago. Pero últimamente hemos estado tan cuestionados que prefieres tener la 
opinión de Santiago. Y nos hemos encontrado con que las opiniones tampoco son 
tan profundas, porque como estamos con el proceso de descentralización… 
Cuando es un tema más complicado se trata de que la región lo resuelva. Cuando 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 He emphasises the need of training of personnel in order to achieve better results. 
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es un tema que no tiene mayor trascendencia lo que puedan decir, lo contestan 
directamente de allá, si uno tiene duda y lo pregunta. Pero si tú preguntas algo 
que es propio de la región, pero tienes ciertas dudas, preguntas, pides el apoyo al 
nivel central y te dicen ‘resuélvalo usted porque estamos descentralizados y este es 
un tema que tiene que resolver el nivel regional’. Entonces al final nosotros 
tampoco necesitamos tanto apoyo del nivel central (…) Siempre estamos 
supeditados a eso, a que estamos descentralizados, pero igual dependemos de un 
gobierno central: de un ministro, de un subsecretario, de un jefe de la División de 
Desarrollo Urbano, un jefe de Políticas Habitacionales… Siempre estamos 
dependiendo de las jefaturas mayores que están en Santiago.’ 
 
‘To be honest, we did not ask for any confirmation. We were quite self-
sufficient because we think we have enough knowledge of the themes; so we were 
not going to listen something different calling Santiago. However, lately we have 
been so questioned that we prefer to have Santiago’s opinion. And we have found 
that their opinions are also not that deep; as we are with the decentralising 
process… when it is a more complex issue, it is left to the region to solve it. When 
it is something about which what they say has not much transcendence, they 
answer directly, if you have any doubt and you ask. However, if you ask something 
that is specific to the region, but you have some doubts, you ask, you seek the 
support of the central level and they say ‘Solve this by yourself because we are 
decentralised and the regional level has to solve this issue’ So, at the end we do 
not need the support of Santiago (…) We are always subject to that, to be 
decentralised but we are also dependent on the central government: of a minister, 
a sub-secretariat, a Head of Division of Urban Development, a Head of Housing 
Policies… We are always depending on the headships in Santiago. ”  
 
(INT 51 – Public Servant, Valparaíso 2010) 
 
This interviewee described the technical team of Valparaíso as very reliable, whose 
expertise at that time was well known in all SEREMIs MINVU; for example, there was 
permanent communication between the Head of DUI Tarapacá and the Head of DUI 
Valparaíso, as Valparaíso’s team had more experience regarding some issues. However, 
the central level did not recognise it and sent contradictory signs to the region: on the one 
hand questioning their decisions and on the other reminding them that there were under a 
decentralising process. Therefore public servants complained of the lack of clarity 
regarding the degree of autonomy of the regions.  
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As formal channels are important within ministerial structures, it is not enough to 
have strong technical teams; the headships of departments are also important, as they are 
the ones who make bridges between the technical and the political personnel. Therefore, 
the experience of a headship is essential when convincing the Head of the SEREMI and 
Santiago about a proposal. This because a person that has been a Head of Department for 
several years has a good knowledge of sectoral and regional laws, which allows him/her to 
take advantage of all the spaces that the legal framework permit for raising his/her team’s 
proposals. Finally, the expertise of the Head of SEREMI is fundamental for the negotiation 
of those proposals in the political sphere at the central level. One interviewee (Head of 
Department)27 explained that working with Santiago is more than just following 
instructions; they can raise themes. For instance, once his team is ready with a proposal, or 
think there is a topic worthy of consideration by the national level, first of all he calls his 
colleagues in other regions and at the central level, seeking similar experiences and to find 
out whether the scenario is positive for the proposal they want to make. Secondly, he 
prepares all the arguments – both technical and political - in order to ensure the success of 
his proposal. And thirdly, he presents the proposal and the scenario to the Head of 
SEREMI who designs the strategy to present it to the central level. Thus, the interviewee 
pointed out that SEREMI MINVU Tarapacá has had several good experiences in which 
Santiago has accepted the regional proposals and it has even introduced them to the 
national programs, such as the case of the ‘participatory pavements’. Some economically 
poor and sparsely populated rural areas are not a priority for the central state. In response, 
SEREMI MINVU Tarapacá developed the idea of combining the efforts of three sources: 
the community, its municipality and SEREMI MINVU in order to pave the streets in those 
areas. Santiago not only accepted this idea as something exceptional for that particular 
region but incorporated it into a generic national program to be applied all over the 
country. Thus, in any place without paved streets, an organised community - such as 
neighbourhood committee – can present an application to pave a street. The requirements 
for SEREMI MINVU are the support of the municipality, having housing development – 
sewerage and potable water systems – and the payment of between 5% and 25% of the 
total cost of the work –. This example shows how a good combination of skills, experience 
and expertise can create new cooperative spaces within the ministry and how SEREMIs 
can be proactive and raise topics to the national level. The following quote illustrates this:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Interview 39, the interviewee had seven years experience being Head of Department at the time of the 
interview 
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‘Para mi hay proyectos en que uno espera las oportunidades. Por ejemplo, 
hoy todo el mundo está convencido de que hay que hacer un parque en el sector de 
‘Las Canteras’. Yo no estoy de acuerdo, creo que es una zona donde podríamos 
hacer un proyecto habitacional a 10 años plazo. Pero como los períodos 
presidenciales son cortos y la gente está interesada en cortar cintas, no me toman 
en cuenta. Yo espero la oportunidad. Por ejemplo cuando viene un jefe de División 
a la región, llevarlo al área y plantearle el tema (…) Mira, yo veo a veces a 
Santiago como a un enemigo. Es decir, al inicio de las negociaciones hay que 
definir siempre estrategias: es un enemigo. Sin embargo, cuando los convences de 
que nuestra propuesta es la más adecuada son unos muy buenos socios.’ 
 
‘For me there are projects that one waits for the opportunity. For example, 
nowadays everyone is convinced that we should make a park in the ‘Las Canteras’ 
area. I disagree; I think that area is better for a housing project over ten years. 
However, as presidential periods are shorter and people are interested in ribbon 
cutting, they do not take me into account. I wait for the opportunity. For example 
when a Head of Division comes to visit the region, I take him/her to the area and I 
explain to him/her the idea (…) Look, sometimes I see Santiago as an enemy. I 
mean, at the beginning of the negotiations you always have to define strategies: it 
is an enemy. However, when you convince them that your proposal is the most 
suitable, they are very good partners. ’  
 
(INT 39 – Political appointee, Tarapacá 2009) 
 
Certainly, this is a different way to approach the central level, but equally effective. 
It is difficult to sell regional ideas to the central level in Santiago when there is little 
chance that they know the area. Therefore, from the point of view of this interviewee when 
the opportunity comes one must take it. Also, the construction of arguments in order to 
convince them is very important for Tarapacá, as they do not have the population factor; 
therefore the public sector has learned to be more creative when justifying proposals. 
Relationships between levels are built in function of communication and mutual 
acquaintance, which is a second disadvantage of Tarapacá Region in comparison with 
Valparaíso Region28. As Iquique29 is 1,800 kilometres30 from Santiago, the number of 
official visits is limited in comparison to those to other regions31 so the knowledge of the 
central level about the region is also limited. For this reason, the interviewee explained that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The first disadvantage is population 
29 Capital of Tarapacá Region 
30 Duration of a trip Santiago-Iquique: 2.5 hours by plane; 22 hours by car  
31 Valparaiso city is 140 kms from Santiago 
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the key to working in the public sector is patience and tolerance to frustration, as many 
good ideas fail to materialise. On the other hand, an interviewee from Valparaíso region 
explained that although they can go easily to Santiago in order to discuss, negotiate and 
solve particular issues, they also had to endure the interference of the central level quite 
often. While Tarapacá complains of being abandoned by the central level, for Valparaíso 
being that close to Santiago is also a disadvantage because they receive more pressures. 
This is because Valparaíso Region is part of the central macro zone so that private and 
public investments are focused in that area. This means that the private sector often lobbies 
at the central level in order to get more favourable conditions for their investments – e.g. 
housing projects, hotels and so on. Also, being so near allows the ministry’s personnel to 
go quite often to the region in order to monitor SEREMI’s work. Although, peripheral 
regions enjoy more freedom in this regard, they also feel the abandonment because 
Santiago does not usually give them high consideration. 
Another issue regarding informal channels (see fig 7-1) is related to the adaptation 
and/or interpretation of national policies at the regional level. Formally, it is not possible to 
adapt or interpret the law or national policies; however, due to the diversity of Chilean 
territory, sometimes the central level overlooks certain issues in the regions. For example, 
there is a requirement in the Law (LGUC) and its Ordinance (OGUC) of a certain 
percentage of ‘green areas’ in urban spaces, which should be applied all over the country. 
However, as the northern regions are located in the Atacama Desert it is absurd to ask them 
to provide ‘green’ areas. Therefore, the requirement of public spaces is re-orientated to 
other types of open space, such as parks and recreational areas with gravel paths, stone 
benches and sunshades, instead of trees, grass and fountains. The flexibility of the central 
level regarding some issues varies according to the minister’s perspective. Thus, Minister 
Poblete was praised by the regional personnel of MINVU as she was quite flexible, 
recognising Chilean diversity and the need for regional adaptation when applying the law. 
 
‘La relación SEREMI-Ministerio depende mucho del ministro que esté. 
Por ejemplo, con la llegada de la Ministra Poblete se les dio bastante libertad a 
las regiones a objeto de que las políticas nacionales puedan ajustarse a las 
realidades regionales. Y además, ha sido muy abierta a considerar las propuestas 
de la región para la adecuación de algunas políticas nacionales. Por ejemplo, el 
subsidio habitacional era de 330 UF para todo el país pero la región hizo un 
estudio que nos dio los argumentos para pedir más, pues con esa plata en algunas 
comunas no nos alcanzaba (…) Hay circulares que te mandatan a hacer ciertas 
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cosas a nivel nacional, pero eres tú la que tiene que ajustar esa circular a tu 
realidad regional (…) son lineamiento estratégicos.’ 
 
‘The relationship between the SEREMI and the Ministry depend a lot on 
the minister in office. For example, with the arrival of Minister Poblete greater 
freedom was given to the regions in order to adjust national policies to regional 
realities. Also, she has been very open to consider regional proposals to adapt 
some national policies. For instance, the housing benefit was of 330UF32 over the 
whole country, but the region made a study that underpinned the argument to ask 
for more, because that amount was not enough in some communes (…) At a 
national level there are circulars that order you to do certain things, but you are 
who has to adapt that circular to your regional reality (…) they are strategic 
guidelines. ’  
 
(INT 40 – Political appointee, Tarapacá 2010) 
 
The interviewee highlighted that the key between national and regional relations is 
the minister, who can exacerbate or attenuate the vertical structure of ministries. In this 
case they had a minister that is willing to give more participation to regions and who 
promotes horizontal relationships; however, the next one might be the opposite. Therefore 
the characteristics of the headships seems to be more relevant than regional strengths, 
which is consistent with the culture of ‘Yes, sir’ so embedded in Chile. This attitude might 
explain in part why Chilean decentralisation is a top-down process, as the state personnel 
and people in general are used to following the guidance of a leader. Despite the positive 
sign of these attempts towards more balanced relations between levels, this is not enough. 
SEREMIs have little space to develop their own strategies, but they can adapt, interpret 
and propose issues that are not relevant to the region such as the example of the green 
areas. An example of this is what happened with Art 55º of LGUC. This is an article of 
exemption that can be used in rural areas for the subdivision of land into sections of 
5,000m2. Its uses were discretional, which means that it was the Head of the SEREMI – or 
the Head of the Urban Development’ Department - who decided when and where to apply 
it. As a consequence, some regions took advantage of this in order to develop urban areas 
outside the provision of the Territorial Planning Instruments (IPTs), while others applied 
the article in a more restrictive way. Thus SEREMIs interpreted this article differently and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 ‘The Unidad de Fomento (UF) is a Unit of account that is used in Chile. The exchange rate between the UF 
and the Chilean peso is now (today) constantly adjusted to inflation so that the value of the Unidad de 
Fomento remains constant on a daily basis during low inflation’ (Wikipedia). Usually housing transactions 
are done in UF. 330UF = 9448 pounds (25/09/13) 
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used it for territorial planning. Often the approval process for IPTs takes years, so regions 
used Art 55º while waiting for their approval in order to have a legal tool for the promotion 
or restriction of the use of certain areas. In 2003 the law was modified and the Art 55º re-
written in order to make clear when and how it can be applied as the central level 
distrusted regional judgement. This example shows that when there are some flexibilities 
within national policies, the central level seeks to unify criteria and makes more specific 
regulations; thus there is scarce room for adaptation and interpretation of the law and 
guidelines. 
Formal and informal channels shape different practices within an institution. While 
formal relations between levels are based on the legal framework, informal relations rely 
on the characteristics of individuals. The obvious outcome of this is that formal channels 
strengthen verticality while informal channels might favour more cooperative relations (fig 
7.1). In the next section the degree of autonomy of SEREMIs will be analysed.  
 
REGIONAL DEPENDENCE VS REGIONAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
 
In this section the dependency and autonomy of SEREMI MINVU will be analysed 
from different angles such as the formal status of SEREMIs, the decentralisation stage of 
the Ministry, the coordination between levels, role and capacity of ministerial personnel, 
regional vs. sectoral struggles, decision-making and informal relations within the ministry. 
Decentralisation in Chile is a process implemented mainly through legal reforms that 
define the structural framework of the state institutions at different levels. This, although a 
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step, is not enough to guarantee a real devolution of power decisions to subnational levels. 
The legal status of SEREMIs is that they are deconcentrated branches of the state but 
highly embodied in their ministries33. The law allows the delegation of some functions, 
which gives them a certain degree of autonomy. However, this autonomy is not legally 
defined. The key factors that defined the degree of autonomy of a SEREMI identified in 
this research are: regional capacities, strength of informal channels and inter level 
coordination (see fig 7-234).  
As explained above formal relations in Chilean institutions are characterised by 
highly hierarchical vertical structures, in which the national level is clearly superior over 
the regional level (see Fig 7-335). Within formal channels SEREMIs are mainly executors 
of national commands and the communication is usually one-way: top-down. Despite this, 
there is space for some flexibility and sometimes the regions are able to raise their issues 
so that MINVU incorporates them to national policies such as the case of the Participatory 
Pavement’s Program discussed.  
 
Despite its vertical structure, it is possible to recognise an early stage of 
decentralisation within MINVU, which is known as administrative decentralisation or 
deconcentration (Finot 2001a; Bardhan, 2002; Montecinos, 2005). Because other 
ministries are much more centralised, most of the respondents from MINVU described it 
as a decentralised ministry. The next quote shows the current formal relation of autonomy 
of SEREMIs with the central level.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Law 19.175 of Regional Government and Administration. Art Nº 61, 63 and 64 
34 Source: author 
35 Source: author 
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 ‘Nosotros tenemos, como SEREMI y como Director de SERVIU en lo que 
es sector Vivienda, competencias delegadas. Por lo tanto, la responsabilidad de 
las decisiones las tenemos nosotros. Pero tú ocupas a los compañeros de Santiago 
como ente consultivo a objeto de que ellos te den la opinión de lo que tú estás 
pretendiendo hacer. Y tú puedes tomarla o dejarla…. Asumiendo las 
consecuencias de que si te equivocaste es tú responsabilidad el error. Yo creo que 
cuando a ti te empiezan a traspasar competencias, la idea es que hay un período – 
al menos es lo que ocurre en el Ministerio de Vivienda – hay un período de mucha 
coordinación. Como de ajuste, como de ir viendo qué materias se pueden 
transferir. Porque qué ocurre… Y ahí hay que hacer un mea culpa a nivel de 
regiones… Es mucho más fácil siempre echarle la culpa que las cosas no resultan 
porque el nivel central no quiso que resultaran, en vez de decir que en la región no 
se hizo todo lo que había que hacer para que las cosas llegaran a buen puerto. O 
sea, hay una situación ahí…(…) En el caso nuestro, nosotros hemos tomado 
decisiones que han tenido sus costos, pero que siempre nos han apoyado 
absolutamente (…) yo creo que en el sector vivienda (la descentralización) no es 
un discurso de papel. Lo que nos han recalcado es ‘oye, nosotros estamos 
dispuestos, pero tienen que hacerse responsables’ O sea, el tema es que después 
no vengamos a llorar sobre la leche derramada ‘que no sé qué’ o ‘que no nos 
dieron las herramientas.’ 
 
‘We have some delegated competences, as Head of SEREMI and Director 
of SERVIU36 within the housing sector. Therefore, the responsibility for the 
decisions is ours. But you use the colleagues in Santiago as a consultant entity in 
order to have their opinion regarding what you are planning to do. And you can 
take or leave it… Assuming the consequences that if you made a mistake, your are 
responsible for the error. I believe that when competences start to be transferred to 
you, the idea is that there is a period – at least that is what happens in the ministry 
of Housing – there is a period of much coordination. An adjustment period for the 
evaluation of what issues can be transferred. Because, what happens… And there 
we need to recognise our fault as regions… It is always much easier when things 
go wrong to blame the central level for dragging their heels instead of saying that 
the region did not do everything it should have done in order to succeed. In other 
words, there is a situation there… (…) In our case, we have taken decisions that 
have had their costs, but they (central level) have always supported us (…) I think 
that in the housing sector (decentralisation) is not empty words. What they (central 
level) have highlighted is ‘hey, we are willing, but you have to be responsible’ In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 SERVIU: Servicio de Vivienda y Urbanismo / Service of Housing and Urbanism. 
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other words, the point is that later on we will not cry over the spilled milk, ‘that I 
don’t know’ or ‘that you did not give us the tools’  
 
(INT 40 – Political appointee, Tarapacá 2010) 
 
Being at an early stage of decentralisation the interviewee accepts the intervention 
of Santiago as part of a transitional period. The key element from her perspective is that 
regions must take responsibility for their actions and decisions; otherwise they will always 
be dependents of Santiago. Therefore, empowered and skilled headships are fundamental 
to strengthen regional capacities, meaning that regional headships with good technical 
knowledge and political expertise will develop more balanced relations with the upper 
level. Although the degree of regional autonomy is questionable, having clear guidelines 
from the central level helps to channel regional decisions; on the other hand, experienced 
officials can gain the trust of Santiago so that the autonomy of a SEREMI increases. 
However, as this is on the basis of individuals skills and expertise, every time the key 
actors change – minister, subsecrtariat, head of divisions, head of SEREMI, head of 
department and so on – it is like starting again; SEREMIs constantly have to prove 
themselves to national authorities in order to gain their trust. Therefore, continuity is very 
important. Regions with people that have worked together for several years are stronger as 
the personnel know each other and take advantage of individual skills in order to build 
solid teams. An important step regarding this matter is that since 2010 headships of 
departments – in all state institutions, regional and national – need to apply to get a three 
years position37. This gives them freedom and continuity, as they can apply again after 
three years. When the teams are too young, inexpert or with a great turnover of staff, the 
relation with Santiago tends to be closer. This is because new personnel tend to ask about 
everything – due to lack of knowledge of the practices within the institution, ignorance or 
lack of self-confidence. On the contrary, when the teams are consolidated, the contact with 
central level is usually less as people have enough experience on the ‘know-how’ of their 
service. In this regard, the regional critical mass may be also relevant as regions with more 
population have a greater number of staff than regions with less population, so the team is 
less vulnerable as it relies on more people. For instance, Tarapacá’s team had a good 
combination of experienced headships and consolidated technical teams; however, the 
departure of three professionals from one department38 in 2007 unbalanced the SEREMI. 
As the new staff were very proactive and willing to learn, the good reputation of Tarapacá 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Until 2010 it was a political appointed position. 
38 The Department of Urban Development and Infrastructure (DUI) of Tarapacá had 7 people at that moment, 
while DUI Valparaíso had 14 
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remained; however, they needed more support from the central level as the department was 
in an adjustment period. The following quote refers to the case: 
 
‘Hay un tema de capacidades, uno tiende a pensar que hay mayores 
capacidades en el nivel central. Entonces uno llama o manda un correito para 
corroborar lo que está pensando respecto a un tema… Eso te deja más tranquilo 
(…) La SEREMI de Tarapacá en los últimos años ha cambiado muchos 
funcionarios, se fueron los 3 que llevaban el peso del Departamento y ha llegado 
gente nueva. Entonces, somos profesionales jóvenes, con poca experiencia. Eso 
nos hace dirigirnos al centro más a menudo para asegurarnos de que estamos 
tomando las decisiones correctas. En ese sentido las universidades no nos 
preparan para el mundo de lo público’ 
 
‘There is an issue of capacities, one tends to think that the central level has 
greater capacities, so one calls or sends a little e-mail to corroborate what one is 
thinking about on an issue… that gives you ease (…) In the last years the SEREMI 
of Tarapacá has changed many public servants, the three who run the Department 
have gone and new people have came; thus, we are young professionals with little 
experience, which makes us address the central level more often to reassure us that 
we are making the right decisions. In that way, universities do not prepare us for 
the public system’ 
 
(INT 37 – Political appointee, Tarapacá 2009) 
 
Therefore the role of individuals and the teams of different departments define 
regional capacities. SEREMIs become stronger when having empowered headships and 
proactive teams. The abilities of the Head of SEREMI in Tarapacá – leadership, political 
management, technical skills, experience and so on - were praised by most of the 
respondents from the region (including other institutions) and from the national level of 
MINVU. Thus, SEREMI MINVU Tarapacá under her administration enjoyed a good 
degree of autonomy. 
 
The second factor favouring regional autonomy is the strengthening of informal 
channels as they can help to balance the relationship between levels. The construction of 
informal channels within MINVU can change the flux of relations between levels and 
among SEREMIs of different regions. Despite the formal channels, the key actors have 
been able to take advantage of the scarce spaces for flexibility, generating proactive and 
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collaborative practices within the ministry, thus raising regional issues and adapting 
national policies to regional realities. These new practices strengthen SEREMIs in many 
ways, for example encouraging proactive behaviour, creating collaboration inside the 
institution and with other SEREMIs of Housing and Urbanism, generating synergies, 
giving more experience to the team so it grows and it is more confident about its proposals, 
and so on. All of this allows SEREMIs to have a more balanced relationship with the 
central level, as they are well prepared to respond to regional needs within the legal frame 
of their sector. For instance, SEREMI MIVU Valparaíso had a strong team – technical and 
political – and it was respected by all SEREMIs over the country and by the central level. 
That led them to propose modifications and adaptations to national policies that even 
transcended their sector, including other SEREMIs – such as Agriculture, Environment and 
Public Works among others – in the design of more holistic IPTs. During several years the 
central level accepted and even encouraged these practices, until 2009 when the Division 
of Urban Development (DDU) cut the ground from under SEREMI’s feet. This will be 
explained below.  
 
 
 
Figure 7-439 shows the same institutions as fig 7-3 but within a different net of 
relations. Formal relationships are the same, from the ministry to its SEREMIs; however, 
their position has changed, as they are around MINVU instead of below. This shows a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Source: author 
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partnership relation, as the minister in office  (2006 - 2010) was encouraging during her 
administration. Besides, the figure shows additional two-way communications between 
regional and national level, and also, among the regions. 
Although the legal frame does not establish inter-regional relations, when those are 
produced, there are several benefits such as better coordination, collaboration and 
preparation to respond to people’s needs. Inter-regional relations strength the whole 
ministry because it can work as one body with thinking tentacles – in other words, 
SEREMIs able to have a more balanced relation with the central level are also more 
prepared to face their problems and develop solutions. Although decentralisation in Chile 
is a top-down process, deeply rooted in legal reforms, this is not enough to change the 
paradigm of a centralist state (see De Mattos, 1989). To build decentralised structures and 
practices, individuals have to take an active role in order to balance the relationship 
between levels. Therefore, the change of formal channels on their own is not enough; it has 
to be accompanied by a change in the state personnel’s culture.  
When SEREMIs share experiences they enrich their knowledge and can produce 
synergies in order to solve common issues. The ministry has encouraged inter-regional 
meetings regarding specific topics such as workshops and training courses on planning – 
e.g. incorporation of Environmental Impact Assessment into planning instruments, 
contracting a third party for specific studies etc. Besides the professional benefits of these 
meetings, another element is the friendship and collaboration between people that have 
worked in more than one region as this gives them better connections inside other regions. 
There were several respondents that have been in more than one region, which give them a 
great advantage when facing new challenges at work as that experience gives them a wider 
understanding of regional diversity and the importance of having flexible spaces in order to 
adapt national guidelines to regional realities. Hence the interchange of experience and 
collaboration with other SEREMIs gives a wider understanding of Chilean realities to the 
staff with similar experiences, knowledge that can be shared at every opportunity they 
have workshops, seminars and training courses.  
 
The third factor identified is inter-level coordination. Well-coordinated relations 
between levels are key for the success of sectoral decisions as this allows issues to be 
discussed and agreed between both levels rather than decisions simply being imposed by 
the upper level. Thus the relationship with Santiago changes from being a vertical one to a 
partnership. In the case of housing much of the tension between the central and the 
regional level is rooted in specific situations regarding the regulations and restrictions that 
certain areas have for construction. For instance, a great deal of day-to-day struggles in this 
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area is associated with the pressures that the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism is 
subjected to from economic interests. The Chilean Association for Construction40 and the 
large construction companies of the country are usually lobbying on every front possible in 
order to persuade MINVU to make regulations that promote construction rather than 
restrict it. This is more intense within the central macro zone; therefore the Valparaíso 
region faces more problems than Tarapacá regarding this issue. Having a good 
communication between regional and national level allows the ministry to respond these 
pressures consistently and co-ordinately across all its branches. 
As there are some functions that have been delegated to SEREMIs - such as change 
of land use in rural areas (Art 55º) and the interpretation of planning regulations at 
regional, intercommunal and communal scales - sometimes they face conflicts with other 
institutions – public or private – as they have the final word over land use issues in the 
region. These include, for instance, the promotion of certain activities in unsuitable areas - 
such as polluting industries near populated areas or housing projects in risky areas – or 
initiatives that do not accord with the territorial planning of the SEREMI for the region. 
When the conflict is produced between sectoral and regional interests, SEREMI’s 
personnel usually align with the ministry as their loyalties are always with their sector. 
Therefore, a constant communication between the Head of SEREMI and the Sub-secretary 
or Minister helps to avoid intra-ministerial conflicts and may assure the support from them 
in the case of disagreements between SEREMI MINVU and GORE or another public or 
private institution in the region.  
 
 
 
Regional struggles usually end at the central level, which not only interferes and 
makes the decision, but sometimes even removes a regional headship. Some respondents 
from SEREMI MINVU recounted that they had been several times in conflict with the 
Intendente in office, requiring the intervention of the central level to solve it. For this 
reason, one of the interviewees recognised that she was constantly calling the central level 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Cámara Chilena de la Construcción 
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in order to be coordinated with them. She also explained that her reasons were to raise 
awareness of regional issues and keep the central level informed of her decisions; she was 
not asking for instructions but confirming that the central level supported her decisions. 
Often, when a SEREMI has a disagreement with an Intendente regarding a project or 
specific issue, the discussion is raised to the central level because a SEREMI has a lower 
rank to an Intendente; therefore the Heads of SEREMI looks for support to his/her 
Minister, who does have the same weight within the state structure - same salary, both 
appointed by the President of the Republic, etc. In those cases the actor who usually ‘wins’ 
is the one who has a stronger political influence, although technical and political 
arguments are important too (see table 7-141). For instance, one conflict involved the 
implementation of a housing project before the SEREMI had approved the land feasibility 
for that. The Intendente in office wanted to speed things up and was ready to call a private 
company to start the project. The SEREMI strongly opposed the Intendente, as the law 
requires the SEREMI’s report and if it is favourable it is necessary to call for a public 
tender in order to choose the most suitable company. The conflict got bigger and the Head 
of SEREMI asked for the support of the Minister; in the end MINVU’s regulations 
prevailed and the Intendente was admonished. Most of the examples given have the same 
pattern: the Intendente commands something against sectoral policies, so SEREMI 
disagrees. The fact that in Tarapacá all political appointee’s personnel of SEREMI 
MINVU remained in their positions, while 5 Intendentes passed through the Regional 
Government during the period 2006 – 2010 proves how strong sectors are in comparison 
with the regional governments; so within the regions usually sectoral decisions prevailed. 
 
‘Si bien ha decidido Santiago, siempre ha estado como la opinión de la 
SEREMI versus el Intendente y ha ganado la SEREMI. Entonces, yo creo que es 
una decisión regional, porque Santiago no le ha impuesto a la SEREMI, sino que 
la ha apoyado’ 
 
‘Although Santiago has decided, it has been always the opinion of the 
SEREMI vs the Intendente and the SEREMI has won. So, I believe it is a regional 
decision because Santiago has not imposed on the SEREMI but supported it ”  
 
(INT 35 – Public servant, Tarapacá 2009) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Source: author 
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This interviewee later on contradicted herself when she pointed out that SEREMIs 
are not autonomous as if they make a decision against the will of the central level, the 
Head of the SEREMI, and many below her/him, would be removed from their positions 
instantly. ‘In my experience it is what Santiago wants that is always done, but it has not 
been bad; thank God it has been the right thing, technically speaking42’. This demonstrates 
that even among MINVU’s personnel there is no clarity about who makes decisions, as 
formal and informal channels are often used interchangeably according to the 
circumstances. However, when there is a good inter-level coordination who takes the 
decision ceases to be paramount, what matters is that the decision is taken together jointly.  
Thus, a permanent communication with the minister and sub-secretariat is 
fundamental for SEREMIs in order to be in coordination with them and to make decisions 
in line with Santiago, in other words, even having the faculty to make some decisions, 
officials prefer to raise awareness of their issues and test whether their solutions are 
according to the interests of the national level. SEREMI’s personnel pointed out that the 
reason behind this ongoing consultation with Santiago is that regional headships are 
appointed, so they are afraid of removal if they do something against the minister’s 
guidelines. The next quote clearly explains it: 
 
‘Mira en el cargo que yo estoy una de las cosas que prima es la confianza, 
yo estoy en un cargo de confianza política. Si yo el día de mañana no tengo la 
confianza de mi jefe, me sacan del cargo y ponen a otra persona’ 
 
‘Look, in my position one of the most important things is trust, I am in a 
political appointee position; if one day I do not have the trust of my boss I will be 
removed and he/she will put someone else’  
 
(INT 39 – Political appointee, Tarapacá 2009) 
 
While the regional headships continue being appointees there will be no real 
autonomy for them. For instance, in Tarapacá during the Bachelet government there were 5 
Intendentes and 4 Directors of SERVIU. Interviewees pointed out that all of them had the 
trust of the central level (President or Minister) when they were appointed, some of them 
even being from the same political party as the minister in office, which shows the 
vulnerability of the position. Regarding that, public servants enjoy more freedom to do 
what they think is appropriate or to express their mind, as they cannot be removed so easily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 ‘En mi experiencia, siempre se hace lo que Santiago quiere, pero no ha sido malo, ha sido lo correcto 
técnicamente, gracias a Dios’ (INT 35 - Public servant, Tarapacá 2009). 
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- it is necessary to prove that there was a breach of contract. Thus, formal relations within a 
ministry shape the behaviour and work practices of its personnel, which many times hinder 
the process of decentralisation, especially, when regional headships are so vulnerable. 
However, as it was shown in the first section of this chapter, proactive individuals can 
develop informal channels in order to reach some goals. However, total autonomy is not 
recommendable, as there have to be strategic guidelines from the national level in order to 
move forward in the same direction. 
The three factors analysed – regional capacities, informal channels and inter-level 
coordination – strengthen sectoral institutions. However, although this sounds good on 
paper, reality is different. The minister in office during the period of 2006-2010 promoted 
more horizontal relations and strengthened informal channels in order to get greater 
coordination between levels and to gives more autonomy to the regions. At the same time 
SUBDERE was negotiating the transference of regional and intercommunal instruments of 
territorial planning (IPTs) – Regional Plan for Urban Development (PRDU) and 
Intercommunal Regulator Plan (PRI) respectively - from SEREMIs MINVU to GOREs, to 
which DDU was strongly opposing; so negotiations were very hard43. And in third place, 
the program for updating IPTs that MINVU had implemented since 2002 all over the 
country was not giving the results they wanted. After 4 years and an investment of U$20 
millions, less than 10% of the IPTs finished have been approved. The combination of these 
three elements made DDU seek the re-centralisation of the IPTs. On the one hand, the 
Head of DDU in office opposed the idea of decentralisation and the transference of 
competence to the regional governments; he supported the idea of a strong and vertical 
relation with the regions. And, on the other hand, DDU blamed the incapacity of SEREMIs 
for the scarce results they have had updating IPTs.  
Until the 1980s the IPTs were all dependent on the central level. In the 1990s that 
was modified so that regional and intercommunal IPTs were designed and approved within 
the region with no intervention from central level, and communal IPTs were designed by 
the municipality and approved by the SEREMI MINVU and GORE. However, in 2009 the 
DDU sent a new directive to SEREMIs where it was settled that before they could approve 
an intercommunal IPT44 they had to send it to the DDU for revision. Once the Plan had the 
‘OK’ from DDU it could continue with the normal procedure of approval. The next quotes 
show the reaction of SEREMIs regarding this issue:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Respondents from SUBDERE willingly gave details of the negotiations, however when interviewing 
people from DDU they avoided the topic or took a stance of indifference. 
44 Regional planning had passed to GOREs and Communal planning remained at the local level 
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‘Hace unos meses atrás estamos volviendo a los años 80, porque nos ha 
llegado un instructivo de que los estudios que se hagan, por los menos los planes 
intercomunales, tienen que pasar por Santiago para tener visto bueno de la DDU 
antes de entrar al proceso de aprobación (…) Esto es por todo lo que se demoran 
en aprobarse… Por lo que Santiago asume que cometemos muchos errores, 
muchas faltas. Por desconocimiento, a lo mejor de la normativa, de la legislación, 
de los procedimientos…’ 
 
‘Since a few months ago we are going back to the 80s, because a directive 
has arrived that says studies, at least intercommunals, have to go to Santiago for 
the ‘OK’ of DDU before going into the approval process (…) This is because of the 
lengthy delays in approval… so, Santiago assumes we make too many mistakes, too 
many faults; for lack of knowledge, maybe of the norms, of legislation, of 
procedures… ‘  
 
(INT 51 – Public Servant, Valparaíso 2009) 
 
Respondents from Valparaíso saw this as a signal of distrust of regional capacities. 
Furthemore, a political appointee from that region complained that Santiago does not want 
to let go of regions, that the autonomy given is always limited because the state does not 
want to ‘release the reins’ and keep the decision-making on what, how and where to spend 
resources45.  
The reactions in Tarapacá were different as the team had been recently renewed the 
change was seen as a normal response of the ministry regarding mistakes committed 
designing IPTs; therefore they could not be approved. A respondent from DUI explained 
that the change was produced because there were too many problems with Contraloría46 
because some IPTs regulated things exceeding their powers; and he added that the answer 
should be more training instead of control “the Division of Urban Development already 
has a huge numer of issues to solve, to receiving additional revisions of territorial plans; 
so I think it is a measure that comes from the urgency but in time (…) what is important is 
to generate the competences47”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 ‘El Estado nunca ha querido soltar las riendas. Santiago sigue llevando la toma de decisiones en el qué, el 
cómo y el dónde se gastan los recursos’ (INT 49 - Political Apointee, Valparaiso 2009) 
46 It is the institution that checks things are according to the law. I don’t know how to translate this to UK 
system 
47 ‘la División de Desarrollo Urbano ya tiene una cantidad enprme de cuestiones por resolver para que 
además durante el año lleguen revisiones de planes reguladores. Entonces yo creo que es una medida que 
surge de la urgencia pero yo creo que en el tiempo (…) lo importante es generar las competencias’ (INT 37 – 
Political Apointee, Tarapacá 2009)	  
	   203	  
This example raises the issue that an attribution that was absolutely regional has 
been centralised again; therefore the relationship of dependency increased as well the 
tension between levels. Does this mean a return to the core? Although the Bachelet 
Government innovated in issues such as increasing governance, thematic round tables and 
gender inclusion, at the same time there was a re-centralisation of some decisions – IPTs 
approval is just one example - during her government.  
 
The strengthening of sectoral institutions is very important in order to have more 
coordinated response to citizenry at every level; however, it is important to keep in mind 
that within the Chilean state, sectoral still means central. Therefore, the strengthening of 
SEREMIs deconcentrates the central state but it does not truly decentralise it. For instance, 
power struggles between regional and sectoral interests are resolved at the central level, 
when decentralisation should promote channels for integrated and holistic solutions within 
the region rather than sectoral at the central level. Despite of all different points of view 
regarding decentralisation, a genuine desire for greater autonomy is expressed by most of 
interviewees from SEREMIs, which is mainly related to the interest of providing a better 
response to regional needs. 
Finally, the relation of dependency or autonomy is of SEREMIs from the central 
level is quite unstable, as it is vulnerable and changeable depending on factors such as 
regional capacities, actors involved, conjuncture and interlevel coordination.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Formal and informal relations shape working practices within institutions, which 
will be more cooperative and proactive if the actors involved are willing to take advantage 
of them. Relationships within the ministry are vertical and hierarchical, but state personnel 
seem to be more comfortable with informal relations by email or phone, where they can 
clear up minor matters or make alliances in order to develop an idea or raise an issue to the 
headships. Coordination inside the institution and with the upper level is fundamental to 
achieve the agenda of the ministry, so the personnel privilege the good relations with 
colleagues and collective work. 
The relationship of dependency with the central level is also exacerbated by sectors 
when they have power clashes (disputes) with other public services or regional 
government. In those cases, sectors see the central level as a solution, an ally (or 
champion) who can fight their fights. So, when a disagreement occurs within the region, 
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each sector goes to their own ministry asking for support, the conflict is solved at 
ministerial level and sectors do in the end what they are told to do. 
SEREMIs are highly sectoral, which means they have a slanted point of view; 
when the Regional Government proposes ideas, projects or strategies that can be very good 
from a regional perspective, but that affects them from a sectoral point of view, the first 
reaction is to call for support the ministry and look there. Therefore, their desire for greater 
autonomy is regarding specific issues within the ministry, such as greater participation in 
the programming budget. Regional personnel have a desire for greater autonomy but they 
do not want to be totally decentralised because they understand that strategic guidelines 
from the central level are essential for harmonious development of the country.  
Regional capacities – empowered headships and proactive, knowledgeable and 
skilled team work – are essential to position SEREMIs within the central level in a more 
balanced relationship. The strengthening of informal relations among SEREMIs from 
different regions also give them a wider understanding of the Chilean territory and its 
needs and helps them to develop better and more suitable solutions for their own issues. 
Finally, coordination between levels is fundamental to have a good articulated 
institution in which the central level gives the strategic guidelines and SEREMIs adapt and 
implement them according to their realities. 
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This last chapter deals with the conclusions of the thesis, aiming to tie up the critical 
thoughts, contributions, findings and further implications of this research. Thus, the first 
section is about the methodology chosen and the answers to the research questions, the 
second deals with broader reflections from the study, the third section addresses the overall 
conclusions, and the fourth considerers further steps from this research. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL THOUGHTS AND RESERCH QUESTIONS 
 
This research set out to examine the process of decentralisation in Chile; it focused 
on its administrative and political aspects within the state structure at the national and the 
regional level. The research questions were rooted in three main concepts: decentralisation, 
power and the state. Although all these concepts were addressed in the three research 
questions, each one emphasised one of them. Thus, the first research question was about 
how decentralisation is understood and applied in Chile, linking it with the discourses 
defined by Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall (2008); the second one analysed to what extent the 
reforms of 2005 and 2009 empower the regional governments, emphasising the perspective 
and agency of the relevant actors involved in the process (Jones, et al 2004; Theodore and 
Peck, 2010); and the third one studied the relationship between the national and regional 
level within the state structures, which establishes the stage of decentralisation in Chile 
based on Keating (1998). The research was mainly based on semi-structured interviews 
and in-depth conversations in order to characterise the process from the individuals’ 
perspectives. In other words, the research was a bottom-up construction of a top-down 
process. Chapters V, VI and VII deal with the findings regarding these questions. 
Every research is a quest, in which the only certainty is the starting point, as even 
having a plan one can never be sure where it will end; unpredictable events can affect it or 
something can go wrong, but never mind, as long as the desire to learn remains. The 
researcher requires an adventurous spirit for this journey, to be as much prepared as 
possible for eventualities or unexpected developments, and to have an open mind about the 
outcomes that can emerge. Thus the first reflections of these conclusions are related to the 
methodology chosen. 
Qualitative research (Marsh and Stoker, 2002; Bryman, 2004) was chosen in order to 
answer the research questions from a constructivist perspective, as the state was 
understood as a social relation (Jessop, 1997); therefore the actors involved are influenced 
by the society in which they are embedded. Driven by the desire to shape decentralisation 
from different points of view, the research was designed to include as many actors as 
possible. However, more is not always the better and the number of respondents per 
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institution could have been less – as two or three per institution would have been enough to 
reveal a certain point of view. Nevertheless, the way that participants were approached and 
data collected seemed to be appropriate as semi-structured interviews and in-depth 
conversations allowed the free construction of ideas and interpretations. Furthermore, the 
instrumental case study adopted was suitable for this research, as it enabled the study to 
relate the process of decentralisation in Chile to broader research questions and debates. 
Finally, as in any quest, this research was a learning process in which the experience 
gained was valuable.  
 
Decentralisation is shaped by three different dimensions or spheres: philosophical, 
political and technical. First, the philosophical dimension, in which broader ideas and 
streams of thought frame the understanding of decentralisation of the key actors e.g. the 
political, economic and cultural discourses defined by Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall (2008). 
The discourses identified in the Chilean case were four: regional autonomy, democracy, 
regional development and state response. Although those four discourses are currently 
entangled and lead the arguments towards decentralisation, a shift from the political 
discourse in the 1990s to a combination with the economic discourse during the 2000s was 
observed. Regionalism (Keating, 1998; Cuesta, 2006) has been gaining strength and 
becoming more important at both the national and the regional level, while the cultural 
discourse is used, although infrequently, only by respondents from the regional level. 
The interpretation of the discourses shapes the political dimension, which is about 
decisions. Political decisions - such as whether to take or not action towards 
decentralisation, the design of strategies and specific policies, and the way those will be 
implemented – are taken at the central level in which SUBDERE acts as the driving agent 
of the process. Other key actors within this dimension are also based at the national level: 
the government in office and the Congress. This research has analysed two specific 
decisions that have been made, shaped and implemented in a top-down fashion: the direct 
election of regional councillors and the creation of DIPLAD. These two reforms 
(decisions) are framed in the discourses identified above; thus the direct election of 
regional councillors is rooted in regional autonomy and democracy discourses, while the 
creation of DIPLAD is rooted in regional development and the state response. 
The interpretation of decisions by relevant actors shapes the technical dimension, 
which is focused on concrete actions in order to implement the decisions that have been 
made. SUBDERE remains as the driving agent to coordinate the implementation of the 
reforms, which is positive as it can ensure consistency between political decisions and 
technical actions; but it also gives hints over the tendency of Chilean institutions to keep 
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control over the issues they consider their own, revealing their scarce capacity for 
delegation. Other actors involved within the technical dimension are regional governments 
and the ministries, including both political and technical staff at national and regional 
level. 
The two reforms analysed in this research aim to increase the autonomy of the 
Regional Council from the Intendente and to change the balance of forces within the 
regions i.e. shift their gravitational centre. The first election of regional councillors took 
place in November 2013, the elected candidates will take up their positions in March 2014, 
therefore little can be said about its impact so far. The fact that the Intendente will not be 
the Head of the Regional Council is undoubtedly a good first step furthering its 
independence; however, elected regional councillors are not enough to change the 
practices and status of regional councils, as they are still part-time positions and have 
limited influence over public decision-making. On the other hand, given that the first 
election has just taken place and that Chilean decentralisation is an ongoing (though slow 
and contradictory) process, the influence and status of regional councils may increase over 
time. 
Implementing and positioning DIPLAD within the regional government and the 
regional arena have been the main tasks of the new Divisions since their creation in 2007. 
The main difficulties are related to the tension between the centre and the regions, and the 
origins of state personnel. The centre usually imposed decisions over the regions while the 
regions mistrusted policies generated and designed at the central level. SUBDERE has 
implemented decentralisation with centralist logic, by imposing the reforms on the regions 
without including regional actors in the decision-making process. In addition, the regions 
do not welcome personnel from other parts of the country; they are seen as intruders and 
not committed enough to the fate of the region. Both of these were felt more in Tarapacá 
than in Valparaíso. The core-periphery tension is also expressed in the tension between 
SEREMIs and GORE, in which SEREMIs personnel were not happy with the transfer of 
regional planning policies to the regional governments.  
 
Redistribution of power is essential in political decentralisation (Boisier, 2003; 
Montecinos, 2005); however, so far GOREs have been strengthened but they have not been 
empowered by these reforms. That is to say, although regional governments have more 
functions and a more prominent position on the regional chessboard, their relationship with 
the central level remains unbalanced. The analysis of this fact depends upon the 
perspective or discourse that one holds; decentralising measures do not always lead to real 
empowerment, which in the views of Montecinos (2005) is not truly decentralisation. 
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Assuming his definition of decentralisation (see chapter II) GOREs are not becoming 
decentralised institutions through these reforms, as there is no real transfer of power – 
neither over economic resources nor over political decisions - from the national to the 
regional level; SUBDERE still has control over all decisions that GOREs make and further 
steps should follow what has been achieved so far in order to have truly autonomous 
regional governments. Taking into account Keating’s classification (1998) of 
decentralisation’s stages these reforms lead towards the third stage, which is Regional 
Administration. Therefore, although so far Chile has not achieved the stage of political 
decentralisation (devolution)1 - but only a certain degree of administrative decentralisation 
(deconcentration)2 - the strengthening of GOREs may be considered as a step towards 
decentralisation3. The path of deconcentration and devolution do not always go hand in 
hand, however, and the tension between them becomes crucial to understand the Chilean 
case. This will be discussed further in the section ‘Administrative Decentralisation v/s 
Political Decentralisation’.  
 
The relationship between the central and the regional level was also analysed from 
the perspective of one institution: the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU). The 
relation of the SEREMIs4 with the centre is defined not only by the legal frame of regional 
and sectoral laws, but also by the informal relationships built by the state personnel at both 
the national and the regional level. The verticality or horizontally of those relations usually 
depends on the national and regional headships5, who promote certain practices that could 
end in more or less autonomy of SEREMIs. However, there is no certainty that those 
practices will continue, as any change of personnel in key positions might alter the 
informal channels and relationship between levels.  
Throughout all the process the role of individuals is fundamental to the success of 
new practices and policies within the state (Jones et al, 2004), as they act according to their 
interpretations of the conjuncture. A good combination of technical and political skills, 
experience and expertise of headships and state personnel at both levels allows the 
construction of proactive spaces. Thus, although SEREMIs are deconcentrated institutions 
within vertical structures, lately MINVU has been promoting the generation of cooperative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The empowerment of subnational governments 
2 Decentralisation of the physical administration of the central government 
3 Authors such as Burns et al (1994), Keating (1998), Bardhan (2003), Boisier (2003) Rodríguez-Pose and 
Bwire (2003), Eaton (2004), Montecinos (2005) among others, have defined different stages to explain the 
whole process of decentralisation, arguing that political decentralisation is the stage in which power is 
devolved to the subnational levels (see Chapter II) 
4 Regional institutions that are also part of one ministry, e.g. the SEREMI MINVU of each region belongs to 
the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism. 
5 Minister, subsecretary, heads of Divisions, head of SEREMIs and head of Departments. 
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and collaborative practices within the ministry. The combination of regional capacities, the 
strength of informal channels and inter level coordination, has as a consequence 
strengthened sectoral institutions. In the Chilean case administrative and political 
decentralisation are opposing forces, as there is still scope for conflicts between strong 
regional governments and strong SEREMIs, which have regional and sectoral perspectives 
respectively. 
 
The lone star shines in the Chilean sky and keeps vigil over the population as the 
father does over his children. The unitary state is rooted in power relations constructed 
along its history since the very beginning of the Republic; historical sedimentation 
(Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2010) is one of the most important elements to explain why the 
Chilean state cannot easily release the reins of regional autonomy, even if part of it wants 
it, as the centralist structure is so embedded in public traditions and practices. As Jessop 
(1997) posses, the state is a social relation; it cannot be apart from the culture and 
traditions of the society in which it is embedded, as society cannot be alienated from the 
state influence. Thus, the main challenge that Chilean decentralisation has faced so far is 
gradualism, which is rooted in its centralist tradition, the state of engagement and regional 
realities. Therefore, decentralisation as long as it is not in opposition towards the idea of 
the unitary state, as long as the lone star remains shining in the sky.  
 
BROADER REFLECTIONS ON CHILEAN DECENTRALISATION 
 
Decentralisation as a process or a sequence of isolated events 
 
Chilean decentralisation can be understood either as an ongoing process, in which 
each step leads to the next, or as a sequence of isolated events, in which the steps are - or 
seem to be – unconnected. This is because it is a discontinuous process: SUBDERE 
visualises a route, so it has a list of several steps to follow: however, although these steps 
are connected, their implementation is so slow and difficult to assess so that it gives the 
impression of disconnection. Only actors from SUBDERE see a clear route to follow; for 
the others, it seems an unconnected set of events. The process can be compared to that of 
an amateur driver, who is able to move the car, but stalls it at every set of lights; 
advancement is not smooth. So, Chilean decentralisation is a discontinuous process, in 
which the hollowing-out of the central state (Jessop, 2007) and the filling-in (Shaw and 
Mackinnon, 2011) of the regions have not been properly incorporated into the machinery 
of the state reforms driven by SUBDERE. The de-nationalisation (Jessop, 1997) of the 
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Chilean state, in which some functions are transferred from the national to the regional 
level6, can be seen as the transfer from the national body (ministries) to the deconcentrated 
branches of the state (SEREMIs) or to the regional governments. In both cases, the 
hollowing out of the central state has been only partial, as national institutions still have 
power over regional institutions. The process of hollowing-out is followed by a period of 
adaptation to the filling-in of regional structures. This pattern explains the extreme caution, 
gradualism and slow progress of Chilean decentralisation, because when a function is 
transferred (hollowing-out) from the national to the regional level, the state apparatus is 
shaken. Then, after the impact of the change, the state has to find a new status quo, in 
which the subnational levels should be more empowered (filling-in). However, that process 
of adaptation has not always resulted in the generation of new work cultures, or the 
strengthening of subnational institutions (Shaw and Mackinnon, 2011), as centralism is so 
strong in Chilean culture (strategic-relational approach, Jessop, 1997; historical 
sedimentation of power relations, Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2010). There are two reasons 
behind this: regionalism is being promoted by a national institution (SUBDERE), 
reflecting the centralist working environment of the Chilean state. Secondly, there is no 
clarity about the goal of decentralisation; there are no official written documents that 
describe what Chile wants and therefore, the steps to achieve that goal.  
There is no consensus as to the extent decentralisation is desired; the answers vary 
from just administrative decentralisation to federalism. There is a general agreement 
around administrative decentralisation; however, going further reveals apprehensions, as it 
might increase uneven development between regions (Finot 2001a; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra, 2010) and as too much autonomy might end in uncoordinated efforts between the 
national and the regional level. Those in themselves are not strong enough reasons, as 
compensatory mechanisms can be developed and strategic national guidelines should be 
coordinated with regional actions. Despite these apprehensions, there is agreement that 
keeping the current centralised state is not an option, not only because there is permanent 
tension between the centre and the regions, but also because the central level has proved to 
be unable to address regional needs to their satisfaction. 
The desire for decentralisation is a consequence of both the extension and the 
internal diversity of Chile. Difficulties in the administration of the territory led the central 
state to develop the current process of decentralisation, which started in 1974 and it is still 
ongoing. On the other hand, the diversity of geographical characteristics of the country 
means that regional needs are very different from the north to the south. Policies from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 de-nationalisation can go to both, supranational and subnational levels (see Chapter II) 
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central level are generic for the whole national territory, without taking into account 
geographical diversity, which limits their scope; therefore regions want the capacity to deal 
with their own problems and make their own priorities in order to tailor the strategy to 
solve them. 
 
Contradictory aspects and the actors involved 
 
Chile’s implementation of political decentralisation has special characteristics. On 
the one hand, it is an entirely top-down process, in which there are not many organised 
movements demanding decentralisation from subnational levels. The rare demonstrations 
in its support are used by SUBDERE as arguments to validate its work. On the other hand, 
the implementation of decentralisation exhibits deep conservatism, being rooted in its 
centralist culture and expressed in resistance to changes, even by beneficiaries.  
Chile’s decentralisation process is an amalgam of contradictions, which has led to its 
slow implementation over the past 20 years with limited success; so gradual a pace gives 
the impression that actually there is no will for it. The Chilean state seeks decentralisation 
in order to respond to the demands of development, democracy, greater autonomy and a 
more efficient state response; however, the same vertical power habits and practices are 
still being reproduced within the state structure.  
Firstly, decentralisation is a top-down process initiated and led by SUBDERE - 
Ministry of Domestic Affairs -; however, there seems to be little will for decentralisation 
within the central level. Having real regional governments elected and empowered could 
end in open struggles between the regions and Santiago, as the latter fears losing control 
over regional territories. Secondly, the Congress asserts its support for greater 
decentralisation because regional authorities would be more representative of regional 
aspirations and, therefore, they could improve the state’s response to regional issues. 
However, at the same time, parliamentarians feel threatened by elected regional 
authorities, so they oppose the measures that would enable them. 
Thirdly, regional councillors claim to support decentralisation, mainly related to their 
greater autonomy in decision-making. However, they do not promote the direct election of 
their positions – as regional councillors – with much enthusiasm because at present they 
are elected within a system of political quotas and cronyism. There is no certainty of them 
keeping their positions in direct elections. Fourthly, public servants and political 
appointees also support decentralisation, but those from the central level are apprehensive 
about regional capacities while those from regions are suspicious of standard policies 
designed at the centre for the whole country.  
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Lastly, SUBDERE is the greatest promoter of decentralisation and regional 
autonomy. However, whenever a function is transferred to the regional government, 
SUBDERE retains control over it. In other words, the regional governments are 
subordinated to its guidelines, which means that regional issues are just being re-
concentrated in the Ministry of Domestic Affairs instead of being based in sectoral 
ministries.  
The agency of the actors promoting and involved in decentralisation is key to the 
process (Jones et al, 2004; Peck and Theodore, 2010); decentralisation is implemented 
through their understanding and the agenda of the groups they represent. As they come 
from different institutions and levels, they reflect particular discourses, which define the 
way they implement or interpret decentralising policies. As consequence, the means 
towards decentralisation are sometimes contradictory, such as efforts by SUBDERE in 
order to empower regions while the same Ministry (Domestic Affairs) sends a presidential 
delegate to them whenever it deems fit. Also, agents operate at different speeds; while 
some are pressuring to accelerate the process, others are more cautious in order to avoid 
further conflicts.  
These paradoxes are rooted in the lack of a national decentralisation policy, which 
explains why its implementation is so slow; the forces acting there are contradictory and 
often without clear objectives, as different interpretations of decentralisation lead to 
contradictive actions and uncertain outcomes. Chile is following no specific model in its 
path towards decentralisation; furthermore, it is not clear what extent of decentralisation is 
desired. This also renders the assessment of the progress to date difficult because there is 
no identifiable goal. Despite this, SUBDERE does not improvise; it has a general strategy 
that it adapts according to the vision of the government in office and the political 
conjuncture.  
Because of the above, many actors question how real is Chile’s decentralising 
process. There is a spectrum of opinions regarding the true intention of the central level 
towards decentralisation, from those who believe in the seriousness of the efforts made by 
the governments in office and politicians in Congress promoting greater decentralisation, 
to those who assert that there is no real intention and they are just empty words said in 
order to get more votes in election periods. Although it is possible to be sceptical regarding 
decentralising efforts and their outcomes so far, the positive side is that decentralisation is 
recognised as a national issue. It has been incorporated into the political agenda; it is in the 
official discourse of the governments in office and in the electoral speeches of politicians.  
Academics have a broad knowledge of decentralisation and focus on theory and the 
practicalities of decentralisation in Chile. Their analysis goes along three lines: 
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conceptualisation of the meanings of deconcentration and devolution; the practicalities of 
decentralisation increasing the power, democracy and autonomy of subnational levels; and 
questioning the role of the nation-state and wondering if it is still needed. They analyse the 
situation from different perspectives: institutional, economic, geographical and political.  
SUBDERE and Ministries at the national level share a centralist point of view. 
Respondents from ministries highlight an administrative perspective, emphasising that 
decentralisation must be implemented with caution and under the guardianship of the 
central state, keeping the regions under its umbrella. On the other hand, interviewees from 
SUBDERE engage with a more integral perspective, in which they frame decentralisation 
as the transfer of administrative, political and economic functions from the central level 
towards subnational governments, emphasising the territorial dimension of 
decentralisation. 
Also, from a national point of view, parliamentarians are an interesting group as they 
are elected by regions, whose desires they should represent. However, as they are mostly 
from and based in Santiago, their perspective is more centralist than regionalist; this raises 
the question of regional identities/representativeness versus political parties’ 
identities/representativeness. For instance, when a proposal is discussed and voted within 
the Congress, politicians usually act as blocks of political coalitions, rather than regions 
against Santiago. This group is also very concerned about power and concentrates its 
efforts in administrative decentralisation more than its political dimension. 
From a regional perspective, regional councillors – politicians indirectly elected - are 
mainly focused on power issues; for them the empowerment of regions should be the final 
goal of decentralisation. Meanwhile, interviewees from DIPLAD are also concerned about 
power, autonomy and democracy. In general, this group has a broad and greater 
understanding of decentralisation within the regions, probably because they have been 
trained in those topics by SUBDERE, so they share a similar perspective. Finally, 
SEREMIs’ staff have a mixed point of view; as they work within a centralist and vertical 
structure, they seek more autonomy within their sector, but oppose the transfer of their 
faculties towards the regional governments.  
Public servants and political authorities tend to see decentralisation as a series of 
reforms towards regional autonomy; the focus is on the transfer of functions and resources 
from the central state to the regional governments. Therefore, decentralisation is mostly 
seen as an administrative process within the institutionality of the state. Interviewees 
emphasise the idea of regions thinking for themselves, defining their own goals, able to 
make their own decisions and administrate their territory autonomously. 
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DIPLAD also sees regional decentralisation mainly from an administrative point of 
view. Decentralisation has to be done because it is a necessity for the country, the central 
level needs to focus its energies and efforts on other things, so regions have to be more 
autonomous; hence decentralisation is a top-down initiative. In this regard there is a 
difference between Valparaíso and Tarapacá, while Valparaiso argues that decentralisation 
is a regional desire, Tarapacá notes that regions resist it in practice. This is also a 
contradiction as the desire of autonomy is greater in Tarapacá, where the idea of federalism 
comes up often. This might be because they see the current decentralising process as an 
imposition from the centre; they want decentralisation but on their own terms. 
 
Administrative decentralisation vs. political decentralisation 
 
Montecinos’ (2005) definition of decentralisation has been used as the pivotal 
starting point of this research. In his definition he explains that decentralisation can be 
understood as the transfer of power from the national to the subnational level. As it was 
discussed in Chapter II, the subnational level of the government may or may not be 
autonomous, which can make the difference in the final outcomes of the decentralisation 
process. 
Two axes towards decentralisation have been identified in Chile: from the ministries 
to their SEREMIs and from the national level to GOREs. The first axis is also historical, as 
the regionalisation process started in 1974, and developed a legal frame for subnational 
levels and gave each region the same administrative institutional structure, which was 
composed of the regional branches of the ministries (SEREMIs). Because administrative 
decentralisation was implemented at the time of the dictatorship, as much control as 
possible was kept at the central level; it was implemented with military criteria. 
Furthermore, regionalisation was used as a means of control over the territory (Garretón, 
1992; Palma, 2009). These in the context of the historical culture of a vertical, hierarchical 
and concentrated Chilean state, were the forces that confined administrative 
decentralisation to its minimal expression. Therefore, it did not lead towards regional 
autonomy or empowerment but helped to enhance the control and power relations of the 
central state over the regions. The central state used deconcentration as a way to extend its 
tentacles over the whole territory; in other words, Chile adapted administrative 
decentralisation to a more natural position according with its institutionality, culture, 
history and political context.  
The second axis is what has been worked by SUBDERE since the return to 
democracy, which is the empowerment of subnational levels. This has had two main 
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stages, first administrative and the second political: the creation of GORE - an 
administrative regional institution – and the political autonomy of that structure. Currently, 
SUBDERE works on the strengthening of GOREs in order to transform them from 
administrative to truly government institutions, which sectors or ministries oppose. 
However, the question of SUBDERE being able to step aside when the regions are no 
longer tied to other institutions of the central level, still remains. Nowadays, the tension 
between regions and central state is still delimited by the dichotomy of relations between 
deconcentrated public services (SEREMIs) and GORE, and between SEREMIs and the 
ministry they belong to. The central state has been always centralised7, so from that 
perspective, any transfer of decision-making is seen as a loss of power. Thus, historical 
sedimentation (Cumbers and Mackinnon, 2010) plays an important role in Chilean process 
towards decentralisation, as it still defined power relations within the state structures. 
According to Keating’s classification (1998), Chile is currently in the third degree of 
decentralisation: regional administration, which is a deconcentrated subnational body of 
the central government. The next step should be to have an autonomous regional 
government, which has been the endeavour of SUBDERE.  
Sectoral deconcentration is precarious as the central level of ministries can transfer 
or take back functions at will from regional authorities; no law stipulates which functions 
are to be transferred to the regional level. So, ministries with headships that are more 
inclined to horizontal/balanced relations between levels tend to transfer decision-making 
process to regions, while headships with a more authoritarian vision tend to promote the 
re-centralisation of functions. Therefore, the scope of sectoral deconcentration is limited 
and arbitrary, as it is conditioned by the will of the authorities in office. A second limiting 
factor of this kind of decentralisation is that, even if SEREMIs are strengthened, this is not 
enough for the regions; SEREMIs are biased by their sectoral perspective and find it 
difficult to work co-ordinately with other regional institutions. Therefore, sectorial 
deconcentration can lead to power struggles among regional institutions, exacerbating the 
difficulties of decision-making within the regions.  
Deconcentration seems beneficial for the regions as the state penetrates the regional 
level, which allows it to gather more information in order to develop a better response, and 
therefore to administer the regions better. Obviously, if the choice is between a highly 
centralised unitary state without much regional presence, with a highly centralised one 
with a strong presence in the regions, the latter is preferable. The point is that the central 
state under the dictatorship created deconcentrated institutions to ensure its control over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Except for 6 months in 1826, which is called the ‘failure of the federal experiment’ (Villalobos, 1993) 
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subnational levels, not to move towards greater decentralisation; so, nowadays, the Chilean 
state may seem decentralised to some degree but actually that depends on the individuals 
in key positions. One cannot fully assert that the decentralising process in Chile is leading 
to real devolution, as there is the possibility that the central state will step back and reset 
itself on the path of deconcentration in order to strengthen centralisation. Thus, 
administrative decentralisation or deconcentration is not necessarily the prelude for 
political decentralisation or devolution; it could be used for a more efficient centralism. 
Therefore, at least in the Chilean case deconcentration is in a crossroad, from which 
devolution o re-concentration may happen.  
Considering that the Chilean state is ‘comfortable’ being centralised, the question is 
why it is making so much effort to decentralise. Apparently this is because it has been 
accused of inefficiency and it has not been able to respond properly to regional claims. 
There is a permanent tension between Santiago and the regions; the regions complain of 
not being taken into account by the central level, but they do not have the strength to stand 
up to the national authorities and exert pressure for their demands. One goal of 
decentralisation is to improve the decision-making process, so transferring decision-
making to the right level seems to be key. Although, in theory, actors at the national level 
agree in the principle of state subsidiarity, when subnational levels are weak – or become 
weak – the central state’s temptation to interfere reappears. Thus the relationship between 
the central state and the regions is similar to one of a father with his children, in which the 
father is always there as soon as they have a problem. Presidential delegates are the 
personification of this.  
There is also an ongoing tension between SEREMIs and GORE at the regional level 
because sectors work within their own ministerial agenda, which is not discussed - and 
sometimes even not known – with/by GORE. As the sectoral regional investment is larger 
- around 75% of public investment8 - than GORE’s (FNDR), the balance of the power 
between them is uneven, not favouring the latter. Sectors are seen by GORE as institutions 
that interfere from outside following their own agenda when the investment should be 
driven from inside, stemming from the territory itself. Thus GOREs administrate regions, 
but they do not rule them. Therefore tension is produced between sectoral and regional 
interests, which usually ends in Santiago. Strengthening GOREs should assure a better 
coordination of sectors, as they have the tools and power to articulate inter-sectoral work 
within regions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Source: DIPLAD, Region of Tarapacá 2011	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Sectoral deconcentration entails two limitations: sectoral and centralist response of 
the state, that is to say, biased by the perspective of each sector and with the influence of 
the central state. Furthermore, it can be said that the central state has adopted 
deconcentration in order to improve centralised mechanisms. However, the worse peril of 
this limited decentralisation is that in the event of a government with a more centralist and 
authoritarian vision, it could step back and re-centralisation could be done without moving 
a comma in the law. In other words, political decentralisation steps take years in congress 
and longer to be implemented, but a step back could be immediate. The above would be 
avoided by having strong and empowered regional governments and a national strategy for 
decentralisation, which are the aims of SUBDERE. Although GOREs are under the 
supervision of SUBDERE, they have a holistic perspective that puts them to be in a better 
position to take decisions regarding their region. Despite this, the definition of a structure 
in which the regional government is an autonomous entity with authorities elected by 
popular vote is fundamental in order for regions to generate integrated responses for 
themselves. 
However, legal reforms by themselves are not enough to produce the filling-in of 
regional institutions, to make them powerful and able to negotiate from a more balanced 
position with the national level. It is necessary that those institutions demonstrate their 
capacity to fulfil the functions transferred.  
Political decentralisation also improves participation and strengthens democracy, 
with the regions being protagonists of their own destiny and playing an active part in the 
decision-making processes. On the other hand, opponents fear that decentralisation might 
lead toward caudillism, corruption and incompetence. However, supporters remark that 
although the former could be a problem, they might be avoided with strong democratic 
control. As for regional incompetence, interviewees point out that this is due to the lack of 
expertise, derived from a small regional population, which can be improved by attracting 
personnel from elsewhere. Therefore, decentralisation is seen as a path toward greater 
autonomy and leadership of the regions and their institutions; however some negative 
elements have also been raised such as the prevalence of political parties or economic 
elites’ interests.  
SUBDERE assumed an inflection towards further decentralisation and understands 
decentralisation as a change in the power relationship between the central state and the 
regions (Boisier, 2003; Montecinos, 2005). Thus, the main structure of the state remains 
the same; what changes is the role of the subnational institutions (Eaton, 2004) and their 
relationship with the central state. Decentralisation does not weaken the state but changes 
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its internal relations and as a consequence the relation of the state with society; therefore 
the primacy of the state not only remains but is also strengthened by its subnational levels.  
Although deconcentration is a first step towards political decentralisation, in the 
current state of art, SEREMIs may re-concentrate power; hence administrative 
decentralisation is not a decisive step, but an inflection point from which both can happen: 
further decentralisation or re-concentration. While the Intendente is not elected and his/her 
autonomous role is not defined by legislation, Chile will continue with a decentralisation 
that promises all on paper but in practice is almost schizophrenic, with state personnel and 
authorities having duplicate bosses – regional and sectoral – and an Intendente who is 
unable to fulfil the different roles he/she has. 
 
Valparaíso and Tarapacá:  comparison of regional responses 
 
There is not much difference between these regions in their appreciations and 
understandings of decentralisation, Valparaíso and Tarapacá share the same desire for 
more autonomy, but they differ in the emphasis of this desire. Valparaíso seems to be more 
conservative, highlighting that Chile is first of all a unitary state and that there is no strong 
tension between the capital and the regions; on the other hand, Tarapacá uses a more 
passionate and extreme language, often using the word ‘federalism’ and, also, showing a 
degree of animosity towards the capital. This difference reflects contrasting regional 
identities; while Valparaíso shares the same history and culture of the Central Zone with 
Santiago; Tarapacá is located in the far north with a different historical and cultural 
background. This also seems to foster the lack of confidence in decentralisation due to 
Tarapacá usually distrusting any policy coming from the national level. Interviewees from 
Valparaíso share the centralist point of view of decentralisation with the central level, so 
they often express the view that decentralisation is more important for peripheral regions. 
Paradoxically, even though Tarapacá desires more autonomy, there is more resistance there 
to the process than in Valparaíso. 
Participants from both regions, Valparaíso and Tarapacá, blame national politicians 
for their lack of will toward decentralisation, because of their reluctance to share power 
and their lack of confidence in regional capacities. While power seems to be the main topic 
within Congress, distrust in the capacities of the regions seems to be the main issue within 
the Executive. 
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OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
 
In wider terms, the main goal of this thesis is to have a better understanding of 
decentralisation processes, which resulted in the identification of three main issues within 
any decentralising process: the role of the key actors – as institutions and as individuals -, 
the power relationships within, between and among actors, and the administrative 
decentralisation as an inflection point to increase decentralisation or to exert more power 
over subnational levels.  
Actors are directly involved in decision-making process and the implementation of 
decentralisation, therefore their interpretations shape the production of policies and affect 
the implementation of them. Although there is a wide range of literature dedicated to the 
role of actors in policy-making (see Jones et al, 2004; Theodore and Peck, 2010), there is 
still scope for addressing issues of personal motivations – e.g. personal beliefs or interests 
such as animosity against the centre or the desire to achieve certain goals – that can hinder 
or smooth over the shaping, design and implementation of certain policies. This could be 
explored in further researches as a main research question in order to enrich the academic 
debate from other perspectives of the issue. Philosophical discourses influence actors 
establishing the theoretical frame in which decentralisation is applied. The position of 
actors and the political conjuncture are essential when analysing the motivations for certain 
decisions/actions and when assessing the outcomes of certain policies. Individuals’ 
disposition towards decentralising policies is another element to considerer, as some can be 
quite proactive and willing to go forward, while others can actively or passively resist 
changes. 
The power relationships between levels reflect the degree of decentralisation of a 
certain territory, as they define what decisions are made in each level. Throughout this 
research power has been analysed from its conventional perspective: instrumental and 
associational (Allen, 2003) as the central level makes decisions and acts accordingly – 
power over -, and also when informal relations within the state allows the emergence of 
collaborative practices – power to. Decentralisation should tend towards state subsidiarity, 
so decisions would be made at the most appropriate scale. Power relations can be analysed 
from two points of view: formal and informal channels. Formal relations are usually 
defined by the legal framework, while the informal relations depend on the skills, 
experience and expertise of the actors involved – e.g. Inter-institutional teams can be a 
powerful tool when they are well coordinated.  
The research has shown that the three points discussed by Cumbers and Mackinnon 
(2010) – power as a capacity, historical sedimentation and agency – are fundamental to the 
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understanding of power relations within the Chilean state structure, and therefore the 
implementation of decentralisation. The central state in Chile can only be explained 
through its construction and evolution under the Portalian ideas and the interest to maintain 
and reproduce power relations, and particularly the privilege role of the traditional elites – 
in the past – and the new economic actors – in the present. This means that the central state 
is by default the driving agent of any policy implemented in the country – e.g. 
neoliberalism and regionalism were imposed in top-down ways in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Finally, there is still place to delimitate the conceptualisation of deconcentration as a 
first step towards political decentralisation or as a separate concept, as in the literature the 
term is treated ambiguously, giving space for both interpretations. Montecinos (2005) in 
his definition of decentralisation incorporates the administrative stage as part of the 
process, making no further distinction with political decentralisation (see chapter II). In 
this research deconcentration was analysed as an early stage of decentralisation – 
administrative - following the example of several authors such as Bhardan (2002) and 
Boisier (2003); however, the Chilean case demonstrated that that assumption is not totally 
valid, as the administrative decentralisation can be used as a platform towards greater 
decentralisation or towards more efficient re-centralisation. Thus administrative 
decentralisation or deconcentration is an inflection point from which is possible to reach 
political decentralisation, or it can be used to exert more control over the territories, and so 
extend a more effective centralism. Therefore, deconcentration should be considered as an 
independent process, although bound to political decentralisation when the conditions are 
favourable. Administrative decentralisation has been long studied as an early stage of 
decentralisation (Conyers, 1983; Burns et al, 1994; Keating, 1998; Finot, 2001a; Bhardan, 
2002; Boisier, 2003; Montecinos, 2005; and so on) because it allows the creation of a 
subnational structure that at some point could be autonomous from the central state. 
However, if these structures are unable to separate themselves from the central body, then 
the central state can interfere in the subnational affairs – i.e. the central state has more 
presence in the territory, has more information from subnational levels and can make 
decisions on subnational matters. This is also fundamental when assessing decentralising 
measures because administrative decentralisation does not necessary mean a first step 
towards political decentralisation, it can be use to reinforce the political power of the 
central structure. Therefore, a country with a strong focus on deconcentration is not 
necessarily a decentralised country.  
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CONTRIBUTIONS AND FURTHER STEPS 
 
The results of this research contribute to both theoretical and practical 
understandings of decentralisation. Although the three conceptual pillars of this research – 
decentralisation, power and the state - have remained mainly unscathed, the research has 
brought a better understanding of the decentralising stages identified in Chapter II. 
Deconcentration is not necessarily an administrative platform for political decentralisation 
as it can be used to reinforce centralism. The analysis of the struggles of a unitary state 
implementing decentralisation is also valuable, as it introduces new elements to take into 
account and provides insights on the empirical side of the issue, such as the way that 
decisions are passed down from the political to the technical sphere, the formal and 
informal relations between state institutions and the importance of an early inclusion of 
regional actors into the process. 
On the other hand, the analysis of agency towards decentralisation in Chile 
encourages policy-makers and relevant actors to address the decentralisation process there 
from a new perspective: it is essential to take into account the characteristics of the society 
in which reforms are being applied, as the state is a social relation (Jessop, 1997). 
Communication between political and technical staff at regional and national level is also 
essential. The participation of subnational actors would also be considered at an early stage 
of the decision making process. A better understanding of the process should help 
SUBDERE to develop more suitable strategies to implement decentralisation and to 
communicate them to the actors involved more effectively; as a consequence, state 
personnel could improve their performance. Decentralisation cannot be a top-down 
imposed policy, as a legal reform is not powerful enough (De Mattos, 1989) to provoke 
changes in working practices. The process should be participatory and horizontal, 
emphasising the inclusion of as many actors as possible. 
 
Although the results of this research are very interesting, as the decentralising 
process in Chile is far from complete, it is highly recommended to continue the research. 
Firstly, because the first election of regional councillors was on the 13th of November 
2013; secondly because the favourite candidate for president – Michelle Bachelet – has 
included in her Government programme the election of Intendentes; and thirdly because of 
the new composition of Congress – elected on the 13th of November 2013 – which now has 
new faces from the student movement and small parties. This suggests that the reception of 
decentralising reforms could be more favourable within the Congress.  
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Another line of research is the analysis of the experiences of other countries, 
specially regarding the outcomes of administrative decentralisation; this could reveal 
whether the ambiguousness or fragility of deconcentration is just a characteristic of the 
Chilean case – because of its particular history and culture -, or whether it is common in 
other centralist states. I believe that deconcentration should not be called administrative 
decentralisation any more, as this leads to the idea of it being part of a further process of 
decentralisation; this research has proved that deconcentration is not a mandatory step for 
decentralisation. Therefore, there is a need to open the debate on deconcentration, as a 
separate subject - that may or may not lead towards political decentralisation. So far, the 
academic literature has considered it as part of the same broader process, which have led to 
a biased understanding of the issue. Deconcentration has only been studied as an earlier 
stage of decentralisation, and I strongly recommend that a study of it should take into 
account that it can also lead to the opposite outcome: centralism. Therefore, 
deconcentration should be studied further and separately in future researches in order to 
clarify its definition, scope and shape in different political-geographic contexts. 
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INTERVIEW TOPIC’S LIST 
 
 
 
Descentralzación / decentralisation 
 
¿Qué entiende por descentralización? / What do you understand by decentralisation? 
 
¿Cómo se ha construído la decentralisación política en Chile? / How has been built political 
decentralisation in Chile?  
 
¿Ha habido algún cambio de paradigma respecto a la concepción de la descentralización o se 
ha trabajado desde el inicio con la misma idea? ¿Cuáles cambios? ¿Por qué? / Have 
decentralisation experimented paradigm changes in the last 30 years? What changes? Why? 
 
¿Quiénes la han respaldado? ¿Por qué? / Who have been supporting decentralisation 
processes? Why? 
 
¿Cómo ha ido evolucionando el proceso? / How has the process evolved? 
 
¿Cuál ha sido el rol del contexto político chileno en el proceso descentralizador? / What has 
the role of the Chilean political context been in decentralization processes? 
 
¿Cuál ha sido el rol del contexto político económico mundial en los procesos de 
descentralización chilenos? / What has the role of the world political and economic context 
been in decentralisation processes in Chile? 
 
¿Quién lidera los procesos descentralizadores en Chile? / Who leads decentralization 
processes in Chile? 
 
¿Cuáles son los elementos claves en los que se enfocan las estrategias descentralizadoras? / 
What are the key elements where decentralising strategies are focus on? 
 
¿En qué etapa de descentralización nos encontramos? / In what stage of decentralization is 
Chile nowadays? 
 
¿El discurso descentralizador es real o es sólo una pantalla? / Is decentralising discourse real 
or it is a screen to seem a decentralised country? 
 
¿Cuáles son los principales obstáculos que enfrenta el país en materias de descentralización 
política? / Which are the main difficulties that face the country in political decentralisation 
issues? 
 
¿En qué estamos? / What is the current situation? 
 
¿Cuáles son los desafíos futuros? / What are the future challenges? 
¿Cuál es la imagen político administrativa del país que estamos construyendo? / Which is the 
political-administrative image that the country is building? 
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¿Qué se está haciendo para llegar a esa meta? ¿Qué falta? / What is the country doing to 
achieve this goal? 
 
¿Por qué es tan importante la descentralización, que se busca con ella? / Why 
decentralization? For what? 
 
¿Cómo se manejan las estrategias descentralisadoras en la eventualidad de un cambio de 
gobierno hacia la derecha? / What will happen with decentralising measures if there is a 
change of government coalition in December? 
 
¿De qué manera los procesos descentralizadores fortalecen al país? / How decentralising 
processes might strength the country? 
 
¿Estamos preparados como país para estos cambios? / Are we prepared for these changes? 
 
¿Hay voluntad de descentralizar? / There is will towards decentralisation? 
 
¿Las regiones se quieren descentralizar? Hasta cuando? / There is a regional desire for 
decentralisation? To what extent? 
 
 
Relaciones de poder / Power relations 
 
¿Quién toma las decisiones en cada región? / Who make decisions in the region? 
 
¿Cuáles son los elementos a considerar en la toma de decisiones en las regiones? / What are 
the elements that are considered in decision-making process in the regions? 
 
¿Quiénes son los llamados a la mesa a la hora de tomar decisiones regionales? / Who are 
included in regional decision making process? 
 
¿Cuál es el proceso aprobatorio de las decisiones regionales? / How is the approval system of 
regional decisions? 
 
Todas las decisiones regionales son ratificadas por el nivel central? ¿Cuales? ¿Cómo? / The 
regional decisions are ratified by central government? Which ones? How? 
 
Si es así, esta ratificación es de carácter simbólico o real? ¿O depende de las voluntades de 
turno? / Is this a simbolic ratification or real? It depends of the authority will? 
 
¿Cuán libres son los políticos regionales (COREs, principalmente) de tomar decisiones 
cuando están representando, en su mayoría, los intereses de partidos nacionales con sede y 
agendas generadas en el nivel central? / How free are regional politicians (regional 
councillors for example) to make decisions when they are subordinated to national parties? 
 
¿Ha habido conflictos de poder entre niveles? / What kind of conflicts they have had to face? 
 
¿Quién toma en última instancia las decisiones? / Who is making decisions? 
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Cuán autonomas son las SEREMIs a la hora de tomar sus propias decisiones? / To what 
extent SEREMIs are autonomous when making decisions? 
 
¿Cómo es visto el nivel central? ¿Un socio, un papá? / How the central level is seen by the 
regions? As a partner, as a father…? 
 
¿Cómo es la relación entre el nivel central y las regions, por ministerio y a nivel de gobierno? 
/ How is the relationship between the central and the regional level, within the ministries and 
from the government perspective? 
 
¿Priman las decisiones técnicas o políticas? / What prevails: technical or political decisions? 
 
¿Cómo son las relaciones de poder dentro de una institución?  
 
¿Cómo funciona la SEREMI de Vivienda: vertical o transversal? / How are the relationships 
within SEREMI MINVU: vertical or horizontal? 
 
¿Cómo funciona la SERPLAC: vertical o transversal? / How are the relationships within 
SERPLAC: vertical or horizontal? 
 
Cual es el rol de los partidos políticos en la toma de decisiones regionales / what is the role of 
political parties on regional decisions? 
 
Cómo se ve la gran cantidad de cargos de confianza que hay dentro del aparato estatal / How 
are seen the many political appointee position within the state apparatus? 
 
 
DIPLAD 
 
¿Qué se busca lograr con la creación de la DIPLAD? / What is the goal of DIPLAD? 
 
¿Cuál es el rol de la DIPLAD dentro del Gobierno Regional / What is the role of DIPLAD 
within the Regional Government? 
 
¿Cómo se produjo el traspaso de funciones MINVU – GORE? / How was the transference of 
functions from MINVU to the Regional Government? 
 
¿Cómo se produjo el traspaso de funciones MIDEPLEN – GORE? / How was the 
transference of functions from MIDEPLAN to the Regional Government? 
 
¿Cuáles son los beneficios y desafíos de este traspaso de funciones? / Which are the benefits 
and challenges of this transfer? 
 
A 3 años aprox de estar funcionando estas oficinas, ¿cómo ha sido el trabajo desempeñado en 
la DIPLAD? / after 3 years app, how are DIPLADs working? 
 
¿Qué dificultades han tenido que enfrentar en términos de relaciones con los otros servicios? / 
What difficulties have they faced in their relationship with the others regional institutions? 
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¿Cuán autónomas son las DIPLADs del nivel central? / How much autonomy have DIPLADs 
from the central level? 
 
¿Cómo son los procesos aprobatorios de la EDR y el PROT? / How are the approval system 
of EDR and PROT? 
 
¿Cuáles son los logros alcanzados hasta este momento? / What are the achievements of 
DIPLAD so far? 
 
¿Cuáles son las metas a corto, mediano y largo plazo de la DIPLAD? / What are the goals of 
DIPLAD in short and middle term? 
 
¿Cuál es el rol de la DIPLAD en la generación de las políticas regionales? ¿Es un mero 
observador o tiene una presencia activa? / What is the role of DIPLAD in the design of 
regional policies? 
 
¿Cómo es visto que las DIPLADs hagan las EDRs y PROTs? / how is seen that the EDR and 
PROT are made in DIPLADs now? 
 
¿Cómo son percibidas las DIPLADs? Dentro del GORE, por la SUBDERE y por los otros 
servicios? / What is the perception about DIPLADs from the Regional Government, 
SUBDERE and the other public services? 
 
¿Cómo es la relación DIPLAD-SUBDERE? / How is the relationship between DIPLAD and 
SUBDERE? 
 
¿Cómo es la relación DIPLAD-CORE? / How is the relationship between DIPLAD and 
CORE? 
 
 
Gobierno Regional / Regional Government 
 
 
¿Cuál es el rol del Intendente? / What is the role of the Intendente? 
 
¿Cuál es el rol del Consejo Regional dentro de los procesos regionales? / What is the role of 
the Regional Council? 
 
¿Qué elementos positivos y/o negativos tiene la elección directa de los Consejeros 
Regionales? / what positive and/or negative elements has the direct eection of regional 
councillors? 
 
¿Hay apoyo para el empoderamiento de los gobiernos regionales? ¿De quienes? / Is there 
support for the empowerment of regional governments? From who? 
 
¿La elección directa de los consejeros regionales es una medida efectiva para aumentar la 
descentralización o es un volador de luces? / Is the direct election of regional councillors an 
effective measure towards decentralisation or it is a diversion? 
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¿Cómo es la relación entre servicios dentro de la región? / How is the relationship between 
the regional services? 
 
¿Cómo es la relación de GORE con los otros servicios (nivel central y regional)? / How is the 
relationship between the regional Government and other services – at national ad regional 
level? 
 
¿Por qué la elección directa de los COREs es vista como un paso hacia la descentralización, si 
el Consejo mantiene sus mismas funciones y modo de operar? / Why the direct election of 
regional councillors is seen as a step towards decentralisation when the Council keeps the 
same functions and working procedures? 
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 Tramitación Informes Oficios Indicaciones Comparados Urgencias Materias
Boletín 7923-06 Volver
Título: Establece elección directa de los Consejeros Regionales.
Fecha de
Ingreso: Lunes 12 de Septiembre, 2011
Urgencia
Actual: Discusión inmediata
Cámara de
Origen: C.Diputados Iniciativa: Mensaje
Tipo de
Proyecto: Proyecto de ley Refundido:
Etapa: Tramitación terminada   
Ley Nº 20.678 (Diario Oficial del
19/06/2013)   
Sesión/Leg. Fecha Subetapa Etapa
 12/09/2011 Ingreso de proyecto . Primer trámite constitucional /C.Diputados
82 / 359 12/09/2011 Cuenta de proyecto . Pasa a Comisión de GobiernoInterior y Regionalización
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
92 / 359 06/10/2011 Cuenta del Mensaje 419-359 que hace presente laurgencia Simple
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
102 / 359 02/11/2011 Cuenta del Mensaje 432-359 que hace presente laurgencia Simple
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
120 / 359 13/12/2011 Cuenta del Mensaje 481-359 que hace presente laurgencia Simple
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
132 / 359 12/01/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 551-359 que hace presente laurgencia Simple
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
140 / 359 06/03/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 578-359 que retira la urgenciaspor receso legislativo
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
140 / 359 06/03/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 603-359 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
6 / 360 21/03/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 22-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
10 / 360 04/04/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 38-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
18 / 360 18/04/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 71-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
21 / 360 03/05/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 86-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
31 / 360 22/05/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 116-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
33 / 360 23/05/2012 Oficio N°93-360. Oficio de S.E. el Presidente de laRepública por el cual formula indicaciones al proyecto.
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
38 / 360 06/06/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 138-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
39 / 360 06/06/2012 Primer informe de comisión de Gobierno Interior yRegionalización. Pasa a Comisión de Hacienda
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
47 / 360 21/06/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 169-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
51 / 360 05/07/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 188-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
60 / 360 19/07/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 207-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
65 / 360 02/08/2012 Oficio N°180-360. Oficio de S.E. el Presidente de laRepública por el cual formula indicación al proyecto.
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
65 / 360 02/08/2012 Cuenta del Mensaje 227-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
 06/08/2012 Primer informe de comisión de Hacienda. Primer trámite constitucional /
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C.Diputados
69 / 360 09/08/2012 Cuenta de primer informe de comisión . Primer trámite constitucional /C.Diputados
71 / 360 14/08/2012 Discusión general . Aprobado en general Primer trámite constitucional /C.Diputados
 15/01/2013 Oficio N°506-360. Oficio de S. E. el Presidente de laRepública por la cual formula incicaciones al proyecto. Tramitación terminada /
125 / 360 15/01/2013 Cuenta del Mensaje 440-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
126 / 360 15/01/2013 Oficio N°506-360. Oficio de S.E. el Presidente de laRepública por el cual formula indicaciones al proyecto.
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
 18/01/2013 Segundo informe de comisión de Gobierno Interior yRegionalización.
Primer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
130 / 360 22/01/2013 Cuenta de segundo informe de comisión . Primer trámite constitucional /C.Diputados
130 / 360 22/01/2013 Discusión particular . Aprobado Primer trámite constitucional /C.Diputados
 22/01/2013 Oficio de ley a Cámara Revisora . Primer trámite constitucional /C.Diputados
98 / 360 23/01/2013
Cuenta de proyecto . Pasa a Comisión de Gobierno,
Descentralización y Regionalización, y a la de
Hacienda, en su caso.
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
100 / 360 05/03/2013 Cuenta del Mensaje 462-360 que retira la urgenciaSuma
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
100 / 360 05/03/2013 Cuenta del Mensaje 467-360 que hace presente laurgencia Suma
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
 11/03/2013 Primer informe de comisión de Gobierno,Descentralización y Regionalización.
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
1 / 361 12/03/2013 Cuenta de primer informe de comisión . Segundo trámite constitucional /Senado
7 / 361 02/04/2013
Cuenta del Mensaje 28-361 que retira y hace presente
la urgencia Suma
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
7 / 361 02/04/2013 Discusión general . Aprobado en general Se fija comoplazo para presentar indicaciones el 15/04/2013
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
 15/04/2013 Boletín de indicaciones . Segundo trámite constitucional /Senado
 17/04/2013
Nuevo plazo para indicaciones. Se ampl&iacute;a
plazo para presentar indicaciones hasta el 29/04/2013
a las 12:00 en la Secretaría de la Comisión de
Gobierno, Descentralización y Regionalización
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
17 / 361 17/04/2013 Cuenta del Mensaje 64-361 que retira y hace presentela urgencia Suma
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
18 / 361 30/04/2013 Cuenta del Mensaje 76-361 que hace presente laurgencia de Discusión Inmediata
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
21 / 361 08/05/2013 Cuenta del Mensaje 90-361 que retira y hace presentela urgencia Discusión inmediata
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
 14/05/2013 Segundo informe de comisión de Gobierno,Descentralización y Regionalización.
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
 14/05/2013 Primer informe de comisión de Hacienda. Segundo trámite constitucional /Senado
23 / 361 14/05/2013 Cuenta de segundo informe de comisión . Cuentainforme comisión de Hacienda.
Segundo trámite constitucional /
Senado
23 / 361 14/05/2013 Discusión particular . Aprobado con modificaciones Segundo trámite constitucional /Senado
 14/05/2013 Oficio modificaciones a Cámara de Origen . Segundo trámite constitucional /Senado
28 / 361 15/05/2013 Cuenta oficio con modificaciones de Cámara Revisora. Queda para tabla
Tercer trámite constitucional /
C.Diputados
28 / 361 15/05/2013 Discusión única . Aprobadas las modificaciones Tercer trámite constitucional /C.Diputados
 15/05/2013
Oficio aprobación de modificaciones a Cámara
Revisora . Oficio N°10.727 al H. Senado, que Tercer trámite constitucional /
07/10/2013 17:06
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comunica aprobacion de modificaciones. C.Diputados
 15/05/2013 Oficio de ley al Ejecutivo . Tercer trámite constitucional /C.Diputados
30 / 361 22/05/2013
Oficio N°105-361. Oficio de S. E. el Presidente de la
República por el cual comunica que ha resuelto no
hacer uso de la facultad que le confiere el inciso
primero del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política de la
República respecto del proyecto.
Trámite de aprobacion presidencial /
C.Diputados
 22/05/2013 Oficio N°10.744 al Tribunal Constitucional Trámite de aprobacion presidencial /C.Diputados
26 / 361 22/05/2013 Cuenta oficio N° 10.727, que comunica aprobacion demodificaciones
Tercer trámite constitucional /
Senado
34 / 361 05/06/2013 Cuenta oficio N° 8670 del Tribunal Constitucional Trámite de aprobacion presidencial /C.Diputados
 06/06/2013 Oficio N°10.770. Oficio para promulgación alPresidente de la República.
Trámite de aprobacion presidencial /
C.Diputados
